

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CUREAU DE LA
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
THE ART
HOW TO KNOW
MEN.

THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

46418

Originally written,

By the Sieur *DE LA CHAMBRE*, *Counsellour* to His Majesty of *France*, and Physician in Ordinary.

Rendred into English

By *JOHN DAVIES* of *Kidwelly*.

Licensed, March 2. 166⅘.

ROGER L'ESTRANGE.

LONDON,

[illegible] by *T.R.* for *Thomas Dring* at the [illegible]*ge* in *Fleetstreet*, neer *Cliffords-Inn*. M.DC.LXV.

WELLCOME

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES

EARL of *CARLISLE*, Vicount HOVVARD of *Morpeth*, Baron *Dacre* of *Gilsland*, Lord Lieutenant of *Westmerland* and *Cumberland*, and one of His Majesties most honourable Privy-Council.

MY LORD,

IF *the Present your Lordship here receives be consider'd only according to its bulk, I must,*

no doubt, lie open to the reproach of offering so mean a Sacrifice, at the Shrine of so noble a Name. But if the excellency of the Subject treated of be put into the other Scale, with this allowance, that whatever is offer'd derives its merit from the sincerity and devotion of the Offerer, I may more rationally hope the acceptance, than fear the rejection of it.

Your Lordship will find, in this small Treatise, the Frontispiece, or first Draught, of the boldest design that, haply, was ever undertaken in the Empire of Learning, to wit, THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN; *an Art, com-*

comprehending what ever contributes to the discovery of their most secret Inclinations, the Motions of their Souls, their Vertues and their Vices; an Art, which, if well studied, will bring to those who shall attain it, answerably to their several qualifications, the greatest satisfaction and advantages imaginable.

For what greater can any one man frame to himself, than those, which accrue from his knowledge of another, even though they move in the meanest station of Affairs? But if those are so considerable, how much more must they be, which are made by persons en-

trusted with the management of Embassies, and the most important Transactions of Crowns and Scepters, and consequently, oblig'd to treat with People of different Tempers and Climates? In these last it suffices not, to be guided by those common observations and characters of men, which are obvious to the Populace, and commonly mask'd and disguiz'd; but the grand secret is, to penetrate into the Closets, and insinuate into the very bosoms, of Princes and Favourites.

And this consideration it was, which the more inclin'd me, to make a particular dedication of this

this Labour of mine to your Lordſhips patronage. For whom could I expect more favourable to the ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, than One, who had ſo lately ſatisfy'd the world, how well he had ſtudied it before? From whom could that Art look for a kinder reception, than from one who had ſhewn himſelf ſo much a Maſter of it, in carrying on a Negotiation, which led him, from the moſt, to the leaſt-civiliz'd extremities of Chriſtendom?

Your Lordſhip might here expect I ſhould give ſome account of my Author, the Advancer of this ſo excellent and beneficial an Art;

but

but I refer what I have to say of him to another place, concluding here, after I have begg'd your Lordship's pardon for the rudeness of this Address, with an assurance, that it is made with the greatest respects and submissions, and, consequently, that I am,

Right Honourable,

Your Lordship's most humble,

and most obedient Servant,

J. Davies.

AN

Accompt of the AUTHOR, *taken out of the Hiſtory of the* French Academy, *Printed at* London, *in the year* M. DC. LVII. *Pag.* 229.

THE Author of that Hiſtory, being to give an accompt of the firſt ſetling and advancement of the Academy, to that time, thought fit, towards the end of his Work, to ſet down a Catalogue of the Members of it, of which number our Author being one, I find this ſaid of him, being the ſixth nam'd in the Catalogue.

MARIN CUREAU DE LA CHAMBRE, Counſellor to the King in his Councils, and his Phyſician in Ordinary, born at Mans. *His Works in Print are,* New Conjectures about Digeſtion. New Conjectures concerning the Cauſes of Light; the Overflowing of the Nile; *and* the Love of Inclination. The Characters of the Paſſions, *in two Volumes.* A Treatiſe of the Underſtanding

ſtanding of Beaſts. New Obſervations and Conjectures about the Rainbow. *If he perfect what he hath begun, we ſhall have* a Continuation of the Characters of the Paſſions; A Treatiſe of Man's Beauty; *Another*, Of the Nature and Diſpoſitions of Nations, and *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN. He hath tranſlated into* French, *the* Eight Books of *ARISTOTLE*'s Phyſicks, *which are not Printed*; *and he gives us hopes, ere long, of* a Commentary on the Aphoriſms of *Hippocrates, which he calls* Uſus Aphoriſmorum; *his deſign is, after he hath ſet down* Hippocrates's *meaning in each Aphoriſm, to apply it to other Subjects, and ſhew all the Uſes which may be made of it.* Thus farr the Author of the Hiſtory. It is very probable, that, not only thoſe Pieces here mention'd of his, but alſo divers others are ſince Printed, in ſeveral Languages. Of which we ſhall forbear to give any further, ſince we cannot give an exact accompt.

TO

TO

The very Worthy *Tranſlator*
of this Exquiſite Piece,

THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

THere are various kinds of *KNOWLEDG* that belong to Man, The chiefeſt of all is, To know his *Creator*; The ſecond, to know *Himſelf*; The third, to know his *Fellow-Creatures*, eſpecially, for *Man to know Man*.

Touching the firſt, 'Tis ſo ſublime, and tranſcendent a Speculation, that, though the greateſt Theoriſts have ſcru'd up their Wits to the higheſt Pin, yet, the further they ſoar'd, the more they were at a loſs; For there is no Finite Intellect can frame a *Quidditative* apprehenſion of God; There may be *Negative* conceptions of Him, as to think he is Immenſe, Infinite, Immortal, *&c.* Or there may be Relative Expreſſions of Him, as when we call Him Creator, King, and Conſervator of all things, *&c.* Or, He may be

be describ'd by an accumulation of Epithets, as Almighty, Mercifull, Just, and by the *Abstracts* thereof, *&c.* But for a comprehensive *Quiddity* of His Essence, it cannot fal under the capacity of any created power; In so much that the Dedication inscrib'd upon the Greek Altar, Τῷ Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, *To the Unknown God*, may, in a *sane sense*, carry with it a holy kind of Admiration and Modesty, rather than Ignorance.

Concerning the second, It was the Motto, which the greatest Philosopher fix'd upon the portal of his School, γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, *Know thy self*; And one would think that every one is near enough to attain this knowledg, yet 'tis observ'd, that not one Physician among twenty, will venture to minister himself Physick, when he is dangerously sick; And touching the *Mind*, every Man commonly looks upon himself through a Magnifying-glass, so that he cannot behold his true proportion.

Touching the last, *viz.* for knowing our *Fellow-Creatures*, we have been near upon six thousand years in study of it, yet, if what *we know* all this while were cast in to counterballance with what *we know not*, 'tis thought the scale of *Ignorance* would outweigh that of *Knowledg*.

But

But for *Man to know Man*, which is the Subject of this Treatiſe, it is an Art as full of incertitude as any; The lineaments of the Face, and lines of the Hands, are not ſtreight enough to lead us unto it, though *Vultus* be *Index Animi*, though the Eyes be as the Caſements of the Soul, yet, many times they prove falſe Glaſſes; though (as the *Turk* believes) every Man's Fate and Fancy be written in his Forehead, yet the letters are ſo obſcure, that we canot read them; and the Poet tells us,

Fronti nulla fid es. ——

Indeed, the probableſt way to get this Art, is by Converſation, and Diſcourſe, according to the *Italian* Proverb, *A Roma ti viddi, a Venetia ti conobbi*, I ſaw thee *at* Rome, *I knew thee at* Venice; which made the Philoſopher ſay to a man who had a promiſing Face of Wiſdom, *I thought thee wiſe, till I heard thee ſpeak.*

This Sagacious and ſharp-ſighted *Author*, hath gone very farr in this Art, as appears in this Diſcourſe, and in other acute Notions that I have read of His, which ſhew him to be full of *penſees deſliees:* Moreover, I had the good hap, and occaſion to know Him, and converſe with Him in *Paris*; and truly I believe, He may well be ranked among

among the Philosophers of the *Upper House* which this Age affords; Therefore Sir, besides your great *Ingenuity*, you discover also much *Judgment* in the Election of your *Authors*, who are much oblig'd to you, for your exact fidelity in rendring them; And consequently, it may well be said, that *You* have attain'd the *Art* of knowing Men, by penetrating the true sence, and very Souls of those *Authors* you deal withall.

JAM. HOWEL.

THE

THE PREFACE.

Wherein is treated of the Excellency of the *ART HOW TO KNOW MEN*, and of the Author's Design.

IT was a groundless complaint of him, who wish'd Nature had plac'd a window before mens hearts, that their thoughts and secret designs might be seen. There was, I say, no reason for that complaint, not only, in regard those are not things which fall under the Senses, and that though the eyes saw the very bottom, and all the windings & turnings of the heart, yet could they not observe any thing therein, from whence they might derive the least knowledge of it: but also, in

as much as Nature hath made other provision for this discovery, and found out more certain means to make it, then would have been that strange openness, which Momus *imagin'd to himself.*

For she hath not only bestow'd on Man voice and tongue, to be the interpreters of his thoughts; But out of a certain distrust she conceiv'd, that he might abuse them, she hath contriv'd a language in his forehead and eyes, to give the others the Lye, in case they should not prove faithful. In a word, she hath expos'd his soul, to be observ'd on the out-side, so that there is no necessity of any window, to see his Motions, Inclinations, and Habits, since they are apparent in his face, and are there written in such visible and manifest characters.

From these characters, it is our design to frame the greatest and most advantageous work, that haply was ever undertaken; a work,

work, wherein the Nobleſt and moſt neceſſary diſcoveries of knowledg, which Man can arrive unto, are contained; in fine, a work, wherein may be found the ſecret and perfection of Wiſdom *and humane* Prudence.

Theſe great promiſes will be thought the more attainable, when it ſhall be known, that what we undertake is THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, an Art whereby every man is taught to know himſelf, *wherein conſiſts the higheſt point of* Wiſdom; *and withall to know* others, *which is the Maſter-piece of* Prudence.

The ſecret of Wiſdom conſiſts in this, that a man knows what he is himſelf, what he may do, and what he ought to do; and that of Prudence, in knowing alſo what others are, what they may do, and what they are deſirous to do. Can any knowledg be more delightful or more profitable then theſe?

And may not he, who hath acquir'd them, justly pretend to the acquisition of the greatest advantages of this life.

Now the Art of Knowing Man *teaches all these things: For though it seems to have no other end, then to discover the Inclinations, the Motions of the Soul, the Vertues & Vices, which are observable in others; yet does it, with the same labour, teach every one to find them out in himself, and to deduce more rational and more impartial judgments thereof, then if he first considered them in his own person.*

For it is most certain, that we cannot by our selves come to a perfect knowledge of our selves: and our Souls may, in that respect, be compar'd to our Faces, inasmuch as the former, as well as the latter, can only view themselvs in Mirrours. If she attempts the beholding of herself, the trouble she is at in that self-reflection distracts and wearies her,

her, and self-love corrupts, and poysons, all the judgments she makes of her-self.

For instance, a person transported with Anger cannot make any just judgment of his passion, which, how furious soever it may be, still thinks that all the reason and justice is of its side. A covetous person thinks his most sordid cares the effects of Prudence and Necessity. In a word, all our Inclinations and Habits please and humour us, all our Passions seem rational to us. Who therefore could be sensible of them, much less condemn them, having the recommendation of pleasure, & being maintain'd by an appearance of Reason, which are the two greatest corrupters of our sentiments? To apprehend therefore their imperfections, it is requisite we saw them in another, that being a glass which flatters not; and though those we make use of do represent such Inages as are immediately blotted out of the memory,

the case is not the same with this, which makes constant and permanent draughts, the remembrance whereof is not easily lost. In fine, it is a thing out of all dispute, that there is no better way for a man to come to the knowledg of himself, then by studying that knowledg in others.

Thus is it then, that the Art, we teach, is able to bring a man to the knowledg of himself. But inasmuch as there are two kinds thereof, one Physical *and* Natural, *which examines the composition of Man, the nature of the Soul's faculties, and the admirable Oeconomy observable in their functions; the other,* Moral, *which relates to Morality, and makes a discovery of the Inclinations, Passions, and Vices: it must be acknowledg'd that it undertakes not to give an account of the former, to the utmost extent it is capable of, but leaves the absolute and exact disquisition thereof, to Medicine and Philosophy.*

But

But being oblig'd to make the ſtricteſt examination of things relating to Manners, *it is impoſſible, but that, enquiring into their cauſes, and the manner whereby they are framed in the Soul, there falls within its deſign the nobleſt and moſt intricate part of Phyſick or natural Philoſophy, and, treating of the conformation of parts, the temperaments Spirits, Humours, Inclinations, Paſſions, and Habits, It ſhould not diſcover what is moſt ſecret, in Body and Soul.*

Nay, I have this further to affirm, that by all theſe diſcoveries of Knowledg, it elevates the ſpirit of Man, to the Soveraign Creator of the Univerſe. For, acquainting it with the infinite miracles remarkable in Man, it inſenſibly inclines him to glorify the Author of ſo many wonders, and, by that means, directs him to the end, whereto he is deſign'd.

For ſhould he conſider only the ſtructure

of Man's body, how can he forbear being ravisht with astonishment, to see the order and symmetry of all the springs and Ressorts, *from which this admirable Machine derives its motion? And the unimitable Art which is concealed therein, would it not discover to him the hand that was employed about it, and the understanding and design of the great Master, whose work it is?*

But if he would raise his thoughts yet a little higher, and make a privy-search into the secrets of the Soul, to find out, there, the manner whereby she comes to the knowledge of things, how she moves, and how many several motions she assigns her-self; What excess of ravishment would not the knowledge of so many miraculous operations cause in him? What sentiments would he not have of the Goodness and Wisdom of God, who hath lodg'd so many vertues, in so small a space, and not only epitomiz'd all the creatures

tures in Man, but would also make in him an abbreviation of himself?

For, not to enter into any discourse of our ineffable Mysteries, & keep within the bounds of Nature, the Inclination he hath infus'd into him towards all sorts of good things, the Light, wherewith he hath illuminated him, in order to the knowledge of all things, are they not the effusions of his infinite Goodness and Wisdom? But what is yet more astonishing, hath he not enclos'd within the spirit of Man, which hath its limits and boundaries, the whole extent and infinity of his Power? And by a miracle which is hardly conceivable, hath he not invested him with a power of creating all things as himself? For if the understanding produces, and, in a manner, creates the images and representations of those things which it knows, it must needs follow, since it hath the power to know them all, that it also, according to its man-

ner

ner, creates them all, and consequently that it is the Creator of a new world, or at least the Copist, or after-drawer of all the works of God. It must be so, inasmuch as when it thinks on the Sun, it cannot do so without making, at the same time, another Sun in it self. By the same rule it makes also Starrs, Heaven, Elements, in a word, whatsoever is in the Universe.

But if God hath wrought one miracle by bestowing an infinite power on a limited thing he hath also done another, in joyning greatness and power, with misery and weakness. For it is certain, that of all the Creatures, there is not any subject to such a multitude of miseries and infirmities as Man: Nay, these are raisd even out of his advantages, and if he had not that pregnancy of wit, and the delicate composure of body which he hath, he would not be so unfortunate and miserable, as he is. So that it may be said, by instancing him

him alone, we may decide that famous Probleme, which hath been so often propos'd, to wit, What thing is that in the world, which is, at the same time, both the greatest and least?

He therefore is only to contemplate himself who would enter into the knowledg he ought to have of the Divinity, and there he will find eternal subjects of the praises, and respects, and thanksgivings, which he is oblig'd to render upon all occasions, and at all times.

These are the high Lessons which may be learn'd by the ART HOW TO KNOW MEN. But when it shall be advanc'd to those, whereby it would discover the inclinations, manners and designs of others, there will be a necessity of making this general acknowledgment, that it is the surest guide can be taken for a man's conduct in civil life, and that he who shall make use of it, will

avoid

avoid thousands of dangers and inconveniences, into which, from time to time, he runs the hazard of falling. There need no reasons to prove a thing so clear, since it is certain that if the ART is able to perform what it promises, there are few actions wherein it is not necessary; as for instance, the Education of children, the choice of Servants, Friends, Company, and most others, which cannot be well done without it. It shews the opportunities, and favourable conjunctures of time, wherein a man ought to act or speak a thing, and teaches him the manner, how he ought to do it. And if it be requisite to suggest an advice, to inspire a passion, or design, it knows all the passages, through which they are to be derived into the Soul. In fine, if we may rely on the advice of the Wiseman, who forbids our conversing with an angry or envious person, and going into the company of the wicked; What can rescue us

from

from those unhappy accidents, but the ART we treat of? For the account commonly given of Man is deceitful, if a man go only according to the reputation they have; and dangerous, if their acquaintance be gotten by conversation: but that, which our ART promises, is only without fraud or hazard.

Yet is it not to be imagin'd, as some at first sight are apt to do, that this ART is no other then PHYSIOGNOMY, and that its power reaches no further, then to make a discovery of the present inclinations, and thence draw some light conjectures, in relation to Vertues and Vices. For, besides that it does all this, as well as the other, but with greater exactness, as shall be seen hereafter; it goes much further, since it promises to shew, what were, or will be, the inclinations and passions, past and to come, the strength and weakness of mens minds, the dispositions they have to certain Arts and Sciences,

Sciences, the Habits they have acquir'd: and what is most important, it teaches the way, to discover secret designs, private actions, and the unknown Authors of known actions. In a word, there is no dissimulation so deep, into which it does not penetrate, and which, in all likelihood, it will not deprive of the best part of those veils, under which it lurks.

Now, forasmuch as all these things may be reduc'd to four principal heads, to wit, the INCLINATIONS, *the* MOTIONS OF THE SOUL, VERTUES & VICES, *it is oblig'd, ere we pass any further, to tell us in the first place, What* Inclination *is, what are the causes of it, and how it is framed in the Soul.* 2. *How the Soul is* Mov'd, *nay how and why it causes the heart and spirits to move in the passions: In fine,* 3. *Wherein* Vertue *and* Vice *consist, and what is the number of the Species of both, whereof it may make its judgment.*

Besides,

Beſides, ſince it ought to denote the Exceſſes *and* Defects *of all things, and ſhew thoſe that are, and are not, conſonant to the nature of Man in general, but alſo to the different ſexes, ages, nations, and kinds of life; it is neceſſary, above all things, that it give us a Modell, and Idæa of that perfection, which is conſonant to the nature of Man, that it may be the rule and meaſure of all the good and evil, which may happen to every one in particular. For it is certain, that the exceſs and defect cannot be known, without a prævious knowledg of the perfection, from which both decline and recede; and, to judge of the diſtance of the* Extremities, *a man ought to know the* Mean *to which they relate.*

Having made an examination of all theſe things, we are further to be ſhewn, what MEANS *it uſes, to perform what it promiſes; what* SIGNS *it ought to employ*

ploy therein, and what is their Nature, Strength, and Weakneſs. It is alſo to tell us, what Uſe it makes of the Rules of PHYSIOGNOMY, and whether CHIROMANCY and METOPOSCOPY are ſerviceable to its deſign, whereof we ought to have a general Draught or Platform.

Theſe are the Præliminaries, which ſerve for an Introduction to the whole Science, *and are contained in this Part, which ſhall be divided into* Two Books; *the former whereof ſhall treat of the matters, which are the* Object *of the ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, to wit, the* Inclinations, Motions of the Soul, Vertues *and* Vices: *The ſecond ſhall examin the* Means, *whereby it ought to diſcover all theſe things.*

THE

THE ART How to know MEN.

The First Book.

CHAP. I.

An Idæa of the natural Perfection of Man.

EVERY thing is perfect to which there is nothing wanting, and which hath whatsoever is necessary for the accomplishment of its Nature. It is therefore requisite, that Man, who consists of Body and Soul, should, to be absolutely perfect, have whatever is necessary for the accomplishment and perfection of these

two parts. Now the natural Perfection of the Soul consists in its having all the faculties and powers, which are necessary, in order to the performing of those functions, whereto she is design'd. The perfection of the Body consists in the dispositions, which those faculties require therein, to serve for Organs to their functions.

But since some of the faculties are nobler then others, and that in the order of things, unequal, the more excellent are the rule of the others; it follows, that the Understanding, which is the noblest faculty in Man, should be the rule and measure of all those that are inferiour to it, and that these last should be so dispos'd, as that, as much as possibly, they may be conformable to that superiour faculty, to the end they should not obstruct the actions it ought to do.

So that the Understanding, being of its own nature indifferent and indeterminate, in order to the judgment it is to make of all things, and consequently, that it is all things, *in potentia*, that is, potentially, as not being determined to any one in particular, it is requisite, that the faculties subordinate to it, should, as much as may be, comply with that indifference. Which indifference since they cannot have in the same degree of perfection as the Understanding, in regard they are material, and consequently determinate, they ought nevertheless to have it so far, as they are capable thereof. Now all the indifference they are capable of is reduc'd to that which consists in a mediocrity, for the mean is less determinate then the extremities, as being indifferent, in respect to both. Those faculties therefore which consist of the mean or mediocrity, are more conformable to the Understanding then those, in the excess, or defect.

But

But foraſmuch as the Inſtruments ought to be proportioned to the powers, by which they are employ'd, it follows that the Conformation of the parts and the Temperament, which are the inſtruments of the Soul's faculties, ſhould have the ſame mediocrity as they have. So that the parts ought to be neither too big nor too little, nor the qualities, whereof the Temperament conſiſts, be predominant one over another, but all ought to be in a juſt *æquilibrium* and mediocrity.

Article I.

That only Man hath the Senſe of Touching in perfection.

AND that this is according to the deſign of Nature, may be deduc'd hence, that ſhe hath beſtow'd this perfect Temperament only on Man; for there is alwaies ſome exceſs in that of other Creatures, one being too hot, or too cold, another too dry, or too moiſt. But in man all theſe qualities are united in a juſt moderation; and therefore the Senſes, which follow this Temperament, as the Touching, and Taſting, which is a kind of Touching, as *Ariſtotle* affirmes, are more perfect in him, then in any other Animal. For theſe Senſes, and eſpecially the Touching, require an exact Temperature in their Organs; it being requiſite, that what ought to judg ſhould be in the mean, that it may judg without any pre-occupation. Now as there are two ſorts of means, one, conſiſting in the abſolute privation of the Objects, and the other, in their equal participation,

only the Touch judges by this latter. For all the others are destitute or depriv'd of the qualities whereof they judg; as the Ey, which judges of colours, ought to be without any colour. But in regard the Touching judges of the first qualities, whereof its Organ cannot be depriv'd, it is requisite, for its more perfect knowledg thereof, that it should have them united in a just mediocrity, that it may judg of their extremities, which it hath not, and of their moderation, by not assigning any excess therein.

But howere it be, Nature hath no other motive in enduing man with this perfect Temperature, then to make conformable to the noblest faculty of the Soul, the general instrument of its functions, and to place it in the mean, that it might be less determinate, and that it, as well as the faculty, should have all the indifference, whereof it is capable, whichwas not necessary for other Animals, all whose faculties are determinated.

Art. 2.

All in Man should be in a mediocrity.

FRom this truth, thus establish'd, there may be drawn a consequence, which confirms what we have said, concerning the mediocrity, which ought to be in the powers of the Soul, not only in those which are subalternate, but also in the superiour, such as are, the Understanding and the Will. For since the Temperament moderates all the faculties, rendring them more or less strong, according to the degrees it hath, and that if it be hot, for instance,

it

it ſtrengthens the Imagination, and weakens the Judgment; and that, on the contrary, if it be cold, it aſſiſts the Judgment, and injures the Imagination, and ſo of the reſt: It follows, that, if there be an equality requir'd, to render the man perfect, it is alſo requiſite, that all the faculties of the Soul ſhould participate of that equality, and that they ſhould obſerve the ſame moderation, which is in the Temperament.

So that the natural perfection of man, requires not an exceſſive vivacity of Imagination, nor an over-circumſpect Judgment, nor a too happy memory: Nay, it cannot bear with theſe ſublime Spirits, which are alwaies fixt on the contemplation of things high and difficult, not only upon this account, that, having deſign'd man for ſociety, it expects, he ſhould equally apply himſelf to Contemplation and Action; but principally, in regard that it is impoſſible, the body ſhould have its natural perfection, when it hath the diſpoſitions requiſite to ſublimity of Spirit. For the Body muſt needs be weak, when the Spirit is too ſtrong, as the over-great ſtrength of Body leſſens and weakens the Spirits, as we ſhall ſhew more at large hereafter.

The caſe is the ſame with all the other faculties; for if the Appetite be too apt to move, if the Senſes too ſubtile, if the Concoctive virtue, the evacuative, or retentive, be too ſtrong, they are ſo many defects and irregularities: they ſhould all be proportionate to the equality of the Temperament, which does not admit of theſe vicious perfections.

Art. 3.

That all the Faculties ought to be in a Mean.

AND that this is true, even in those faculties, which are spiritual, may be deduced hence, That the action and the power ought to be conformable one to the other, in as much as the action is only a progress, and effusion of the active power. If therefore actions cannot be perfect but so far as they are moderate, it is necessary, that the faculties should derive their perfection from their moderation. But it is a receiv'd maxim in morality, That actions, to be virtuous, ought to be in a mediocrity, and consequently, the faculties, from which they proceed, should also be in the same mediocrity. Now the first spring of this mediocrity is the Indifference, which is natural to the rational Soul: for since the Action is conformable to the power, the actions should be as indifferent as the other is, and though it be determined by the action it does, yet does it nevertheless preserve its indifference, by the mediocrity, which the action receives from it, The reason is, that what is in the mean is indifferent, in respect of the extremities, and that what is in the extremity is less indifferent, and more determinated, then what is in the mean, as we have shewn already.

And thence proceeds the necessity there is, of moderating the passions. For though, in other animals, they are the more perfect, the greater and stronger they are, and that the more fearful a Hare is, and the more cruel a Tigre, the more perfect is each of them in

in its kind: yet is not so in those of man, in as much as they ought to be in a mean, between excess and defect, that they may be the more conformable to the indifference of the superiour part.

Art. 4.

That all natural Inclinations are defects.

I Conceive it will be no hard matter to apprehend, and subscribe unto all these truths, because they are maintain'd by reason and experience. But there is yet another may be deduc'd from the same principles, which I question not will be thought very strange, though it be no less certain. It is this, That, though there be some Inclinations which are good in themselves, and deserve commendation, such as those men have for the virtues; yet are they defects, and alter the natural perfection which is conformable to humane nature. And certainly, this will occur upon common observation and experience, that those who have from their birth, some excellent virtues, have had them attended by greater vices, for a man must needs fall into defects and imperfections, so far as he is at a distance from perfection. Now the perfection of man is, to be indifferent, and, not determinated to any particular virtue, he should be capable of all. For the Virtues that come along with the birth are not real virtues, they are only the initiatios of them, or rather, they are but inclinations which a man hath for them. In a word, they are bounds and limits, confining the capacity of the Soul, which is universal, to a particular habit. The Soul, of its own

nature, is not determinated, and ought to be capable of all humane actions; And, as it may know all things, so is it requisite, that the Appetite, which follows her knowledg, should have also the freedom to incline it self to all things. And this universal capacity is at the same time an effect of the spirituality of her nature, and the cause of the liberty she hath: For if she were material, she would be determinated, and if she were not indifferent, she should not be free.

The Inclinations therefore, which man may have, though they might be for the most excellent virtues, are imperfections; he ought not to have any for any one in particular, but for all together. And this is that, which the Angel of the Scholes hath so judiciously deliver'd, when he affirm'd, That there is no Animal, but hath some inclination, to a Passion conformable to his nature; but that man only is the mean of all, and that it is requisite, he should be equally susceptible thereof, in as much as he is, of his own nature, indifferent and indeterminate.

To conclude, since the Temperament and the Conformation of the parts are the two principal causes of natural Inclinations, as we shall shew hereafter, and that they make the Soul incline to those actions which are conformable to them, it is not to be doubted, but that the mediocrity, and the mean, which they ought to be guided by in man, does also invest the Soul with an equal bent towards both the extremities.

Art. 5.

Art. 5.

That every ſpecies hath its proper Temperament.

BUt it is to be obſerved, that in the diſtribution of the Temperament, made by Nature to Animals, ſhe hath in the firſt place conſidered their ſpecies, and hath appointed every one, that which was moſt convenient for it. For example; ſhe hath aſſign'd a hot and dry Temperament for the ſpecies of the Lion; a hot and moiſt, for that of a Horſe; a cold and dry for that of an Aſſe, and ſo all the reſt. But, as ſhe hath been careful of the conſervation of theſe ſpecies, and, to that end, hath beſtow'd on them the two Sexes, which were to receive different qualities, ſhe hath been oblig'd to divide this firſt Temperament, and to give one part of it to the male, and the other to the Female. For though, in the ſpecies of the Lyon, the male and female are hot and dry, yet is it certain that the female is ſuch, in a lower degree then the male, and the ſame thing is to be ſaid of all the reſt.

It is therefore to be granted, that the juſt and equal Temperament, we have ſpoken of before, is that which is moſt convenient to humane Nature. But in as much as it was alſo requiſite, that the man and Woman ſhould have different qualities, that juſt Temperament was divided between them, and without ſtraying too much from that perfect Temperature, the man hath receiv'd a little more heat and drought, and the Woman a little more cold and moiſture.

And this is the true interpretation that we muſt give

give to the Fable of *Androgyne*, when *Plato* saies, that Man and Woman at the beginning made up but one body, which was of a round figure; that they were afterwards divided into two, and that the Love they have one for the other, is onely the desire they have to be re-united, and a means of their perpetuation. For, this first union of Man and Woman, is nothing else but humane nature comprehending both Sexes, and having, for its body, that just temperament, which may be compar'd to a round figure, whereof all the parts are equal and uniform. But in the distinction, which was made of this nature, into two Sexes, that Temperament was divided into two parts, and thence were fram'd two bodies, unlike one to the other, in respect of the different qualities, which they receiv'd in order to the conservation of the species.

Art. 6.

Why Sexes were bestow'd on Animals, and why the Male is hot and dry, and the Female cold and moist.

THe bestowing of Sexes on Animals, was onely in order to Generation, and where there is no generation to be made, there are no Sexes, as in Angels. But in regard this action, as all others whatsoever, stands in need of two principal causes, to wit, the *Efficient* & the *Material*, there was a necessity, that every species of Animals should be divided into two Sexes, to execute the function of these two causes. And that is also the reason there are but two Sexes, for as much as these two causes are sufficient for any action whatsoever.

But

But whereas there is not any vertue or power, which ſtands not in need of certain diſpoſitions, to execute the function, whereto it is deſign'd, and that among the corporeal diſpoſitions, the firſt qualities are moſt efficacious and moſt neceſſary; it muſt follow, that heat and drought, as being the moſt active, ſhould be beſtow'd on the Sex which executes the function of the *Efficient* cauſe, and that cold and moiſture, as being the moſt paſſive, ſhould be moſt obſervable in that Sex, which repreſents the *Material* cauſe. And this is the original reaſon, why Man is hot and dry, and Woman cold and moiſt, for that Man hath the vertues and qualities of the *Efficient* cauſe, and the Woman thoſe of the Paſſive cauſe.

For, though there be ſome diſpute among the *Philoſophers*, concerning the function of the Female in the buſineſs of generation, and that it is maintain'd by ſome, that ſhe is concurrent to the production of the Animal, as well as the male; yet not thinking it neceſſary to produce the reaſons and experiences which deſtroy that opinion, this at leaſt is certain, that if the ſaid aſſertion ſhould be granted, it muſt be acknowledg'd, that the active vertue which the Female may have, is much weaker in it, and that the Paſſive cauſe is the more predominant. Which is enough to prove, that the paſſive qualities are alſo the more prevalent in the ſame work.

And certainly, to make this truth the more clear, we need onely conſider the natural conſtitution of the Woman. For her weakneſs, as to body; a ſmaller conformation of the parts; the fearfulneſs, which is natural to her; the delicacy & ſoftneſs of the skin and fleſh, and the many humours wherewith ſhe abounds, are infallible demonſtrations of the cold and moiſt temperament ſhe is of.

Art.

Art. 7.

Wherein the Beauty of Sexes consists. That there are two sorts of general effects, ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

IT being therefore granted, that the Temperament of Man is hot and dry, and that of the Woman cold and moist, we are now to consider, what dispositions these Temperaments raise in the Soul, and what constitution the whole body receivs from them. For, the Perfection and Beauty of each Sex consists on these two things, for as much as the intellectual Beauty which ought to be in them, is nothing else than a combination or concurrence of all the faculties which are necessary to them, for the execution of those functions, whereto they are design'd; and that the corporeal Beauty is also nothing else, than a concourse and compliance of all the dispositions which these faculties require in the parts, to become organs subservient to their functions. For that part is beautifull, which hath the largeness, figure, and all the other dispositions, necessary for the performance of the action it ought to do: and if all these are not in it, or that it have any dispositions which are not requisite, it must needs appear ugly and deformed.

Howere it be, we are here to observe one thing, which is very considerable in this matter, and in all the effects of Nature, which is, that there are two kinds of these effects, some wrought for a certain end, which Nature proposes to her self; others wrought out of pure necessity, so as that Nature had not any design

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in the working of them. That a man should have hair on the chin, the eye-lids, and eye brows, is for some particular end, which Nature proposes to her self, wherein she never fails of her purpose, she disposing the matter of the hair, and directing it her self into those parts. But, that he should have any on his breast, is not an effect proceeding from the design of Nature, for if it were, all men would have some there, and therefore abundance of matter is onely the cause thereof, it being the property of that, to make its way where ever it can.

This is also most evidently apparent in the Passions; for that a man transported with anger, should keep a stirr; that he should threaten; that he should strike; all these are actions whereby he pretends to revenge himself, which is the end of that Pasion. But that his countenance should be enflam'd; that his forehead should be wrinckled; that his words should fall from him with certain interruptions; these are effects wrought by necessity, so as that the Soul had no design in the production of them, in regard they do not contribute to the revenge, whereto she is inclin'd.

Art. 8.

That there are some Faculties and Inclinations, which it is Nature's design to bestow on the Sexes, others not.

UPon these grounds, we may affirm, that there are some Faculties and Inclinations, which Nature hath, out of a formal design, bestow'd on the several Sexes: such as are the faculties of the Soul consider-

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ed in themſelves, and in their origin, excluding all modification by the Temperament, as the rational, the ſenſitive, the vegetative Faculties, and conſequently the Inclinations, which accompany them; for every Animal power leaves in the Appetite, an inclination to perform its proper actions. But as to the powers and inclinations which proceed from the Temperament, as the ſtrength or weakneſs of thoſe firſt faculties, the Inclination to confidence or fearfulneſs, to liberality or avarice, *&c.* Nature hath not any deſign to beſtow them on either Sex, in as much as the natural perfection of the humane ſpecies do's not admit of any in particular, as oblig'd to be equally capable of all, by reaſon of its being indeterminate and indifferent, as we have ſhewn before. It is therefore out of pure neceſsity that they are raiſed in the Soul, and by the connexion and unavoidable conſequence there is between the effects and their cauſes.

True it is indeed, that Nature hath propos'd to her ſelf to beſtow on Man, beſides the Faculties convenient for his ſpecies, thoſe alſo which are proper to his Sex, to wit, the active vertue in order to generation, and heat and drought to ſerve as inſtruments to that vertue, as ſhe hath beſtow'd on the Woman the paſsive power, and cold and moiſture, to perform the function of the material cauſe. But all the Inclinations conſequent to thoſe qualities, as confidence or fearfulneſs, liberality or avarice, *&c.* are onely diſpoſitions fram'd in the Soul, without her knowedge, and beſide, or againſt her intention. It muſt be confeſs'd they are natural, becauſe they are by accident in the order of Nature, and follow the cauſes which depend on the matter. Nay, they are allow'd to be perfections, and if they ſhould be wanting, there would be a defect,

fect, in as much as the causes, from which they proceed, necessarily require that consequence and concatenation which is between them. For, a Man who should not be couragious, or a Woman who should not be timorous, would be guilty of the same imperfection, as a Lion that should be fearfull, and a Hare that should be couragious.

Art. 9.

That there are some parts fram'd by Nature out of design, others not.

THE same thing may be said of the Conformation of the parts; for Nature hath, in her Idæas, that figure which is most convenient to every species, and which she would bestow on every individual, were she not prevented by the particular causes, such as is the Temperament. And though she gives each Sex a different structure of body, yet does she, as much as lies in her power, always preserve the character of the figure, which is proper to the species. For, though the Conformation of the Woman's parts be different from that of the Man's, yet is there a greater resemblance between her and Man, than any other Animal whatsoever.

Now, it is certain, there are some parts which are proper to each Sex, and such as Nature hath a design to frame after such and such a fashion; as those that serve for organs to perform the functions, whereto each of them is ordered: But for the rest, as height of stature, largeness of head, a square figure of the face, *&c.* which are to be observ'd in Man, or lowness of stature,

ſtature, littleneſs of head, and roundneſs of face, &c. which are proper to the Woman, all this variety, I ſay, proceeds not from the deſign of Nature, but pure neceſſity, conſequently to the Temperament, which is proper to either, though it contributes to the perfection and beauty of the body, for the reaſons we have given already.

SECT. 2.

Wherein the Perfection of the Male conſiſts.

ART. 1.

Of the Inclinations proper to Man.

THis preſuppos'd, we now come to obſerve the Inclinations, conſequent to the Temperament of Man. Nature hath made him *hot* and *dry*, for the end we have already aſſign'd, But according to the proportion of his being *hot*, he muſt neceſſarily be *ſtrong*, and conſequently thereto, that he ſhould be naturally *Couragious*, deſirous of *Fame*, *Magnanimous*, *Sincere*, *Liberal*, *Mercifull*, *Juſt*, *Gratefull*; and conſequent to his being *dry*, he ſhould be *Reſolv'd*, *Conſtant*, *Patient*, *Modeſt*, *Faithfull*, *Judicious*.

The reaſons of all theſe effects are eaſily found. For, as the Soul makes uſe of theſe qualities, knows what ſhe is able to perform by their means, and is inclin'd to the actions conformable to their vertue:

So

So upon her being ſenſible of the *heat*, which is the principle of *ſtrength* and *courage*, ſhe takes a confidence in her ſelf; and, upon that, ſhe would *command*, ſhe courageouſly undertakes, and ſlights ſmall *dangers*: And being *courageous*, ſhe is *forward*, *free*, and without *artifice*. She is alſo *liberal*, not onely upon this account, that it is the property of *heat* to dilate it ſelf, but alſo for this reaſon, that the confidence ſhe hath of her ſelf, takes away the apprehenſion of wanting thoſe things that ſhall be neceſſary for her. She eaſily *pardons*, becauſe ſhe thinks ſhe cannot be *injur'd*: She is *juſt*, becauſe ſhe deſires *little*, as being ſatisfy'd with her ſelf; in fine, ſhe is *gratefull*, becauſe ſhe is *juſt* and *liberal*.

On the other ſide, as *drought* obliges things to keep within their bounds, and hinders them from ſpreading and diſperſing themſelves; ſo ſhe accommodates her ſelf to this vertue, and is fortify'd within her ſelf, not eaſily changing the reſolutions ſhe hath taken, patiently enduring the inconveniences which happen to her, conſtantly endeavouring to perform the promiſes ſhe hath made, and not ſuffering her ſelf to be carried away with the vanity of thoſe honours, which ſhe deſerves not. In a word, *drought* contributes to the purity of the Spirits, and checks the impetuous ſallies of the Imagination, allowing the time, required by the underſtanding, for the conſideration of things, whence proceed *prudence* and ſoundneſs of judgment

Art. 2.

That the Temperament of Man is hot and dry in the first degree.

BUt it is here to be obſerved, that all theſe natural vertues are not conſiſtent with theſe two qualities if they be exceſſive. For, if the *heat* be too great, inſtead of *Courage*, it will raiſe *Temerity*; the deſire of *Fame* will be chang'd into *Pride*; *Magnanimity*, into *Inſolence*; *Liberality*, into *Prodegality*; *Juſtice*, into *Severity*; *Clemency*, into *Indulgence*; and *Gratitude* into *Oſtentation* and *Vanity*. In like manner, if *drought* be predominant, the *Conſtancy* of the Soul degenerates into *Obſtinacy*, *Harſhneſs*, *Inſenſibility*, *Auſterity*. The perfection therefore of the Temperament convenient to Man, in reſpect of his Sex, ſhould come as near as may be to the exact Temperature, proper to humane Nature, as we have ſhewn; And ſo it may be affirm'd, that it ought not to be hot and dry, but in the firſt degree, whatever goes beyond it leading to exceſs and imperfection. The reaſon this, that Nature, which always endeavours to give the ſeveral Sexes the Temperament convenient to the ſpecies, recedes no further from that Temperament, than is neceſſary for the diſpoſing of them into the order of thoſe cauſes, whereof they are to perform the function. Whence it may be inferr'd, that the leaſt degree of heat and drought which Man may have beyond the exact Temperature, is ſufficient to give him the vertue and efficacy of the efficient cauſe.

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The same thing is to be advanc'd, concerning the *Conformation* of the parts; for there is one conformation which is convenient to the species, and is a mean between those which are proper to the several Sexes. For, as all things should aim at a certain mediocrity in humane nature, for the reasons before alledged; so ought the conformation of the body to be in the mean, between the excess and defect, which may be found therein. But, in regard the Temperament qualifies the formative vertue, and forces it to give the parts that greatness and figure which are proper for them; it was requisite, that those of Man should be answerable to the two qualities, which were to be predominant in him, and that they should be larger, not onely than those of the Woman, but also than those which were design'd to the humane species.

Art. 3.

A Model of Man's figure.

Aristotle hath design'd the figure of Man according to that of the Lion, as if there were no other Animal, in which the form of the male Sex were more perfect, and that it ought to be the Model, according to which that of Man should be represented. But, not to urge that Man is the most perfect of all Animals, and consequently, that he ought to be the measure of the rest, the Lion is more proper to frame an Idæa of the *strength*, than of the *perfection* of the Sex, for as much as that quality requires more heat and drought than is necessary to the male Sex. And

accordingly the Lion is one of the leaſt fruitfull creatures of any, and conſequently hath not always the vertue and efficacy, convenient for that Sex: beſides that his Temperament recedes too much from the mediocrity moſt befitting humane nature, and whoever ſhall compare it to that of Man, which is hot and dry but in the firſt degree, will find that the Lion's reaches to the third.

Add to this, that the *atra bilis*, or black choler is predominant in the Lion, as alſo in a ſtrong and robuſt man; and therefore they have both large mouths, a harſh and thick hair, the forehead full of folds and contractions, between the Eye-brows, the extremities large and tough, the fleſh hard and muſculous, the voice bigg, and reſounding, as it were, out of the throat, the gate grave, with a certain weighing from one ſide to the other; all which are the ſignifications of an exceſſive heat and drought, as we ſhall ſhew elſewhere.

And it is probable, that *Ariſtotle* did not, in that place, conſider Man ſimply, according to the vertue of his Sex, but according to the quality which was moſt conſiderable in the opinions of men, to wit, *Heroick Fortitude*, which is the ſource of *Valour*, which hath the prerogative of *commanding*, and for which men always reſerv'd the greateſt honours, and the nobleſt rewards. Accordingly, when he propoſes the Panther for the Idæa of the Female Sex, it is eaſily perceiv'd, that his conſideration runs more upon the ſtrength of the Sexes, than their natural perfection, ſince that is a creature, which is indeed very ſtout and couragious, but hath not the docility, the fearfulneſs, and other qualities proper to the Woman

Art.

Art. 4.

Of the Figure of Man's parts.

But for our parts, who follow not the opinions of Men, but the deſigns and orders of Nature, we cannot repreſent a figure of Man convenient to his Sex, but according to a draught of thoſe qualities, which are natural to him, with reference to the compariſon to be made between them and thoſe of the Woman, there being not among Animals, any that hath a greater reſemblance to the Man, than She.

We are therefore to affirm, that as to his *ſtature*, it is of a greater height, and more unbounded than that of the Woman.

That his *head* is bigger.

That his *hair* is ſtronger, and inclining to a certain curle towards the extremities.

That his *Forehead* is leſs round, leſs ſmooth, and almoſt of a ſquare figure.

That his *Eye-brows* are bigger and ſtronger.

That his *Eyes* are more lively.

That the *Noſe*, deſcending in a ſtreight line from the forehead, is ſomewhat bigger at the extremity.

That the *Noſtrils* are a little more open.

That the *Mouth* is larger.

The *Lips* thinner.

The *Voice* bigger.

The *Chin* leſs round.

And the whole Face inclining to a ſquare figure.

The *Neck* ſhould be thicker.

The *Shoulders* and *Breaſt* larger and ſtronger.

The *Buttocks* and *Thighs* leſs fleſhy.

All the *Junctures* more free.

The *Extremities* larger and ſtronger.

The *Fleſh* harder and more muſculous.

The *Meen* more majeſtick.

The *Carriage* and *Deportment* of the body more noble.

The *Gate* more ſprightly and vigorous.

Art. 5.

The Reaſons of the figure of Man's parts.

NOw, whoſoever ſhall ſeriouſly conſider the whole buſineſs of this Conformation of the parts, ſhall find, that it proceeds from the moderation of the two aforeſaid qualities, as we have ſhewn. For height of ſtature, greatneſs of the head and mouth, the openneſs of the noſtrills, the thickneſs of the neck, the largeneſs and breadth of the ſhoulders and breaſt, the ſprightlineſs of the eies, the bigneſs of the voice, the freedom and activity of the junctures, the majeſty and nobleneſs of the meen, carriage and gate, are the effects of *heat*, which dilates the parts, and renders the motion of them more active and more vigorous.

On the other ſide, the harſhneſs of the hair, the hardneſs of the fleſh, the ſolidity of the junctures, the ruggedneſs of the forehead, and its figure leſs round, the thinneſs of the Lips, the more obtuſe figure of the chin, and that of the whole face inclining to a ſquare, are the effects of *drought*, which hardens the parts, and reſiſts the motions of the humours, not permitting them to aſſume the round figure, which is proper

proper and natural to them, as we ſhall hereafter take occaſion to ſhew more particularly.

Art. 6.

That the figure of the parts denotes the inclinations.

BUt what calls upon our further obſervation in all theſe parts, is, that they have a certain rapport to and dependency on the faculties and inclinations, which the Sex beſtowes on the Soul, ſo that they ſerve for markes and ſigns to diſcover them: whether it proceeds hence, that they are the Inſtruments of thoſe powers, and that the knowledg of the inſtrument diſcovers the cauſe, to which it is ſubſervient; or that both the inclinations and ſigns proceed from the Temperament, as their common principle, and that the Conformation of the parts bewraying the Temperament, the Temperament afterwards bewrayes the inclination and faculties, whereof it is the cauſe.

Accordingly the largeneſs of the breaſt and ſhoulders, the nimbleneſs and ſtrength of the junctures, the openneſs of the noſtrills, and the greatneſs, or wideneſs of the mouth are markes of Courage. A thick neck, the fleſh hard and muſculous, the extremities large, are ſigns of Strength, as well of Body as Soul.

The ſquare forehead, the noſe ſomewhat big, the lips thin, the chin ſomewhat large, denote magnanimity, and greatneſs of courage.

The ſtature high and ſtreight, the ey-brows elevated,

ted, a majestick gate, and sprightly eies, signify Glory, or a desire of Fame.

The forehead and face of a square figure, and the head of a convenient bigness, are marks of Wisedom, Constancy and Justice; and so of the rest, as we shall further shew in its proper place. Whence it may be affirmed, that, of all the parts, which make up the Male Beauty, or which is beseeming a Man, there is not any but denotes an inclination to some particular virtue.

Thus have we discover'd wherein consists the natural Perfection of a Man, as well in reference to the powers of the Soul, as to the Conformation of the body, which is convenient for his Sex.

SECT. III.

Shewing wherein consists the natural perfection of the Woman.

WE come now to the examination of the *Woman's* perfection. But what a difficult, what a dangerous enterprise do we undertake! Since it cannot be attempted without engaging against the greatest and most formidable power in the world. For, to make short work of it, we must unthrone that Beauty, which commands Kings and Monarchs, which forces obedience from Philosophers, and which hath caused the greatest alterations, that ever happen'd upon earth. From that

that high pitch of glory and perfection, whereto it is now advanc'd, it must be pull'd down, and degraded into the order of vicious things, and we are to shew, that all those attractions, and charming graces, wherewith she is adorned, is nothing but a deceitful mask, hiding an infinit number of defects and imperfections. 'Tis neither better nor worse; for if there be any certainty in humane ratiocination; if the principles, which Nature hath scatter'd into our Souls, in order to the discovery of truth, have any thing of solidity, it will necessarily follow, that there is not any one of all the parts, requisite to the framing of the Woman's Beauty, but is the mark of an inclination to some Vice.

But what? Is there any necessity we should discover things, which Nature hath made it so much her business to conceal? Why should we be so forward to condemn those, who innocently force the adorations and respects of all the world? This onely we have to allege, that our case is much like that of a Judge, who, out of his obligation to Justice, is forc'd to pass Sentence against his friend. Who can forbear falling in love with Beauty? But who is it also that can oppose Truth, which is stronger than Beauty? It is Truth then that forces us to condemn that Beauty, and to pass judgment against her, which, though severe, is yet just and necessary. For, if it may be deduc'd, that it is onely a fair appearance, which hides an infinite multitude of defects, and so farr from being the flower of Goodness (as it hath been sometimes flatter'd) that we may as well affirme it to be the bark, which covers the vices of Nature; it is impossible, but it must abate much of the pride, whereby it is attended, and somwhat raise their spirits, who adore it with so much slavery.

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But all consider'd, it is possible, we may represent the mischief greater then it is, and we are ready to acknowledge as much. For we speak onely of the *Inclinations*, that is, the *first seeds* of the Soul's *affections* which may be smother'd and weeded out, before they have fully taken root. And to speak more precisely, the *Inclination* is onely a secret *weight*, which gives the Soul a *bent* to certain actions, and which is easily balanc'd by some other advantages, such as may be example, education, and contrary habits. As to which, we must make this acknowledgment, for the honour of the Women, that these means have a greater influence over them, then over the Men, and that commonly, we find the practice of the vertues more exemplary and exact in this Sex, than in the other.

With this precaution, we may presume to affirm, upon the principle we have laid down, that the Woman is *cold* and *moist*, in order to the end, which Nature hath proposed to her self, and that from her being *cold*, it follows, she should be *weak*, and consequently *Fearfull*, *Pusillanimous*, *Jealous*, *Distrustfull*, *Crafty*, apt to *Dissemble*, *Flatter*, *Lie*, easily *Offended*, *Revengefull*, *Cruel* in her revenge, *Unjust*, *Covetous*, *Ungratefull*, *Superstitious*. And from her being *moist*, it follows, that she should be *Unconstant*, *Light*, *Unfaithfull*, *Impatient*, easily *Perswaded*, *Compassionate*, *Talkative*.

Art. 1.

The Reasons of these Incilinations.

THe reasons of all these Inclinations are evident and necessary. For since *heat* is the principle of *strength*,

ſtrength, courage and *confidence*; *cold*, on the other ſide, muſt be the principle of *weakneſs*, *lowneſs of ſpirit*, and *fearfulneſs*. And from theſe three proceed all the reſt, which are the attendants of a cold Temperament: for diſtruſt and jealouſie are the iſſue of weakneſs and fear; whence it is, that ſtrong and courageous men are neither diſtruſtfull, nor apt to ſuſpect. Artifice & craft are alſo the attendants of weakneſs, in as much as they ſupply the want of ſtrength; and we find moſt of thoſe creatures which are weak, to be more cunning than the others; on the contrary, all of great bulk are not malicious, in regard commonly ſtrength goes along with bulk. Diſſimulation follows artifice and diſtruſt, as flattery and lying follow diſſimulation. Beſides, weakneſs, in as much as it is expos'd to all manner of injuries, is eaſily offended; And thence it comes, that ſhe is revengefull, for that revenge, which hath no other end than to prevent the continuance of the injury, is commonly found in thoſe who are weak; and therefore old people, children, and ſick perſons, are more teſty and angry than others. But a Woman's revenge is cruel; for as much as cruelty proceeds from weakneſs and fear; for a generous perſon is ſatisfy'd with the victory, whereas a Coward having his enemy at mercy, revenges himſelf to the utmoſt extremity, out of a fear he may recover himſelf, and retort the revenge upon him. Superſtition follows from the ſame ſpring; for weakneſs, being ever more fearfull than it ſhould be, imagines Heaven hard to be pleas'd, and that all endeavours are to be uſed to gain its favour. Nor does Avarice proceed from any other principle; for the fear of falling nto want, raiſes a deſire of preſerving what one hath, and acquiring what one hath not;

whence

whence it comes, that old men, and persons addicted to melancholy, are inclin'd to this vice. Now, it is impossible that these desires should be without injustice, or that they should easily admit of gratitude, and acknowledgments.

On the other side, the Soul, complying with the nature of humidity, which is, as it were, its organ, and which is unconstant, changeable and susceptible of all the impressions may be given it, is also apt to receive an inclination to the vices which are correspondent to those qualities; such as are Lightness, Inconstancy, Impatience, Unfaithfulness, and Loquacity, which are the effects of Fickleness; as Credulity and Compasion are the consequences of a weak resistance, and the easie impression, which things make upon her.

Art. 2.

That the Inclinations of the Woman are not defects.

But whereas the Inclinations may be either strong or weak, and the vices, whereto they are inclin'd, may have several degrees, it is certain, that those which are consonant to the Woman, with reference to the perfection of her Sex, are the weakest that may be, in regard her Temperament recedes very little from the just temperature, as we have shewn. So that the fearfulness, distrust, avarice, and the rest, are, in her, in the lowest and weakest degree they can be. Nay, there are some of them, which, in that condition, may pass for so many natural vertues. For Distrust and Dissimulation may deserve the name of Prudence;

Prudence; a moderate Avarice, may fall under the notion of Frugality; a light Superſtition may paſs for Piety; moderate Revenge may aſſume the name of Juſtice; and that Timidity, which begets ſhamefaſtneſs, is the greateſt ornament and commendation of the Woman, and the bridle which is moſt likely to give her a check, in the bent ſhe might have to all the greateſt vices. But it is alſo to be inferr'd, that, when the coldneſs and moiſture exceed the degree of that moderation, all the Inclinations we have mentioned, are proportionably heightned, and become as vicious as their names imply them to be.

Moreover, thoſe Inclinations, which go under the name of vices, are not, to ſpeak exactly, ſo many defects, but rather, on the contrary, ſo many natural perfections, as being correſpondent and conformable to the feminine Sex. For, as it is no imperfection in a Hare to be fearfull, nor in a Tygre, to be cruel, for as much as their natures require thoſe qualities in them; ſo can it not be ſaid, that Timidity, Diſtruſt, Inconſtancy, *&c.* are defects or imperfections in a Woman, in regard they are natural to her Sex, which would be defective, if it were depriv'd thereof.

Yet is it to be granted, that, comparing them with the Inclinations of Man, they ſeem to be vicious; but the compariſon which is made between diverſe things, may not be the rule and meaſure of their natural perfection, in as much as it transferrs to one ſubject what appertains to the other, and there is not any thing, wherein ſome exceſs or defect may not be found, when it is ſo compar'd. Accordingly, the ſtrength of a Man, compared to that of a Lion, is weakneſs; and all the Inclinations, which are infus'd

fus'd into him, upon the account of his Sex, though they seem vertuous, are nevertheless defects, in respect of the humane species, which ought to be indifferent, as we have shewn elsewhere. Nay, mediocrity it self, which is so perfect in reference to things humane is a defect, as admitting any comparison between them and the supernatural and divine.

The Inclinations then, which the Woman derives from her Sex, whatever they may be in themselves, are to be accounted perfections, when they are confin'd within the moderation, correspondent to the first degree of cold and moisture, of which Temperament she ought to be. If they exceed it, they are defects, declining from the perfection requisite in her Sex; and the excess of that Temperament causes no less deformity in the Soul, than it does in all the parts of the Body.

Art. 3.

That the Inclinations of Man are defects in the Woman.

But what? Is it impossible that a Woman should be of the same Temperament as a man, and consequently that she may have the same inclinations, and be couragious, magnanimous, liberal, *&c.* as we experimentally find many of them, who have all those qualities? It must be acknowledg'd; but what is a perfection in one subject, may be a defect in another: as for instance, courage in a Lion, is a vertue, in a Hare, a vice; and so what is a perfection in the man, is a default, and imperfection in the Woman, because it makes her recede from the natural perfection of her Sex. And if these Inclinations proceed not from

from instruction, education, example, or some rational habit, they are indeed such qualities as seem vertuous, but have withall the attendance of farr greater vices. And those Women, who are born with that confidence and audacity, which are proper onely to man, are commonly rash, impudent, unthrifty, *&c.* there being a necessity, that whatever recedes from perfection, should fall into defects; and the greater the recession is, so much the more remarkable are the vices. Whence it proceeds, that no body wonders so much to see a Woman very fearfull, very covetous, and very light and unconstant, as to find her couragious, prodigal, obstinate; in regard these last qualities proceed from a Temperament which is absolutely opposite to that of the Woman, whereas the former are consonant to that which is proper to her, though it exceeds the moderation it should have. In like manner, to be cowardly, penurious, fickle-minded, are farr greater imperfections in a man, than if he were hare-brain'd, prodigal, self-will'd, in as much as the latter are the effects of the hot and dry Temperament, proper to him; the former of the cold and moist, which is perfectly contrary to him.

Art. 4.

Wherein the Beauty of the Woman consists.

WE come now to examine the Conformation of the parts, which is consequent to the Temperament of the Woman, and to consider, wherein the Beauty, which is proper and natural to her, consists.

In the first place, as to her *Stature*, she is lower, and smaller than the man. The

The *Head* is lefs and rounder, and the whole face inclining to the fame figure.

She hath a great quantity of *hair*, and that very long, fmall, and foft to the Touch.

Her *Forehead* is even, fmooth, higher, and rounder towards the Temples.

The *Eye-brows* are flender, foft, at a little diftance one from the other, and gently twining about the Eyes.

The *Eyes* are large, black, betraying a certain mildnefs and modefty.

The *Nofe*, of a middle fize, defcending in a ftreight line upon the Lips, and gently inclining to a roundnefs towards the Extremity.

The *Noftrils* narrow, and not opening much.

The *Cheeks* round.

The *Mouth* little.

The *Lips* red, fomewhat bigg, or plump, not fhutting clofe together, nor moving, unlefs it be when fhe fpeaks or laughs.

The *Teeth* are fmall, white, and orderly difpos'd.

The *Chin* fhould be round, fmooth, not admitting the appearance of the leaft hair.

The *Ears* little, foft, and of a convenient compafs.

The *Neck*, round, fomewhat long, fmall, fmooth, and even all about.

The upper part of the *Breaft* plump, and fleshy; and the Breaft it felf, or Dugg, firm, and fomewhat hard, round, and of a middle-fize.

The *Shoulders* little, and clofe.

The *Back* ftreight, and weak.

The *Thighs* round, and fleshy.

The *Knees* round, and fo as there be not in them the appearance of any juncture.

The

The *Feet* little, round, and fleshy.

The *Arms* short, and of a proportionable roundness.

The *Hands* long, little, and fleshy.

The *Fingers* long, small, and round.

The *Skin*, in all parts, soft, delicate, and of an exquisite whiteness, save onely in those places, which admit a mixture of carnation, as in the Cheeks, the Chin, and the Ears.

Lastly, *Weakness* ought to appear in her *voice*, and all her motions; *bashfulness* and a reserv'd *modesty* in her *countenance*, her *gestures*, *carriage*, and *behaviour*.

Art. 5.

The Causes assign'd of this figuration of parts in the Woman.

OF all these parts, the little, short, and slender, are the effects of the cold Temperament, which confines the matter, and hinders it from spreading and dilating it self. The fleshy and soft parts are the productions of the moisture, for they denote abundance of flegmatick bloud. But of the round, some have their dependance on the cold, others on the moisture: for they either proceed from the fat, which fills the vacant places of the muscles, as in the arms, cheeks, thighs; or from the cold, which contracts the figure of the parts, and presses them of all sides; whereas the heat, always spreading it self forward, causes unevenness & angles, which prevent the roundness of them. Hence it comes that the forehead and face of the Man are of a square figure, and those who

are inclin'd to Melancholy, have corners of the forehead ending in a ſharp point, and long faces, contrary to the Flegmatick, who have them almoſt of a round figure. The mildneſs, modeſty, and the baſhfulneſs which appear in the countenance and actions of the Woman, are alſo effects of the cold, which abates the courage, and checks, or remits the motion of the parts. To the ſame principle is alſo to be attributed the ſmalneſs and weakneſs of the voice, by contracting the throat, in which it is framed, and weakning the vital faculty. But all theſe things fall more particularly under conſideration in the Treatiſe of *Beauty*; it ſhall ſuffice here to obſerve in the main that the natural conformation of the Woman follows the Temperament of cold and moiſt, in that degree which Nature hath preſcrib'd for the perfection of her Sex.

Art. 6.

That all theſe parts denote the Inclinations which are proper to the Woman.

OUr next work muſt be, to ſhew, that all theſe parts have a certain relation to the qualities of the mind, whereof we have given an account; that they are the ſigns which diſcover them, how ſecret ſoever they may be; and laſtly, that, of all the figures and lineaments which contribute to the Beauty of the Woman, there is not any one but denotes a vicious inclination.

We need produce no other proof of this truth than the natural weakneſs, which is remarkable in the body of the Woman, and the conformation of all her parts, whereof there is not any one, but is the effect, either

either of the coldneſs of her Temperament, or the moiſture predominant in her, as we have ſhewn already. For, ſince the weakneſs of the body, and of natural heat, is ever attended by an inclination to fearfulneſs, diſtruſt, avarice, *&c.* and that the ſuperabundance of moiſture accompanying it, cauſes ſoftneſs of nature, effeminacy, inconſtancy, and fickleneſs, *&c.* it follows, that ſhe hath not any part, which does not diſcover ſome one of the Inclinations beforementioned. But, for the further clearing up of a Propoſition that ſeems ſo ſtrange, we muſt fall into a more particular conſideration of things, and make it appear, by thoſe rules of Phyſiognomy, which *Ariſtotle*, and other great Perſons among the Antients, have left us, that there is no truth ſo well eſtabliſh'd as this.

Ariſtotle hath given us this obſervation, That a little face is a ſign of puſillanimity, and lowneſs of ſpirit. By that character, he deſigns thoſe who are not abe to bear good or bad fortune, who, upon the leaſt ſmile of proſperity, become inſolent; upon the leaſt frown of adverſity, are utterly caſt down and diſcourag'd; who entertain the leaſt delay or denial, as a great misfortune; a ſmall negligence for a great injury; continually complaining, diſtruſtfull of all they have to do with, full of ſuſpence in the taking of any reſolution, *&c.* as we ſhall ſhew more at large, when we come to the particular characters of this vice.

The round face denotes maliciouſneſs, and an eaſie inclination to anger.

The narrow forehead is an argument of a fickle and incorrigible diſpoſition.

The round forehead is a ſign of teſtineſs, and weakneſs of mind.

The high forehead, and very ſmooth, ſignifies flattery and diſſimulation.

Black eyes denote fearfulneſs; the large eye argues inconſtancy.

Thick and ſoft lips are marks of Loquacity, an over-buſie enquiry into the affairs of other people, and a negligence of their own. Some affirm; that they are the ſignificators of avarice and lying; which two vices are commonly obſervable in the *Moors*, whoſe lips are of that making.

The little mouth is a ſign of weakneſs and lying.

The round chin denotes envie.

The long and ſmall neck denotes a timorous diſpoſition, and a perſon inclin'd to loquacity.

When the upper part of the breaſt is ſmooth and fleſhy, it is an argument of credulity, and weakneſs of judgment.

The ſhoulders little and cloſe together, are ſigns of avarice.

When the thighs, feet and hands are fleſhy, the back ſtreight and weak, the hands little, all theſe are ſigns of a ſoft and effeminate conſtitution, that is, they denote a delicate and voluptuous perſon, one who is not able to endure any hardſhip, or pains-taking, to whom the ſlighteſt inconveniences are inſupportable, and one that impatiently bears the want of the leaſt pleaſures and enjoyments of life.

Art. 7.

Wherein perfect Beauty conſiſts.

THis is all the account we have to give of the Beauty as well of the Man as the Woman. There remains yet onely one difficulty, which, no doubt, will

will occurr to all thoſe who ſhall read this Diſcourſe, and may, if not reſolv'd, bring the truth we have eſtabliſhed, into ſome diſpute: It is this, that the Beauty, whereof we have given a deſcription, is proper and correſpondent onely to our climats, and not to be accommodated to others: for there is no Countrey but admits a diverſity of judgments and opinions, concerning this point; nay, there are ſome Nations that are ſo much at a diſtance from the ſentiments we have of Beauty, that they account beautifull, ſuch perſons, as in our apprehenſions, are little remov'd from deformity it ſelf.

If the caſe ſtand thus, how can any one frame to himſelf a certain and determinate Idæa of Beauty, which is ſo indeterminate, and full of diverſity, and reſtrain, to the deſigns of Nature, a thing which ſeems wholly to depend on the opinions of men? Nay, it being ſuppos'd, that it is a natural perfection, what Judge ſhall be able to decide, which is the moſt perfect and accompliſh'd, ſince every People and Nation, will imagine, it hath good grounds to beſtow the prize on that which is proper to it ſelf?

We anſwer then, that Reaſon onely is that ſoveraign Judg of all Nations, who is able to pronounce a final ſentence, in a buſineſs ſo nice, and proſecuted with ſo much partiality. Yet is it not *paricular* Reaſon that ſhall have this prerogative, but the *general* Reaſon, which is grounded on common notions, and principles not admitting of any diſpute.

This Reaſon it is which teaches us, that the Body is the Inſtrument of the Soul, and the greater number of faculties and different powers this latter hath, ſo much the greater diverſity of parts muſt the former have, to be employ'd as the organs thereof: for the

Instrument ought to be proportionate, both to the cause by which it is used, and to the action which it is, by its means, to perform. And whereas every power hath some, action proper thereto, it is accordingly requisite, that it should have an Instrument, particular to it self, that is, such as may have the consistence and figure proper to that very action. For, if the Saw had not the hardness and figure which are convenient for it, 'twould not be of any use to the workman, who hath any thing to do with it. Now, when an Instrument hath the qualities and dispositions requisite in order to the performance of its action, we may affirm it hath its perfection, in regard there is nothing wanting to it.

Moreover, it is certain, that in every order of things, there is but one onely perfection, in as much as there is but one principal end, whereto every one is design'd, and perfection consists in the end. Whence it may be inferr'd, that every power of the Soul hath but one perfection, and that the Instrument, whereof it makes use, can also have but one. So that Beauty, which is the perfection of the parts, and consists in the just Conformation they ought to have, can be but onely one, and that all those, which have not that conformation, have not the exact and perfect beauty, which is consonant to the nature of Man.

Now, the question is, to know, wherein this perfect and compleat beauty is to be found. To do that, let us proceed according to the principles which we have laid down before, and affirm, that the natural perfection of Man's body consists in the mediocrity, or *æquilibrium* of the Temperament, and the conformation of the parts. for the reasons we have already alledged; and that the Sexes, which could not retain it,

it, by reaſon of the different qualities it was requiſite they ſhould have, recede but very little from it. For it follows thence, that the Climate wherein perfect beauty is to be found, is that which is leaſt oppoſite to that mediocrity, and which, by its exact temperature, preſerves it, and alters it not. Now, it is out of all diſpute, that thoſe Countries, where the Elevation is about fourty five degrees, are the moſt temperate, as being in the midſt of all the extremities, and conſequently, if we are to ſearch after perfect Beauty, in one place rather than another, 'tis in thoſe Countries, and the parts adjacent, that it may be found.

I know there are ſome Countries ſo ſcituated, where it is not to be met with, as in thoſe parts of *China* and *America*, which are under the ſame degree. But we are not here to conſider onely the Poſition of the Heavens; we muſt alſo examine the nature of the Soil, the origine, policy and government of the Inhabitants. For that of *China* is too moiſt, by reaſon of the many Lakes and Rivers that are thereabouts: and that which is in *America* is too cold, by reaſon of the Woods and Mountains, as *New-France* is. Add to this, that there are ſome Nations, which are ſeated in very temperate places, but are not the original Inhabitants of them, and yet have preſerved the conformation which they receiv'd from their firſt habitations. In fine, theſe Nations are barbarous, and deſtitute of policy, and it is not to be doubted, but that the diſorders and imperfections of the Soul are communicated to the Body, and, in time, alter its Temperament, and many times diſtort its figure. So that we are not to look after true Beauty out of *Europe*, and that, of the Countries, comprehended within this part of the World, *France* is the likelieſt ſeat of it,

as being ſcituated juſt in the midſt of the extremities of hot and cold, dry and moiſt; in a word, of South and North.

Thence it is, that we have taken our Model of the Beauty which is convenient for Man and Woman. 'Tis true, we have made but a rude draught, or rather but drawn the firſt lines of it; but we ſhall fully finiſh, and give it its abſolute perfection, in the Treatiſe we have pupoſely deſign'd for ſo noble a Subject.

CHAP. II.

Of the Inclinations.

SECT. I.

Of the Nature of Inclination.

TO underſtand what is meant by *Inclination*, methinks there needs no more than to conſider the very word it ſelf, for it ſufficiently diſcovers, either that it is a Motion cauſing the Soul to incline or bend her ſelf towards ſome Object, or that it is a Diſpoſition to move towards it, ſince it cannot be imagin'd, that a thing may have a bent, or to bow it ſelf, towards ſome place or part, without ſuffering any motion. Now, whereas it may be ſaid that a man is inclined to Choler, without being ſtirr'd

ſtirr'd or mov'd thereby, and without feeling the effects of it, the conſequence is, that Inclination is not a Motion, and that it is onely a diſpoſition to move. But, in regard there are ſome diſpoſitions tranſient, and others that are conſtant and permanent, and that it is commonly ſaid, a man is inclin'd to a Paſſion when he is only diſpos'd thereto, by ſome extraordinary accident; it is expected, that the Inclination ſhould be a conſtant diſpoſition, by proceſs of time deeply rooted in the Soul.

Moreover, ſince it makes the Soul bend towards certain objects, it is requiſite, they ſhould have the appearance of good, for ſhe is never bent towards that which is evil; on the contrary, ſhe eſchews it. And though thoſe objects may, in effect, be evil, yet is it neceſſary, that, to her, they ſhould ſeem to be good, to raiſe in her the bent and inclination ſhe hath towards them. So, a Perſon inclin'd to Choler, finds a pleaſure in revenging himſelf; and accordingly, all the Paſſions, how troubleſome ſoever they may be, give a certain ſatisfaction to Nature, who, by them, provides for her own preſervation. For, though it be the judgment of Reaſon, that the Paſſion is evil, yet the ſenſitive part of the Soul finds in it a certain content, as in an action advantageous to it, in order to the end ſhe propoſes to her ſelf.

Art. 1.

The Object of the Inclination.

THe objects of the Inclination are of two kinds, Things and Actions, for a man hath an inclination for perſons, books, pictures, *&c.* There may alſo

also be an inclination to Passions, Vertues and Vices. But there is this difference, that it may be said people are inclin'd to actions, but it is not in like manner said of Things; for though it may be said of one, that he hath an inclination *for* a certain person, yet it is not said that he is inclin'd *to* that person. Whence it may be easily apprehended, that there are two kinds of Inclination in general, one justly and properly so called, the other improperly and figuratively.

That kind which communicates its form and name to the subject wherein it is, ought to pass for the proper and true Inclination, whereas the other is rather the effect of the Inclination, then the inclination it self; since it is the very motion, which the Appetite suffers, in loving and desiring something, and the other kind of Inclination is not the motion, but the disposition to move. So that, when it is said of some body, that he hath an inclination for such a person, it is meant of the friendship he hath towards him, or the disposition he hath to love him. This is the true inclination, the other onely the effect of this.

Art. 2.

The distinction of Inclinations.

HAving nothing to say here of that kind of inclination which is improperly so called, we shall speak onely of that which truly deserves that name. Of this also there are two kinds; one *Natural*, and proceeding from Nature; the osher *acquir'd*, and proceeding from habit and custom. There are some men naturally inclin'd to Love, Anger, Justice, *&c.* others

others acquire an inclination to Vertues, Vices, and Paſſions, whereto they were not naturally inclin'd.

Art. 3.

The Seat of the Inclinations.

BUt the kinds before mentioned reſide in the Soul as their true and proper ſeat. For beſides that, of the Inclinations, ſome are wholly *Spiritual*, as thoſe which Arts and Sciences leave in the mind, others are *Corporeal*; as for example, the eaſe and facility, wherewith a Trades-man works, when he hath good tools; for this facility is not in the tools, though it proceeds from them. In like manner, the inclination which a man hath to be angry, is not in the organs, though it proceeds from the conſtitution of the organs; in as much as the diſpoſition, , which a thing hath to move, as well as the motion, whereby it is afterwards agitated, ought to be in the thing it ſelf, and not in the cauſes, from which it receives that diſpoſition and motion. It follows therefore, ſince it is the Soul which ought to move, that the diſpoſition to move ſhould be in the Soul.

From hence it may be eaſily inferr'd, that the *Appetite* is the ſeat of the Inclinations, in regard that is the onely part of the Soul, which may be moved. And whereas there are three ſorts of Appetite, the *Will*, the *Senſitive* appetite, and the *Natural* appetite, each of them hath ſuch inclinations as are ſuitable and conformable thereto: that is to ſay, the ſpiritual are in the Will, as thoſe which Arts and Sciences leave in the mind; the Senſible are in the Senſitive appetite, as thoſe which a man hath to the paſſions of the ſenſitive

sitive Soul; and those which are purely *corporeal* make their aboad in the Natural appetite, such as are those which Nature hath for certain motions of the humours in diseases, and for all the actions, for which the organs are design'd. For, even before the parts are in a capacity and condition to act, the Soul hath an inclination to the functions, which they ought to perform. Whence it comes, that a young Ramm runs his head against things before his horns are in sight; a young wild Boar will offer to bite, before his tusks are grown out; and Birds endeavour to flie, though though they are not fully fledg'd. Yet are we to make this observation by the way, that the inclinations of one Appetite are many times communicated to another: For the Inclination a man hath to passions is at last entertain'd into the Will, and those of the Natural appetite commonly spread themselves into the Sensitive, as the examples we have alledged sufficiently evince.

Art. 4.

How Inclination is to be defin'd.

FRom all these considerations, me thinks it were no hard matter to frame an exact definition of Inclination, which may be this. *Inclination is a certain disposition deeply rooted in the Appetite, which receives from it a bent towards certain objects acceptable thereto.* But to speak more significantly, we are to acknowledge that these *Metaphorical* kinds of expression are not proper to define *things*, and the words of *bending*, or *bowing*, or *weighing*, whereby Inclination is commonly defin'd, cannot be properly said

said of any thing, but *bodies*, and are not to be attributed to the Soul. Let us endeavour then to find out some other expedient, to clear up this matter, and to look after some other notions and terms, which may be more proper to the thing, now under our examination.

Art. 5.

Whence proceeds the Disposition, wherein the Inclination consists.

Out of all controversie then it is, that the Appetite hath certain motions, whereto it is commonly more inclin'd then to others, and it may be said, that it hath a disposition to perform them, and that the said disposition consists in the facility, which it meets with, in the performance of them. The question then is, to know, whence it receives this disposition and facility: for it cannot proceed from the weight, situation, figure, or any other circumstances of that kind, which cause, in Bodies, a disposition and facility to move themselves.

To discover this secret, it is to be laid down as granted, that the Inclination is a disposition, and a fixt and permanent facility, that happens to the Appetite, and consequently it is necessary, that the cause which produces it, should also be durable and permanent. Now all the causes of that order which may be imagin'd, as to the present enquiry, are reducible either to the disposition of the organ of the appetite, or to the habit, which it may have acquired, or to the images which are preserv'd in the memory, and frame

frame the knowledge precedent to its motion: for these things onely are permanent, and may cause that disposition and constant facility, wherein the inclination consists. It might then be affirmed, that, if the Spirits are the organs, and immediate seat of the Appetite, as we shall have occasion to shew hereafter, it must follow, that according as they are more subtile or more gross, they are the more or the less easily mov'd, and that the Appetite, which moves along with them, receives its motion with greater slowness or activity. And that hence it proceeds, there are some constitutions which are so changeable, love with so much facility, and desire things with so much earnestness; and on the contrary, there are others, whose Souls are so heavie, that it is almost impossible to stirr them, and prosecute the attainment of their desires with a lethargick supinity and negligence.

But this reason is not general for all the Inclinations; for, besides that there are some which proceed from the instinct, and have no dependance on the qualities of the spirits, there are some also in the Will, which is not engag'd to any organ; nay, we acknowledge, that there are such even in Angels, in whom it is out of all dispute, that neither that cause, nor any other corporeal disposition, can have any place. The same thing is to be said concerning the habit, which the Appetite may have contracted, since the habit is a quality acquired by many actions, and that there are some natural inclinations, which are derived from the very birth.

If these things be as they are laid down, there remain only the Images, preserv'd in the memory, which may be the general and immediate cause of this disposition and facility, wherein the Inclination consists.

Art.

Art. 6.

How the motions of the Appetite are wrought.

TO underſtand how this is done, we are to obſerve, that the Appetite, what order ſoever it be of, is a blind power, which, of it ſelf, hath not any knowledge, but ſuffers it ſelf to be guided by another faculty, that hath the priviledge of diſcerning, whether the things are good or evil, and afterwards to command the Appetite, to move conformably to the judgment it hath paſs'd of them. This Faculty is called the *Practick Underſtanding*, in the Superiour part; and in the Senſitive, it hath the name of the *Eſtimative faculty*. And there is not any motion wrought in theſe two parts of the Soul, which is not preceded by the judgment of one of theſe two faculties.

The ſaid faculties have alſo this further property, that they do not paſs their judgment according to the nature of the things, but according to the Sentiment they have of them. For it ſomtimes happens, that thoſe things may be profitable, which they judge evil, and, on the contrary, thoſe may be evil, which, according to their judgment, ſeem good. Nor is this to be wondred at at all, in as much as Good and Evil are of things relative, which yet are not known to be ſuch, but according to the compariſon made by the Soul between them; things which have no particular ſpecies to ſmite the Senſes, as all ſenſible qualities have; and which are not known, but onely by the Images which theſe faculties frame of themſelves, without borrowing of them elſewhere. Whence it comes,

comes, that it is said in the Scholes, the knowledge of them is attain'd, *per species non sensatas.* In a word, what is good to one, is not such to another, nay, one and the same person thinks that delightfull to him now, which, a little before, he had thought troublesome; whence it may be easily seen, that Good and Evil depend on the opinion conceiv'd thereof.

To find out now whence the opinion may derive this knowledge, and what obliges it to judg that things are good or evil, is a busines that requires a more particular consideration, than to be fully determin'd here. Let it then suffice, that we give this satisfaction at present, That it is the Instinct, experience, & the true or false ratiocination which it makes of things. For upon the knowledge it hath of the Temperament, and the parts organically subservient thereto; upon that which it receives from the conceit of its own strength or weakness; and lastly, upon that, which proceeds from the defect or abundance wherein it is it judges, that the things are conformable, or contrary to it, advantageous or hurtfull, in a word, good, or bad.

Art. 7.

Of the Judgments of the said Faculties.

AS soon then as either of these two Faculties hath thus fram'd to it self an Idæa of Good and Evil, it ordinarily makes two judgments; according to the former whereof, it is convinc'd, that the Good ought to be persu'd, and the Evil avoided, and this is that which is simply called *Practick.* By the second, it effectually commands the Appetite to persue, or to avoid; and

and accordingly it is called in the Schools actually Pratick, *Practicè practicum.* Thereupon the Appetite moves, commanding the motive vertue, which is in the members to perform the motions neceſſary, either to attain the Good, or avoid the Evil.

All theſe actions are performed conſequently, and commonly wrought-in a moment; but ſometimes they are alſo diſtinct and ſeparate, and that eſpecially in Man. For the underſtanding may know a thing to be good, yet without judging that it ought to be perſu'd; and many times it judges that a thing is to be perſu'd, and yet does not order the will to do it. Nay, it often happens, that, after all theſe judgments, the Will, which is at liberty, follows not thoſe orders, and may remain immovable, or make a contrary motion. But in other Animals, the Practick Judgment, and the motion of the Appetite, cannot be ſeparated, and as ſoon as the Eſtimative faculty hath known a thing to be good, there is a neceſſity, that, in the ſame moment, it ſhould judge, and command the Appetite to perſue it; and this latter punctually obeys, and never fails moving, conformably to thoſe judgments.

There remains then onely the command, which the Appetite lays on the motive vertue of the members, that may be ſuſpended. For we commonly find, that a Beaſt deſires ſome thing, which it dares not take, by reaſon of the awe it is in. In which caſe, the Appetite moves and frames the deſire, but it proceeds no further, ſuſpending the concurrent action of the members.

However it be then, it may be eaſily inferr'd, from all we have already delivered, not onely, that the Appetite moves conformably to the Practick

Judgment, that is to say, that its motions are strong or weak, according as the Estimative faculty does strongly or weakly command it to perform them; but also, that the Practick Judgment answers the Notion which the Estimavite faculty hath fram'd to it self of the good or evil, and that the command is more or less pressing, according to the imagination it frames to it self of higher or lower degrees of goodness or evil in the things. For a greater good requires a more imperious command then a lesser, and such a command raises a passion so much the more violent.

Art. 8.

That the Images which are in the memory, are the causes of Inclination.

NOw, if the motions of the Appetite have this dependance on the judgments of the Estimative faculty, it must follow, that the dispositions, which make it inclinable to those motions, should also have some relation to the said judgments. Yet shall not this relation be to those, which the estimative faculty frames to it self when it knows; for they are transient, and the Inclination is a permanent disposition; but it shall be to those, which are preserv'd in the memory, as we said before. Of these, there are two kinds; for they are either *Natural*, or *Accidental*. The natural consist in the Images which Nature imprints in the Souls of Animals at their coming into the World, and this is that which is called *Instinct*, as we have shewn in our Treatise, concerning the *Knowledge of Animals*. The acquired or accidental consist also in the Images, which

which remain in the memory, after the action of the Estimative faculty. Under this name I comprehend also the Practick Understanding.

Now, as these two sorts of Images serve for Models to the estimative faculty, in order to the framing of its Judgments, according as they shall be more expressive, and have a greater representation of the goodness or evil of the objects; so will they be more proper to raise, in the Estimative faculty, such commands as shall be more pressing, and in the Appetite, greater motions.

In the mean time, it is certain, that the Natural are perfectly representative, in as much as they are of Nature's own framing, in order to the conservation of the Animal, and that they are the more deeply graven in the Soul, to the end they might not be blotted out. But the acquired are but superficial, and if they be not often renewed, they are so lost or weakned, that they cannot make a perfect representation of things. 'Tis true, there are certain objects, which upon the first sight make so strong an impression in the Soul, that the species thereof are preserv'd a long time in the memory, and that the first apprehension, which is had of them, hath as great an influence upon him, as many several apprehensions often reiterated would have, upon some other occasion. Hence it comes, that the first sight of a very beautifull person, many times, raises a Love which continues many years. Upon this account, it is said commonly in the Schools, that there are certain acts, which, alone, and upon the first performance of them, may produce habits. But otherwise, that is, those onely excepted, there is a necessity, that the Images, which the Soul frames, and continues in the me-

mory, should be often renew'd, and, as it were, receive a second touch, by several subsequent reflections, that they may be perfectly expressive and representative. For as often as ever the Soul makes an apprehension, or a commemoration of some object, so often does she frame an Image thereof to her self; in regard that, by apprehending or remembring, she acts, and that she can have no other action, then the production of Images; which Images, joyn'd with those that are in the memory, render them stronger, and more lively, much after the same manner, as the colours, which are often touched over; as we have shewn in the place before alledged.

Art. 9.

That the disposition and facility of the Appetite's motion proceeds from the same Images.

THese Images therefore which are in the memory, and are accordingly perfectly expressive, are those, from which, the disposition and facility, which the Appetite hath to motion toward certain objects, does proceed.

And certainly, it may be affirm'd, that the Soul, which finds her self stored with these Images, and sees her self in a condition to produce the apprehensions necessary to her, is raised up to a certain confidence in her self; and, without any reflection of hers thereupon, she is sensible of her own strength and courage. And as a man who hath a vigorous body, much wealth, or is of noble extraction, assumes a confidence in himself, and is at all times in a condition

tion to undertake things conformably to his power, though he thinks not of it: in like manner, the Soul does the same, when she hath the Images in a readiness, in order to the making of her judgments; she hath all her faculties in a disposition fit to act; and, when she is in action, it may be easily perceiv'd she was prepar'd thereto.

And thence it will not be hard to judge, that the Instinct, the Temperament, the Habits, *&c.* cause the inclinations, because all these things presuppose Images perfectly expressive. For those of the Instinct are strong and deep, as we have already shewn; those of the Habits ought to be often reiterated: and the Temperament, the Conformation of the parts, kind of life, *&c.* which the Soul knows, and is sensible of, have the same effect on the Images, as the Habit. Whence it may be inferr'd, that, in all these the Images are perfectly representative, the Appetite is in a condition to move, as soon as the Practick understanding, or the Estimative faculty, shall present them to it. And here does consist the facility which it hath to be inclin'd thereto, as the Inclination consists in that facility, as we have already affirmed. These things thus laid down, we may define the Inclination, by proper notions and terms, thus: *The Inclination is a permanent disposition, and a facility, attain'd by a long progress of time, which the Appetite hath to move towards certain objects, which are acceptable and delightfull thereto.*

SECT. 2.

What are the Causes of the Inclinations.

Art. 1.

The several distinctions of the said causes.

THus farr have we discourſed concerning the nature, object, and ſeat of the Inclinations; we now come to an examination of the cauſes thereof. For, though we have already ſpoken of the principal cauſe, and that which is the immediate ſource of them, to wit, the Images, which are preſerv'd in the memory, yet are there yet remaining ſome others, which, albeit not ſo nearly adjacent to the Inclination, are nevertheleſs, in a certain degree, neceſſary thereto; nay, they are ſuch, as, being better known, and more manifeſt, will accordingly give a greater light to a thing ſo obſcure as this is.

Beſides therefore that ſecret and immediate Cauſe we have treated of before, there are two other kinds, to wit, *Next* cauſes and *Remote*, and both of them are either *Natural*, or *Moral*.

Of the *Natural*, the *Next* are, the Inſtinct, the Temperament, and the Conformation of the parts. The *Remote* are, the Starrs, the Climate, difference of Age, of Suſtenance, and indiſpoſitions of the body.

The *Moral* are, nobleneſs, or meanneſs, of Extraction,

traction, Riches and Poverty, Power and Subjection, good and bad Fortune, and kind of Life, which comprehends Arts, Sciences, Habits, and Counsels, Examples, Punishments, and Rewards. For all these things raise particular inclinations, by disposing the Soul, to judge, whether the things are good, and givng her a bent towards them. We are now to consider how this is done.

Art. 2.

That the Instinct is one of the causes of the Inclinations.

AS to the *Instinct*, there is no doubt, but that it must be numbred among the said Causes, when it shall be found, that it consists in the Images, which have their birth with the Animal, in order to its apprehension of those things, which are necessary for its conservation, and whereof he cannot come to the knowledg by the Senses. For as these Images are perfectly expressive, as being perfectly present to the Soul; so, upon all occasions, they are the Sollicitours and remembrancers of the Estimative faculty, that it would propose them to the Appetite, and raise, in that, as we said before, the inclination it hath to the action, which they command should be done.

Thus is it, that the Soul apprehends, and is inclin'd to the functions, whereto she is design'd, and to a search after most of those things, which are necessary for her. For thence proceeds the inclination which Birds have to flie, Fish to swim, Men to discourse; and which all living Creatures have, to seek

out the sustenance and remedies, which they know are naturally fit and profitable for them.

Art. 3.

That the Temperament is one of the causes of the Inclinations.

AS concerning the *Temperament*, it is unanimously acknowledged by all, to be the most general, and most eminent cause of the Inclinations; that, according to that quality of the humours which is predominant in the body, men are inclin'd to such and such passions; that such as are subject to Melancholy are naturally sad, and ingenious; the Cholerick, active and angry; the Sanguine, jovial and affable; the Flegmatick, stupid and slothful. As to *Climates*, there are some, in which men are more ingenious, and more civiliz'd; in others, more dull and savage, according to the quality of the air they breath, and which produces that effect, by the impression it makes upon the Temperament. Lastly, that the very Animals themselves are fearful, or venturous, docile or untractable, proportionably to the coldness or heat, the thickness or subtility of their blood.

The reason, for which the Temperament is the cause of all these effects, is deduced from the secret knowledge which the soul hath of the instruments whereof she makes use in her actions; for being so neerly united or joyned to them, she knows the weakness or strength thereof, and consequently is soon satisfi'd what she may, and what she may not do by their means.

Now

Now though this knowledge be secret, yet does it not proceed from the instinct, for the instinct is a clear and distinct knowledge, which is bestow'd only on the species, and consequently ought to be common to all the individuals that are under it, whereas this knowledge is different in every one of them, and is withall obscure and confused. For the Soul hath but a confused knowledge of choler: and thence it comes, that she represents it to her self in dreams, by certain Images, which do not absolutely resemble it, but have only a certain conformity to it, such as are those of fire, fighting, bright colours, &c. She does the same thing in Melancholy, which she figures to her self by spectres, obscurity, and inextricable disturbances; and so proportionably of the others, as we shall press more particularly in the Treatise of the *TEMPERAMENTS*.

Now this knowledge, how confus'd soever it may be, is sufficient to instruct the soul, how far she may be able to act, or not to act, by the assistance of these humours. For it teaches her, by the experience she makes of it ever and anon, that choler is an active and unconstant humour, and that it may be serviceable to her, in assaulting, fighting with, and destroying whatever injures her: That, on the contrary, Melancholy is not easily stirr'd, troublesome, and opposite to the principles of life; and so of the rest. And upon this knowledge, the Estimative faculty frames its judgment, conformably to the effects produced by these humours, which it keeps in the memory, and every foot, refreshes by new apprehensions, by that means rendring them perfectly representative, and capable of producing the inclinations, which we commonly observe therein.

Art.

Art. 4.

That the Conformation of the parts is a cauſe of the Inclination.

AS to the *Conformation of the parts*, I do not think any body doubts, but that it is a certain ſign of many Inclinations, in as much as it is obſervable, that, without any art, but only, by the bare inſpection of the lineaments of the face, the humour and thoughts of ſome perſons may be, in ſome meaſure, diſcovered; That thoſe men, in whom there is a certain reſemblance to certain other Animals, are inclinable to the ſame paſſions as they are; That ſuch as deal in Horſes, and Huntſmen, conſult it very exactly, that they may thereby judge of the docility and tractability of Horſes and Dogs; And laſtly, that it is come into a Proverb, affirming, that thoſe are not to be truſted, who are guilty of any ſtrange default or miſcarriage of Nature.

But I am further to add, that this Conformation of the parts is not only the ſign, but is alſo the cauſe of thoſe inclinations, for it gives the ſoul a bent to certain actions, as the Temperament doth. Yet is it not to be ſaid, that the Conformation is the effect of the Temperament, and conſequently, that it does not denote the inclinations upon any other ground, then that it denotes the Temperament, which is the true cauſe thereof, and not it. For though this may be true, in many occaſions, and that it is certain alſo, that ordinarily the parts are lengthned, contracted, and aſſume ſeveral figures, according to the quality of the

the predominant humour; yet does it very often happen, that the Conformation agrees not with the Temperament, and that, for instance, a cold complexion may be consistent with a Conformation, which seems to denote heat. Accordingly the heart and brain are sometimes too great or too little in the same Temperament; which must needs cause a notable difference in the passions, over which those two parts have any power. Add to this, how many cholerick persons are there who have thick and short noses; and how many subject to melancholy have them long and sharp, contrary to the nature of those humours? Who would affirm, that all the *Tartars* and all the *Chineses* are of the same Temperament, because all the former have large faces, and that the latter are all flat-nos'd? Are there not some creatures of different species, that have the same Temperament, and yet the figure of their parts is wholy different?

To be short, it is not the Temperament which penetrates the veines and arteries, which makes the articulation of the bones, divides the fingers, and builds up that admirable structure of the parts of every animal. But it is the formative vertue is the Architect, which the soul imployes to build up a body, such as may be fit to perform the actions, whereto it is designed; and whereas this vertue alwaies endeavours to make the Animal it frames, like unto that which produces it, if this latter have parts of such a largness and figure the aforesaid vertue, which bears the character of it, alwaies frames the like, if it be not obstructed. It is true, that many times the Temperament opposes its design, and hinders the parts from receiving that figure, which the formative vertue

vertue had design'd to give them: but many times also, it does not oppose, but leaves it to act, according to the measures it hath taken. Hence it comes, that the imagination of Women with child causes it to change the figure of the Embryo's parts, so as that the Temperament makes no opposition: Thus the Stars imprint on the body such marks as are not correspondent to the natural complexion thereof, &c.

Art. 5.

How Figure acts.

ALl this presuppos'd, the next question is, to know, how *Figure*, which is a barren quality, and does not act at all, may cause inclinations. Nor is it to be imagin'd, that it produces them by an active vertue: for the Temperament it self, though it have that vertue, yet does not employ it upon the soul, which is not susceptible of material qualities: there being not any thing, that can really either warm or cool the soul. So that both the Temperament and Conformation of the parts, are only occasional causes and motives, which excite her to the performance of her actions. When she hath taken cognizance of the heat which is predominant in the body, she frames her judgements conformably to the effects, which she is able to produce, and afterwards disposes her self to set the organs on work, according to the design she hath taken. The same thing is to be said of Figure, she knows which is, which is not proper for certain functions, she afterwards makes her judgment of them, and lastly sollicits the Appetite to

to move conformably to the resolution she hath taken.

Now as there are some figures, which are fit for the motion of natural bodies; others, opposite thereto; so is it certain, that every organicall function hath a certain figure, that is suitable to it, and without which it cannot be otherwise then imperfectly performed. Thence it comes, that every part, nay every species of living creature, hath a different figure, because the functions of it are different. And as the body, which should have been square, and was consequently design'd for rest, receives a property and aptitude to motion, when it is reduc'd to a round figure; in like manner, when any one of the organical parts, which should have been of such a figure, receives some other, it is deprived of the disposition it had for the function, for which it was design'd, and acquires that which hath some correspondence with the extraordinary figure it hath receiv'd.

The case is the same, as when an Artisan makes use of an Instrument, which is not convenient and fit for the design he had propos'd to himself; for instead of doing what he intended, he does the quite contrary; he cuts off that which he should have bored, he makes uneven, what he should have smooth'd, and whereas his design was to cast the statue of a man, he does that of a Lyon, if the mold he makes use of be such as may represent that creature.

Such is the procedure of the soul, when she hath such organs as have not the natural figure they ought to have. For there is nothing more certain, then that man, as well as all other Animals, hath a proper and peculiar figure, design'd by nature to every one of his

his parts. And therefore as the soul hath an inclination to perform the actions, which are proper to the organs, she ought to have, so must it needs follow, that that inclination will be chang'd, when the organ is chang'd.

But there remains yet a difficulty which seems not easily resolvable. It is this, that the soul knows, by the instinct, the action, which the organs ought to perform, when they have the conformation proper and natural to them. On the contrary, this cannot be said, when the organ hath not the figure it ought to have, because the Instinct gives her not the apprehension of the action, which is not proper to her, since it is a particular default, and that the Instinct is a general apprehension bestow'd on the whole species.

To rid our hands of this difficulty, we are to observe, that the figure of the parts is the effect of the formative vertue, and that the said vertue follows the Temperament, or the impression, and image it hath receiv'd from the animal engendring. If it follow the Temperament, the figure is not the cause of the inclination, it is only the sign of it, in regard the Temperament is the true cause thereof, and in that case, the soul knows the action of the part by means of the Temperament, as we have said before. But if it follow the impression, or the image of the animal which engenders, the formative vertue is the cause of the inclination, inasmuch as it is a faculty, which brings along with it, not only the character of the parts of the animal engendring, but also the disposition which it had to act conformably to their figure. And this is so unquestionable, that, many times, the child betrayes the same inclinations as his parents

parents had done before him, though he do not resemble them, the Temperament having opposed the figure of the parts, yet not had strength enough to deface the disposition to the inclination, which they had. Now it is certain, that it is only the formative vertue which brings the character of these inclinations, there being not any thing which the animal engendring communicates to that which is engendred, but only that vertue, as several modern experiences have made apparent.

Now as the formative vertue, which is in the organs of the animal engendring, moves with those organs, so it acquires the same bent, and the same disposition to move, which those organs have; so that, coming to frame another animal, it carries along with it that very same disposition, which it hath acquir'd, and communicates it thereto. And whereas this disposition is as it were a weight, continually pressing and solliciting the soul to move; the soul sensible of that sollicitation, at last frames the judgment conformable to the impression she hath receiv'd from it, and afterwards derives it to the Appetite, which entertains the same bent: and this bent is the true Inclination, in regard the Inclination cannot be any where but in the appetite.

Art. 6.

How Inclinations are produc'd by the remote Causes.

THus far have we discours'd of the *Natural* and *Next* causes of the Inclinations. As to the *Remote*, they are all in a manner reducible to the Temperament.

perament. For the Stars, the Climate, Age, Aliment, and the Indiſpoſitions of body, have no other influence on the inclinations, then what is caus'd by the alteration they make in the temperament. True it is, there are ſome diſeaſes, which alter them, by deſtroying the Conformation of the parts, as a man, who is maim'd in the hand or leg, looſes the inclination he had to play on the Lute, or dance.

As concerning the *Moral* Cauſes, they diſpoſe the *Eſtimative faculty* to make its judgments, according to the apprehenſion it receives from them, of the ſtrength or weakneſs they have: as Nobleneſs of birth, Wealth, good Fortune, raiſe in men an inclination to Ambition, Pride, and Courage, in regard they are perſwaded, by the power they derive from them, that they deſerve honours, and that there is not any thing, which they may not attempt; whereas, on the contrary, the inclinations ariſing from meanneſs of birth, poverty, and ill fortune, are oppoſite to the other. All the reſt, as courſe of Life, Arts, Sciences, Vertues, and Vices, are grounded on Cuſtome, which renders things eaſie and agreeable, upon the recommendation of the profit or pleaſure, that may be reaped thereby. For all this being frequently repreſented to the Eſtimative faculty, it makes favourable judgments thereof, which are preſerv'd in the memory, and at laſt cauſe the Appetite to incline, as we have ſhewn elſwhere.

But we muſt not in this place omit one advertiſement, which is abſolutely neceſſary in reference to the ſubject we treat of. It is this, that, when we ſpeak of the Temperament, we do not underſtand only, by that word, the conjunction and mixture of the firſt qualities, but our meaning is, to add thereto the

the second qualities. And therefore we do not speak only of the hot, cold, dry, or moist Temperament, but also of the Sanguine, Cholerick, Flegmatick, and Melancholick Temperament, in regard the humours, which give the denominations to these Temperaments, comprehend these two sorts of qualities. But, of all the second qualities, there are not any so considerable, in reference to the Inclinations, as *subtilty* and *grossness*, for every humour may be either subtile or gross, and a subtile Melancholy is more different from a gross, then it is from choler. Accordingly, the effects of it are promptitude, inconstancy, anger, as they are of choler; whereas the productions of the gross melancholy are slothfulness, stupidity, obstinacy. And it is upon this particular, that medicine hath not sufficiently explicated it self, in the division of the Temperaments; for it hath set down but nine, one temperate, and the other eight in excess, which might have been multiplied, by addition of subtilty and grossness, and by the interchangeable mixtures, which may be assign'd in men; as the Cholerick-Sanguine; the Melancholick-Sanguine, *&c.* as we shall shew more exactly in the *Treatise of the Temperaments.*

Art. 7.

Of the nature of Aversion.

THus have we given an account of all we could discover in a business, which haply is the most obscure, and most abstruse, of any relating to Animals. I must, for my part, ingenuously confess, that I

never met with any thing, more hard to conceive, then the nature of the inclination, the manner after which it is fram'd in the soul, and how it causes the Appetite to move. But if I have perform'd what I aim'd at in this disquisition, I may say, that I have made two discoveries for one; for the reasons I have used to clear up these difficulties, may also serve for those that may occur in the knowledge of *Aversion*, and are in all respects like unto them.

Accordingly the tearm *Aversion* is not here taken for that motion of the Appetite, which frames *Hatred*, but only for a Disposition and facility that it hath to assume that motion, the account we have to give of this, as to our meaning thereby, being the same we have already given of the word *Inclination*.

Suitably to this explication, we are to affirm, that as the Inclinations are either *Natural* or *Acquired*, so are there the same divisions of *Aversion*. The Appetite also is the seat of both. All the same causes, whether *Natural*, or *Moral*, or *Next*, or *Remote*, act therein after the same manner, and equally dispose the soul to move. All the difference is, that they have contrary objects, and that they alwaies tend to contrary motions. For the inclination looks only after things agreeable, and gives the soul a bent towards them; but Aversion is for those that are unpleasant, and disposes the Appetite to avoid them.

So that it may be thus defin'd, *Aversion is a permanent Disposition, and a facility attain'd by a long progress of time, which the Appetite hath to recede from certain objects, which are disagreeable thereto.*

There is no necessity of any further explication, how the soul comes to attain and contract this facility; for

for whatever we have said concerning that which is in the Inclination is common to both.

CHAP. III.

Of the Motions of the Soul.

SECT. I.

That the Soul moves.

ALL people talk of the motions of the Soul; 'tis generally said, that she is inclin'd towards the good, and avoids evil; that she grows resolute, or is discourag'd, at the meeting of difficulties; and there is no language but hath certain terms, whereby to express the agitations she gives her self: so that it is a thing manifest, and such as ought not to be admitted into dispute, that the soul can move, and that she effectually hath such motions as are proper and peculiar to her.

And certainly, as it is to be granted, that she ought to know the things that are good and evil, and that this knowledge were of no advantage, nay would be prejudicial to her, if she had not the means to enjoy the good, and shun the evil; In like manner, is it necessary, that, with the said knowledge, she should have the vertue of moving, that so she may

approach the good, and recede from the evil, which she knows.

Art. 1.

What part of the Soul moves.

FOr this reason therefore hath the Soul two principal *faculties*; one, in reference to her *knowledge*, the other, to her *motion*; which faculties are in all the orders of the soul. For in the *Intellectual* Soul, the *Understanding* knows, and the *Will* moves; in the *Sensitive*, the *Imagination* supplies the place of the *knowing* faculty, and the *sensitive* Appetite frames the motions: And in the *Natural*, there is also a certain vertue, which, after its manner, knows what is good or bad for it; and an *appetite* which causes all the motions that we observe therein.

Art. 2.

That the motions of the Soul are not metaphorical.

THe greatest difficulty of all, is, to know, of what nature these motions are, and whether the soul does effectually move, or that this is a figurative manner of speaking, representing the actions of the soul, according to a certain conformity, which may be between them and the motions of the body. For my part, I am fully satisfy'd as to the question, and

and therefore affirm, (though contrary to the Tenents of all Philosophy and the Schools, maintaining that they are only metaphorical motions) that they are true and real motions, whereby the Soul changes place, and puts her self into diverse situations.

Art. 3.

That the rational Soul hath a real motion, as the Angels have.

TO establish therefore this doctrine, which must serve to explicate the nature of the Passions, we are, in the first place, to consider the motions of the rational Soul. For if it can be shewn, that, being wholy spiritual, as she is, she nevertheless moves, it will be a great presumption for the others, which are fasten'd and chain'd to matter.

Now to do this would be no hard task, could we but comply so far with Theology, as to grant that Angels really move, that they pass from one place to another, that they dilate and contract themselves, taking up a greater or lesser space. For this verity presuppos'd, it may be inferr'd, that the rational soul, which is of the same nature with them, ought to have the same advantage.

But what, is not the soul dilated when a child grows bigger? Is she not contracted, and restrain'd into a less space, when some members are cut off? And when one dies, does she not depart out of the body, and remove into some other place? Which, if

it is not to be doubted, that she is susceptible of a reall motion, since that in all these, there is a change of situation and place, as in the Angels.

And certainly it cannot well enter into a man's imagination, that being Noble, as she is, she should be depriv'd of a vertue, which is common to all things created. For there is not any body, but hath the power to move it self, either by the weight or lightness it hath; all things having life grow and diminish; all animals move of themselves; and if, to all this, we add the motion of Angelical substances, it is not probable, the soul should be the only thing in the Universe, that hath not any motion, and should, of its own nature, be immovable.

Art. 4.

That the motions of the Will are reall motions.

I imagine to my self there are few persons will oppose this kind of motion, but they will haply object, that it is not in this the knot of the difficulty consists; and that the question is, to know, whether the internal motions of the Will, as Love, Hate, *&c.* are of the same kind with the forementioned.

To make our way into this deep and subtile part of Philosophy, we are to presuppose, that all the intellectual substances, which are created, have certain bounds and limits, in regard Immensity is one of the incommunicable attributes of the Creator. Now, that which

which hath limits, muſt of neceſſity have extenſion, and that extenſion ought to have parts; for a man cannot conceive limits without extenſion, nor any extenſion without parts, at leaſt virtual and aſſignable, as they are called in the Schools. True it is indeed, that this extenſion, and theſe parts, are of another kind then thoſe of bodies; for they are ſpiritual, indiviſible, aud may be penetrated, without being ſubject to any place, whereby they ſhould be limitted or confin'd: wheras thoſe of bodies are material, diviſible, and impenetrable, and really take up place, which limits and contains them. Upon this ground we may affirm, that the Rational Soul hath extenſion, and the parts that are proper to ſubſtances ſeparated from matter, that is to ſay ſuch as are ſpiritual, indiviſible and penetrable, and that, by their means, ſhe takes up ſome certain ſpace, wherein ſhe is.

If the Soul moves then, as we have ſhewn ſhe does, as being movable in all its ſubſtance, it is in her power, not onely to paſs from one part to another, and take up another ſpace, then that which ſhe had before; but ſhe may alſo, without changing the place, or part where ſhe is, cauſe her parts to move in her ſelf, after the ſame manner, as the water, contain'd in a Veſſel, may be agitated in its parts, without changing its place. For ſince ſhe hath parts, and that thoſe parts are movable, as her ſelf, ſhe may move ſuch as ſhe pleaſes, and as ſhe thinks fit. And thence it is conſequent, that one appetite may be moved, while the other reſts, or ſuffers a contrary motion; as it is ſaid, that an Angel may have ſome parts that move, while others reſt. When therefore the Soul changes place, ſhe makes that kind of motion, which is called *tranſient*, which is like that which the Angels make, when they remove

from one place to another. But when she changes not, and is onely mov'd within her self, she makes the interiour motions of the Will: for, according as she either sends forth, or calls in her parts within her self; according as she dilates or contracts them, she frames all the Passions, as we shall shew hereafter.

And certainly the Soul may, with just grounds, be compar'd to a great abyss, which, without exceeding its bounds, suffers all the motion, which the tempest can raise therein: one while it is violently forc'd against the banks, and then immediately to receed again; another, it seems to be forc'd out of its profundities, and then again to enter into them; but how impetuous soever the tempest be, the other never exceeds its bounds.

The case is much the same with the Will, when it makes after the good, or shuns the evil, it makes place for it self; if it go forward, or retreat, it neither gains nor loses any thing of the space, which it took up, in so much that it may be said, that it is already where it would go, and that it still continues in the same place whence it went. For, in fine, we must necessarily acknowledge, that there are in this vast and profound power many, and those different, parts, which like waves follow one in the neck of the other, and keep in motion the current, into which it suffers it self to be carried away. When one is advanc'd to the highest pitch, another that follows takes its place, which it as soon resigns to another, and so successively, till such time as the Soul gives over moving!

True it is, that the agitation, which the Will raises in the spirits, and humours, makes its motion last much longer then it intended it should: for when they are gross and dense, the impetuosity, which they have re-

ceiv'd,

ceiv'd, cannot be so soon calm'd, as when they are rare and subtile, and the Soul suffers her self to be carried away by the motion, whereby they are agitated. Thus is it, that the Passions continue longer in Men then Children: for these latter pass in a moment from joy to sadness, nay, when they give over laughing, we see the lines and lineaments of the precedent laughter immediately vanished: whereas in Men, they pass away slowly, and leave in the face, for the space of some minutes, the impression they have made therein. For all this difference proceeds hence, that the spirits of Children are more delicate and subtile, and consequently, as all other things of the like nature, do not long retain the violence of the motion, which is imprinted in them, and that those of Men, being more gross, preserve them a long time.

How ere it be, according to the principle we have laid down, it may be easily conceiv'd how the Soul is mov'd in the passions, and the mind remains much more satisfy'd with this manner of acting, which is conformable to that of corporeal motions, then when it is affirm'd, that there are no real motions in the Soul, and that they are onely Metaphorical. For, if by that word, it be not understood, that they are not absolutely like the motions of the body, the thing it self remains as obscure as it was before.

Art. 5.

The Objections made against the motions of the Soul considered.

I Know very well, what Objections *Aristotle* made against *Plato*, who maintain'd, as we do, that the Soul

Soul really moves? I have also look'd on those, which the Schools have added unto *Aristole*. But there is but one answer to be made to them all which, is this, that taking away the motion of the Soul, they take away that of angels, upon which the same inconveniences, which are attributed to the other, must necessarily fall, though, that Angels do move, be a truth, not to be brought into dispute.

It is argu'd further, that whatsoever moves ought to take up some places, and, as place, to have quantity; that the Soul hath no quantity, since she is indivisible, and wholly in every part of the body, and consequently that she cannot move. Moreover, it is requisite that in all motion, what moves should be different from that which is moved; and that the Soul, which is simple and indivisible, cannot have things separate and different, and consequently, that it is impossible she should move. But do's not al this reflect on the Angels as well as on the Soul, who, notwithstanding these reasons, are yet granted to move of themselves? But when all is done, these maximes are proper onely to corporeal motions, and not to those of spiritual substances, as we learn in the Metaphysicks.

What might be objected of greatest weight, is, that Motion is, of its own nature, successive, and that succession implies time, whereas most part of the Souls motions are instantaneous, that is, made in an instant. But we have shewn in our Treatise, *Of Light*, that there are real motions of those, taht are momentany; That those of Light, and those of Angels, which after they have been contracted, resume their former dilation or extent, are so wrought; And consequently, that the motions of the Will, being eminent, are of that order, since it is a thing affirm'd by many eminent philo-

Philosophers, that those Motions of immaterial substances, which are transient, are made in an instant.

It is therefore a thing to be maintain'd as manifest, that the rational Soul moves; That, being a limited substance, she hath some extension, without which, we cannot conceive any limits; That the said extension cannot be without parts, and that those parts are movable, as well as the whole; That accordingly she may move within her self, by moving her parts, and that thence proceed all the interiour motions of the Will.

Art. 6.

The Motions of the Appetites.

NOw, if this be true of the Rational Soul, which is spiritual, it will be much more easily comprehended to be so in the others, which are fastened to matter, and there will be no question made, but that they are susceptible of the same motions, in as much as motion belongs principally to things material. Accordingly therefore, the sensitive and natural Appetites, suffer the same agitations as the Will, when it loves, when it hates, *&c.* and these motions are interiour and immanent, and are fram'd in a moment, as those of the Will.

But what? wil some body say, If these two Appetites are chain'd to matter, there is a necessity the matter should move along with them; and how can matter move in an instant? It may be said in the first place, that we are not to imagine the matter, whereto the Appetite is chain'd, to be gross and weighty, as most of the parts of the body are, but it is requisite that the

power

power have a ſubject proportionable to it ſelf, and that the Appetite, which is the moſt movable part of the Soul, ſhould have a ſubject the moſt movable of any. Thus, though the Appetite have its ſeat in the heart, yet it is not to be inferr'd, that the whole heart is its firſt and principal ſeat. No, that ſeat is the ſpirits, and that moiſt heat, which is the ſource of life, and ever in motion, as *Hippocrates* affirms. So that it is not to be admir'd, the matter whereto it is faſtned, ſhould ſo eaſily and ſo readily follow the agitation, which it gives it ſelf.

Secondly, it is to be noted, that matter doth not always hinder things from moving in an inſtant, in regard there are maſſie bodies, that do move ſo. For it is not to be doubted, but that a weighty body, ſuſtain'd in the air, makes ſome effort to deſcend, that it preſſes upon the hand that ſtays it there, and that a man feels every moment the impulſion which it makes therein, which impulſion is, no doubt, a real motion.

Moreover, Light, which is a material quality, and requires a ſubject to ſupport it, does nevertheleſs move in an inſtant, as we have ſhewn in its proper place. Now, theſe two examples do not onely make it manifeſt, that material things are mov'd inſtantaneouſly; but they alſo give us a certain apprehenſion of the manner, whereby the Appetite moves the Soul, and whereby it moves it ſelf in the body. For it may be ſaid, that it is like a weight, which thruſts the Soul to that whereto it would have her to go. And it moves in the heart, as Light does in a tranſparent body; that is, it enters into it; it comes out of it; it dilates it ſelf in it; it alſo contracts it ſelf; yet ſo as the diaphanous body hath no ſenſe of all thoſe motions, though it be the ſubject, whereto the light is annexed.

The

The case is the same with the Appetite, which, though fastened to its subject, may dilate it self in joy, contract it self in grief, issue out of, and return into, it self in love and hatred, and all, so as that the body suffers nothing of all these motions. True it is, that the heart and spirits are agitated and stirr'd in great passions; but, not to urge that they are effects which follow and come after the emotion of the Soul, it is to be observ'd, that there are some passions, which continue in the Appetite, without making any impression on those parts. And this may suffice, to shew, that the Appetite may move, so as that the body be not chang'd thereby.

SECT. 2.

How Good and Evil move the Appetite.

BUt in order to a more exact knowledge of all these motions, we are yet to find out, what it is that engages and excites the Appetite to make them, which is one of the most abstruse things, of any in the nature of the Soul, and the most hard to be conceiv'd, according to the maximes of the Schools. For, though it be out of all controversie, that Good and Evil are the onely objects, which cause all the motions of the Appetite, yet is it not easie, to express the manner, how it is done, since Good and Evil make no impression on the Soul, otherwise then by the Images, which the knowing Faculties frame there-

of

of, and that those Images have not any other vertue, then to represent.

For, if that representation be not subservient to the knowledge of things, it will not be any way usefull to the Appetite, which is a blind power, and, as it is affirmed, not capable of any knowledge. I am content that the *Practick Understanding*, and the *Estimative faculty* should judge, whether things are Good or Evil; that they should present them to the Appetite, and command it to move, in order either to its union with them, or recession from them. But how does the Appetite see? How does it know, when it neither sees nor knows any thing but those Images, those judgments and commands being fram'd in the said faculties? What is it that teaches the Appetite, that it ought, at that time, to move after such or such a manner, in order to its union with the Good, and, after another manner, to recede from the Evil, when it knows not whether the Good or Evil have been presented to the Soul?

All these difficulties are the brood of two principles, which some have brought into the Schools. One is, that the Images, which are fram'd in the Soul, depart not out of the faculty, whereby they are produced: the other, that the Appetite, of what order soever it be, hath not any knowledge. And upon these two foundations, they imagin'd that this inference must necessarily be built, that the faculties act one after another, by a certain sympathy there is between them, or by the direction of the Soul, in the substance, unto which they are reunited. Now, we shall elsewhere make it appear, that these two means cannot be maintain'd; and therefore some other must be found, to take away the difficulties proposed, without destroying those principles.

We

We must then subscribe unto, as certain, That the Image, Idæa, and Conceit, which the knowing faculty frames, goes not out of it; and that the Appetite, of what order soever it be, hath not any Animal knowledge, which it may frame by Images, as the Understanding and Imagination. But it is as certain also, that the Image, which the Understanding and the Imagination frame, produces another, which is spread into all the parts of the Soul; And that the Appetite hath a natural knowledge, which is common to all things, by which knowledge they know what is good, what evil, for them, as also the actions whereto they are design'd.

Art. 1.

How Knowledge is wrought.

TO make an absolute establishment of this Doctrine, it is to be presuppos'd, that *Knowledge* is an *action*, and that, without doubt, the noblest of all those that are performed in Nature, and that the Soul *acts* and *does* something, when she *knows*. Now, in regard we cannot make any other conceit of Knowledge, then as the representation of things, which is made in the Soul, it follows, that the Soul, which acts, while she knows the things, must her self make this representation, that is, frame the Pourtraiture and Image of the things. For there is no other action then that, that the Soul can do in knowing, and so to *know*, signifies as much as to *frame* the *Image* of the Objects, as we have shewn at large in our Treatise, *Of the Knowledge of Animals*.

Now, whereas there are several faculties that know, it is requisite, for the reasons by us before alledged, that every one of them frame its image. For my part,

part, who acknowledge but three principal ones in the ſenſitive ſoul, to wit the *Senſe*, the *Imagination*, and the *Eſtimative faculty*, and two in the Intellectuall, to wit, the *Speculative* Underſtanding and the *Practick*, I muſt accordingly allow, that there may be framed but five ſorts of Images in general. And though they all repreſent the ſame thing, yet are they different one from another, not onely by reaſon of the ſubtilty which they acquire by ſo many different examinations, but alſo by that of the ſeveral circumſtances, which each of the faculties add thereto.

For the external Senſe frames its Image, according to the model of the ſenſible ſpecies, which come from without, and repreſents the object, with the circumſtances of Time, Place, *&c.* as a Whole, whereof it diſtiguiſhes not the parts. From this firſt Image, the Imagination afterwards produces, that which is proper to it; but it diſtinguiſhes the circumſtances, and the parts of the object, it ſeparates, or unites them; and ſo frames its judgments, which may be called, in ſome ſort, ſpeculative, becauſe the Animal makes no advantage of them, in order to action, but onely in order to knowledge. Then the Eſtimative faculty makes its Image, according to the model of that of the Senſes and Imagination; but it adds thereto the notions of Good and Evil, which it alſo unites, and which it ſeparates, that ſo it may make the Practick judgment, which is to move the Senſitive Appetite.

But if, after all this, there be a neceſſity, that the underſtanding ſhould take cognizance of the ſame object, according to all the precedent material Images, it alſo frames its own, which is wholly ſpiritual, which it ſeparates from all material accidents, and whereof it conſiders all the parts, and the relations it may

may have, uniting, or dividing them, in order to the making of ſpeculative propoſitions: And then it adds thereto, the notions of conformity, or contrariety, goodneſs or evil, from which it frames the practick Judgment, which excites the Will and Senſitive Appetite. All this would require a long elucidation; But it would not be proper for this place; and therefore let it ſuffice, that we have given an account, in general, of the progreſs made, in the buſineſs of Knowledge.

Art. 2.

That the Images are multiply'd.

BUt however the caſe may ſtand, this Image, ſo framed as before ſhewn, of what order ſoever it may be, is a quality, which, after it is once produced, is multiply'd, and diffuſed into the parts of the Soul, as was ſaid before. For, ſince there is not any ſenſible quality, which hath not the vertue of multiplying it ſelf, and diffuſing it ſelf into the air, and other bodies ſuſceptible thereof, as may be obſerv'd in light, colour, ſound, ſcent, *&c.* it is not likely, that this, which is the nobleſt of all, as being the term and effect of the moſt perfect action of all, ſhould be depriv'd of an advantage, common to all the reſt. Beſides, were it not for this multiplication, it would be impoſſible, to give any reaſon, for moſt things that happen in Animals.

For example, we ſhould not be able to comprehend, how the formative faculty does ſometimes change the order, which Nature hath preſcrib'd it, in the Conformation of the parts, to follow the deſigns which the

Imagination propoſes to it, without judging whether it ought to participate of the Images, which the latter hath framed, ſince there is ſo great a reſemblance between its work and the imagination. And as theſe images cannot get out of the Imagination, ſo is it neceſſary, they ſhould produce others like themſelves, which ſhould deſcend to the lower part of the Soul, to deſign to her the figure which it is then giving to the organs.

Moreover, if the Memory be a power, different from the Imagination, it is neceſſary, that all the ſpecies, which it hath in keeping, ſhould be of this nature, and the effects, and, as it were, the copies of thoſe firſt Images, which were produced by Knowledge, and which can no more paſs from one power to another, then any of all the other accidents.

In fine, there will be no ground to make any doubt of this truth, if it may be ſhewn, that after the Images of the Imagination are blotted out, there are ſtill found ſome remainders thereof in the other powers, and ſubſiſt there a long time, after the others are loſt. Now, beſides that the proof of it is clear in the Memory, which ſo preſerves its images, is prejudic'd by a too intentive application of ſpirit, and grows leſs faithfull, when the Imagination would relieve it. It may be alſo drawn, from thoſe marks, which Mothers give their children, during their being with child; From that kind of Reminiſcency which remains in the fingers of a Luteniſt, even after he hath forgotten the Leſſons he could have play'd; And from thoſe deep impreſſions and inclinations, which certain objects leave in the Appetite and Will. For it is impoſſible all this ſhould happen as it does, but that there muſt remain ſome Character of theſe firſt Images, which the Underſtanding or Imagination

gination frame, and are preserv'd in those other faculties, a long time after the former are vanished.

Yet it is not to be imagin'd, that the faculties, into which these Images are diffus'd, should be of the rank of the knowing faculties, because they have the Instruments of knowledge; for we have shewn in the place alledg'd, that a faculty cannot know, but it must withall produce in it self the images of the things. So that these, not producing the images which they have, and onely receiving them, as an effect of the first image, fram'd by the Imagination, they cannot know it by a clear and perfect knowledge, but onely, according to that which is competent to all natural things, which, if we may use an odd kind expression, Know without knowing, what is conformable or contrary to them. Thus is it, that the Magnetick vertue, which is communicated to Iron, makes it know, and sensible of, the presence of the Load-stone, and afterwards excites it to move, and make towards it.

When therefore there is an image fram'd, in any one of the knowing faculties, it is, as it were, a Light, which is multiply'd, and diffuses it self into all parts of the Soul susceptible thereof. Our meaning is, that that which is spiritual is communicated to the spirial faculties, and that which is material, to the corporeal faculties, and both kinds act therein according to the nature of the faculty, into which they are entertain'd. For, if it be movable, as the Appetite, that Image moves: if it hath no action, as the Memory, it produces nothing, but is onely preserv'd in it: if it be alterative, as the formative vertue, it serves for a model for the alteration, which it causes in the members; and so of the rest. The case is the same with it, as with that Magnetick vertue we spoke of before,

which, though equally communicated to all bodies, does not equally act upon them; it alters and moves the Load-stone, Iron, and glaz'd Tiles, yet without causing any alteration or motion in all the rest.

If it be so, it will be no hard matter to affirm, how the Appetite, blind as it is, may know Good and Evil, and move conformably to the nature of either. For since the Image, which the *Estimative faculty*, or *Practick Understanding*, hath fram'd thereof, is multiply'd, and diffus'd through all the parts of the Soul; the Appetite receives it, feels it, and afterwards moves, as it ought, in order to its union with the Good, or recession from the Evil, to its assaulting, or opposing of it, according to the instruction receiv'd from the Instinct, and the knowledge which all natural things have, either to be united to that which is conformable, or to avoid and resist that which is contrary to them.

SECT. 3.

What are Motions of the Soul.

TO resume the Discourse we have interrupted, we say further, that, of what kind soever the motions of the Appetite are, whether real, or metaphorical, they are those which frame the Passions of the Soul. For though the Schools have restrained that name, to the Motions of the sensitive Appetite, either by reason of the violence they do Reason, or that the body sensibly suffers thereby; yet, if we consider the agitation, which the Soul endures, we shall find

find, that not onely that which is made in the Will, but also that in the natural Appetite, is like that, which the Senſitive Appetite ſuffers. For the Will loves and hates, rejoyces and is ſad, as well as the other: and there are in the natural Appetite, ſuch motions as are anſwerable to thoſe others, ſince Nature ſeeks that, which is behovefull, and ſhuns what is prejudicial to it, is ſatisfy'd, or troubled, at the occurrence thereof, is heightned or diſcourag'd, as we ſhall ſhew more particularly hereafter. And as to the violence which the Senſitive Paſſions do Reaſon, and the alteration they cauſe in the body, they are the effects which they produce, yet enter not into their eſſence, but are common to all the motions of the Appetite, of what order ſoever it be, and do not always accompany the emotions of the ſenſitive Appetite.

Accordingly, as the Appetite is the principle of all corporeal motions, ſo is it requiſite, that it ſhould be moved, before any Part of the body can be; and conſequently the agitation of the Spirits, which is obſerv'd in the Paſsions, and cauſes all the changes, that happen in the body, is not wrought, till after the Soul is moved. Moreover, the Motions of the Will are, many times, contrary to reaſon, as well as thoſe of the ſenſitive Appetite, and in the moſt ſpiritual Paſſions, ſuch as Ambition, Envie, *&c.* it alters the body, as well as the other. Nay, it may be affirmed, that, in the motions of the natural Appetite, the body ſometimes endures a greater alteration, then in thoſe of the ſenſitive Appetite, as it appears in a Fever, which is the choler of the natural faculty. To be ſhort, neither doth that violence, nor that alteration always follow the emotions of the ſenſitive Appetite. Of theſe, there are ſome conformable to Reaſon; there

are some that remain in the Soul, and do not descend to the corporeal faculties, as being raised up and dispers'd so of a sudden, that they have not the time to spread themselves into them. Whereto may be added, that Angels are susceptible of love, hatred, joy, sadness, &c. as Theology teacheth.

Whence it may be inferr'd, that there is no ground, for the taking away of the name of Passions, from the motions of the Will and natural Appetite, and consequently, it may be affirm'd, that all the motions of every Appetite are Passions, since the agitation, which the Soul endures thereby, is equal in them all, and that the end, which she proposeth to her self therein, is, as to them, also alike: for by them all she is agitated and mov'd, either towards the enjoyment of Good, or the eschewing of Evil.

True it is, that these motions are called by divers names, according as they are more or less vehement. For, as we call those winds which are more then ordinarily violent, by the name of Storms and Tempests; so, when the Passions are great and extraordinary, they are called Perturbations. And certainly, it may, with some ground, be affirm'd, that the Passions are, as it were, the winds of the Soul. For, as the Air, which continues in a constant calmness and tranquility, is unwholesom; and yet is purify'd by moderate winds, but if they are too violent, they raise tempests in it: in like manner, the Soul, which is not stirr'd by any passion, must needs be heavie, and of an unhealthy constitution; and therefore it is requisite, it should be moderately agitated, that it may be the more pure and more susceptible of vertue. But if it happen that the Passions become too violent, they raise in her such tempests, as di-

ſturb Reaſon, confound the humours, and alter the whole conſtitution of the body.

SECT. 4.

Of the Number of the Paſſions.

THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, Having promiſed to diſcover the motions of the Soul, we now come to examine, how many ways it may be mov'd, and what number there may be of the Paſſions, whereby it may be ſo mov'd. In order to the proſecution of that deſign, it is to be preſuppoſed, that every Appetite hath two parts, the *Concupiſcible*, and the *Iraſcible*; by the former, it perſues Good, and ſhuns Evil; by the latter, it either oppoſes, or complies with, the difficulties, which preſent themſelves. For, as the Univerſe conſiſts, and is full of things contrary and oppoſite one to another; ſo is there not any thing can continue in it, without meeting with enemies, which aſſault and endeavour to deſtroy it. So that it was the work of the providence of Nature, to beſtow on every thing, not onely the vertues, which were neceſſary for the execution of its ordinary, and, as it were, domeſtick Functions, but alſo thoſe, which ſhould ſecure it againſt the attempts of others, and prevent the violences which it might be expoſed to abroad. Upon this account it is, that all things have ſome qualities, conducing to the preſervation of their being; and others, enabling them to oppoſe what is contrary thereto; and

that the Animals, wherein these vertues are more distinct, have bestow'd on them two different Appetites; the Concupiscible, to seek out what is convenient for them, and avoid what is hurtfull; and the Irascible, to resist Evil, to ingage against, and destroy it, if there be a necessity. In fine, the Irascible is that part of the Soul, which governs the forces of the Animal, and manages them, according as the Evil seems to require a weak or powerfull resistance.

Now, these two parts of the Appetite may move either together, or distinctly: for, in Grief, onely the Concupiscible part is mov'd; in Courage, onely the Irascible; but in Anger, both are mov'd at the same time, in as much as Anger is a combination of Grief and Courage. When they move distinctly, they frame *Simple* Passions; when they move together, they make *mixt* Passions.

Art. 1.

What the Simple Passions, and how many there are.

THe Schools set down eleven *Simple* Passions; in the *Concupiscible* Appetite, six; to wit, *Love*, *Hate*, *Desire*, *Aversion*, *Pleasure* and *Grief*: and in the *Irascible*, five, to wit, *Hope*, *Despair*, *Confidence*, or *Audacity*, *Fear*, and *Anger*.

But we are to observe, that, in this division, *Constancy* is forgotten, which is a real Passion, and serves for matter to the vertue of CONSTANCY, Patience, and Perseverance, Obstinacy and Hardness of heart; as also, that among the *Simple* passions, Anger

Anger and Hope are numbred, which, no doubt, are *mixt* passions; the former, consisting of Grief and Courage; and Hope being framed of Desire and Constancy. Moreover, Aversion is propos'd, as a Passion distinct from Hate, though it be the same thing. Nay indeed, Desire ought not to have been put into the number, as being a species of love, and having not any motion, different from that of the other.

Art. 2.

That there are but eight simple Passions.

HAving therefore taken off these four passions, and establish'd Constancy in their stead, there remain but eight simple Passions; four in the Concupiscible Appetite, to wit Love, Hate, Pleasure and Grief; and four more in the Irascible; that is to say, Audacity, Fear, Constancy, and Consternation, under which Despaire is comprehended,

Art. 3.

Why there are but eight simple Passions.

THis is the natural division of the Passions, as being grounded on the several kinds of motions, whereby the Soul is stirr'd: for since the Passions are the motions of the Soul, it is according to the diversity of the motions, that the Passions ought principally to be distingish'd. It is also easie to be comprehended, by the consideration of the motions, which

which the Spirits ſuffer in the Paſſions; for being like thoſe of the ſoul, which communicates to them the agitation that ſhe endures, it is manifeſt, after how many faſhions ſoever the Spirits are moved, ſo many ſeveral waies is the Soul alſo moved.

Now the Spirits are ſuſceptible of four motions, which are common to all natural bodies, and are the firſt and ſimpleſt of all motions; to wit, thoſe of Aſcent, Deſcent, Rarefaction, and Condenſation. For when they iſſue out of the heart, to ſpread themſelves into the exteriour parts, the motion is from the centre to the circumference, and that is, to aſcend; and when they make their retreat into the heart, 'tis the contrary motion, from the circumference to the centre, that is, deſcent: they are rarified, when they ſpread and are dilated; and laſtly, they are condens'd, when they are contracted in themſelves.

The Appetite ſuffers proportionably the ſame motions; for though it changes not place, as they do, and that its motions are interiour and immanent, yet does it nevertheleſs cauſe thoſe parts to move, which are in the extenſion of the Soul; ſo that, one while, it forces them to iſſue out; another, it makes them retreat in again; one while, it dilates; another, it contracts them.

When therefore theſe four motions are made in the concupiſcible Appetite, they frame the four firſt Paſſions, of that Appetite, to wit, Love, Hate, Pleaſure and Grief. For the Soul does as it were iſſue out of her ſelf in Love; ſhe retires into her ſelf in Hate; ſhe dilates her ſelf in Pleaſure, and ſhe contracts her ſelf in Grief.

But when the ſame motions are made in the Iraſcible Appetite, which is that part, which hath a reſpect

ſpect to the difficulties that encompaſs Good and Evil, they frame the four firſt Paſſions of that Appetite, to wit, Audacity, Fear, Conſtancy, and Conſternation. For in Audacity, the Soul iſſues out, as in Love, in Fear, ſhe retires, as in Hate, in Conſtancy, ſhe contracts her ſelf, and is confirmed, as in Grief; and in Conſternation, ſhe dilates her ſelf, and is enlarged, as in Joy.

So that there is a reſemblance, between the motions of both Appetites, and they differ only in reference to the power, whereby they are excited, and the end, which the Soul propoſes to herſelf therein. For, in Love, the Soul iſſues out of her ſelf in order to the embracing of the Good ſhe perſues; but in Audacity, ſhe iſſues out of her ſelf, to engage the Evil ſhe would oppoſe; and ſo of the reſt, as we ſhall ſhew more particularly in the Diſcourſe of every Paſſion, and as may be obſerv'd in the ſeveral definitions we ſhall give of them, in the ſubſequent Article.

Art 4.

The Definitions of the Simple Paſſions.

THere are therefore, according to the precedent deduction, four *Simple* Paſſions in the *Concupiſcible* Appetite; to wit,

Love, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul is inclin'd towards the Good, in order to its union thereto.

Hate, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul ſeparates her ſelf, and recedes from the Evil.

Plea-

Pleasure, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul is dilated, and spreads her self into the Good, in order to her more absolute possession thereof.

Grief, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul contracts her self, to shun the Evil that presses upon her.

The four other Passions, which belong to the *Irascible* Appetite, are,

Constancy, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the soul is fortifi'd, and grows resolute, in order to the resistance of those Evils which set upon her.

Consternation, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul is weakned, and gives way to the violence of the Evil.

Audacity, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul violently bestirs her self against the Evil, to overcome it.

Fear, which is a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul retreats, and with a certain precipitation, shuns the Evil, which she perceives coming upon her.

Art. 5.

The definitions of the mixt Passions.

AS concerning the *mixt* Passions, which are made up of the Simple, and are framed, when both the Appetites are moved at the same time, the most considerable of them are these:

1. *Hope.* 2. *Arrogance.* 3. *Impudence.* 4. *Emulation.*

lation. 5. *Anger.* 6 *Repentance.* 7. *Shame.* 8. *Jealousie.* 9. *Compassion.* 10. *Envy.* 11. *Agony.*

Hope is a mixture of the desire of the Good, and the Constancy a man expresses, in opposing the difficulties, whereby it is encompassed.

Arrogance proceeds from Self-love, and the Audacity a man hath to surpass others.

Impudence is fram'd of the Pleasure and Confidence a man hath to do unhansome things.

Emulation is a mixture of Grief which a man is apt to be subject to, that he is not master of those perfections, of which he imagines another to be, and the Hope of being able to acquire them.

Anger consists of the Grief, which a man endures for an injury receiv'd, and the Audacity he hath to retort it.

Repentance proceeds from the Grief, which a man conceives for the evil he hath committed, attended by a Detestation of it; which may be termed a kind of Audacity, as we shall shew in its proper place.

Shame proceeds from a mixture of Grief, and Fear of infamy.

Jealousie is a confusion of Love, Hate, Fear and Despair.

Compassion consists of the Grief, which other mens misfortunes raise in us, and a Fear lest we our selves may fall into the like inconveniences.

Envy is a mixture of Grief, and a certain Despair of coming to the enjoyment of that Good, which we see happens to others.

Agony is a mixture of Grief, Fear, and Audacity.

Art.

Art. 6.

The Natural order of the Passions.

THe order, which all these Passions ought, naturally, to observe among themselves; requires that the *Simple* should be rank'd before the *mixt*, since these last are but so many compositions of the others; as also that the Passions of the *Concupiscible* part should have precedence of those of the *Irascible*, in regard the Concupiscible Appetite, being employed about the simple consideration of Good and Evil, and the Irascible considering the same with the difficulties whereby they are encompass'd, the said difficulties are only subsequent circumstances.

But if we compare them, according to their particular kinds, Love and Hate ought to have precedence of all the rest. For there is not any one of those, which have the Good for their Object, but it is preceded, and accompany'd by Love, as all those that have Evil for their Object are the same, by Hate. Accordingly, he, who is sensible of the Evil, or opposes it, who engages against it, or shuns it, does infallibly hate it: in like manner, Love is the first motion which the Appetite makes towards the Good as Hate is the first it makes, in reference to Evil.

But what Love and Hate are in respect of all the Passions, the same is Constancy, and Consternation, in respect of all the Passions of the Irascible Appetite, whether they be simple or mixt. For it is requisite, that the Soul should be fortify'd, in Audacity, Hope, Arrogance, Impudence, Emulation, Anger and Repentance: on the contrary, in Fear, Shame, Jealousie, Com-

Compaſsion and Envy, it is expected ſhe ſhould be enlarged, or admit of ſome relaxation.

Love alſo hath the precedence of Hate, becauſe Good ought naturally to have it of Evil, as the form precedes privation. Pleaſure ſhould alſo go before Grief, in as much as the former proceeds from the preſence of the Good, the latter, from the preſence of Evil. The ſame thing is to be affirm'd proportionably of Conſtancy and Audacity, in reference to Conſternation and Fear. And according to theſe rules, the mixt Paſsions ought to be ranked, as we have done it: for Hope ought to be the firſt, becauſe it conſiſts of Love and Conſtancy, which are the firſt Paſsions of both the Appetites. Arrogance hath the next place, as being a mixture of Love and Audacity; and ſo of the reſt.

Art 7.

That there are three Orders of the Paſſions.

NOw all theſe Paſsions, as well the Simple as the mixt, are of three Orders, or Claſſes; for they are framed, either in the Will, or in the ſenſitive Appetite, or the natural Appetite, each whereof hath its diſtinct concupiſcible and iraſcible parts. But there is nevertheleſs this difference between them, that thoſe parts are more diſtinct, and more compleat in the Will, then they are in the Senſitive Appetite, and more perfect yet in this latter, then in the natural Appetite. For there are ſome, eſpecially of the mixt paſsions, which can hardly be obſerv'd in the ſenſitive Appetite, and in caſe they be fram'd therein, they ar

are (if we may use that expression) but shadows and rude images of those, which are rais'd in the Will. Accordingly, though Anger, Hope, Arrogance, Jealousie, Emulation, and Envy are apparent in Beasts, yet are all the rest but *trick'd* and rudely drawn; and therefore it is not easie, to make, in them, any observation of Shame, Impudence, Compassion, and Remorse, though they may discover certain obscure lines and tracks thereof. But all, even the Simple passions themselves, are so obscure in the natural Appetite, that never any body yet gave them the name of Passions, though they be really such, and ought to be so called, as we said before.

We are however to observe, that those Passions which belong to the Irascible Appetite, are more apparent in the natural Appetite then the others: for it is certain, that Nature opposes Evils, that she engages against them, that sometimes she is discourag'd, and quits the field, and there is not any thing so common in Medicine, as to say, that she is stirr'd and provoked; nay, we have shewn elsewhere, that a Fever is the anger of the natural faculty, so that it is not to be doubted, but that Audacity and Anger, Constancy, and Consternation, are framed in that inferiour part of the Soul. But as to those of the concupiscible Appetite, they are not so manifest in it; neither are Love, Hate, Pleasure and Grief, to be observ'd in it so sensibly as the others: and yet there is a necessity they should be framed therein. For it is not to be imagined, that the evil can be shunn'd, unless it be first hated, since Hate is the first motion, which Evil excites in the Appetite. Neither can Anger be without Grief, since it is part thereof. So that the natural Appetite is susceptible of Hate and Grief,

Grief, and consequently of Love and Pleasure; since they are contraries compatible to the same subject.

Moreover, if nature knows and shuns what is hurtful to her, it is requisite that she should also know and pursue that which is good for her; and this cannot be done unless she have a love to it, since Love is the first motion fram'd by the Appetite, in order to the pursuit of Good: and as the presence of evil procureth Grief to her, so is it necessary, that the presence of Good should cause pleasure to her.

But, as we said before, these passions are so weak and obscure, that the senses cannot easily take notice of them; and indeed they are not easily discoverable, otherwise then by reason and discourse.

The cause of this diversity proceeds not only hence, that these Appetites are more inclin'd to motion, one then another. For the Will, being disengag'd from matter, moves more easily then the sensitive Appetite, and this more easily then the natural, in regard it hath, for its subject, a more subtile matter, and consequently more inclinable to motion then it. But it proceeds also from the more or less perfect knowledge, which directs them. For as the Understanding knows more perfectly, and more things, then the Imagination, so does it withall inspire the Will with a greater variety of motions, then the other does; and this latter also, having a greater and more exact knowledge, then the natural faculty, does accordingly frame more Passions in the sensitive Appetite than there are in the Natural Appetite.

SECT. 5.

How the Passions of one Appetite are communicated to another.

THere is yet another thing to be considered, which is of very great importance, to wit, that the Passions, framed in either of the three Appetites, are ordinarily communicated from one to another; so that those of the Will descend into the sensitive Appetite, and the natural Appetite, as theirs do ascend into the Will. For it is certain, that the Will does many times suffer it self to be transported with the Love, Pleasure, and Grief, by which the sensitive Appetite is stirr'd, in the same manner as Love, and the gladness and sadness of the mind spread themselves into the body, and cause conformable emotions therein.

But the difficulty is, to know how this communication is wrought. For it might seem, since things material can have no action upon the spiritual, that neither sensible goods nor sensible evils can touch the Spirit; nor consequently, be acceptable or delightful objects thereto. On the other side, though the Understanding may heighten the Phantasmes of the Imagination, and render them spiritual, yet is it not in the power of the Imagination, to change the Idæa's of the Understanding, which are spiritual, into corporeal Phantasms: consequent whereto it is, that the goods and evils of the mind cannot touch the sensitive

ſenſitive Soul, nor raiſe any Paſsion therein.

To anſwer theſe reaſons, and reſolve this great difficulty, we might affirm, with the Schools, that there is a Sympathy between the faculties of the Soul, and that they are ſo ſtrictly combin'd together, that it is impoſsible, one ſhould not have a ſentiment of what paſſes in the other; or haply, that, being all reunited in the ſubſtance of the Soul, which is the Centre and principle thereof, and, as it were, the main wheel, which keeps them all in their ſeveral motions; It is the Soul her ſelf that cauſes them to act, one after another, conformably to the actions that are to be done. So that, for example; the Appetite moves, after the knowledge of Imagination, and the members move after the emotion of the Appetite, in regard there is a certain ſympathy betwixt theſe faculties, or that the Soul excites them, and diſpoſes them to act in that order.

This being ſo, it would be no hard matter to tell how the Paſſions of one Appetite paſs into another, in as much as theſe powers acting one after another, according to the ſympathy there is between them, or by the particular direction of the Soul, it is neceſſary, not onely that the Soul ſhould move, after ſhe hath been enlightned by the Underſtanding, but it is alſo requiſite, that the Senſitive Appetite ſhould ſtirr after her; in the ſame manner as we apprehend, that the Will is oblig'd to move, as ſoon as the Imagination hath excited ſome motion in the Senſitive Appetite.

But to deal ingenuouſly, we muſt acknowledge, that theſe opinions do not fully ſatisfie the mind. For, beſides that the word Sympathy is one of thoſe tearms that ſerve to elude difficulties, and flatter our ignorance; it may be farther preſs'd, that if, by it onely,

the rational Soul and the ſenſitive communicate their paſſions to each other, it will be requiſite, that there ſhould not be any paſſion in the latter, which does not aſcend into the Will, and that all kinds of ſadneſs ſhould be attended by grief, and in like manner all grief by ſadneſs. But this is not true; ſince they are onely the greateſt ſadneſſes whereof the body hath any reſentment, and that light griefs reach not the mind, and caſt it not into ſadneſs.

Beſides, this Sympathy does not exclude that manner of acting, which is natural to the faculties: it is an order eſtabliſh'd by Nature, that the Senſitive Appetite ſhould be enlightned by the Imagination, and that the Imagination ſhould take cognizance onely of things ſenſible. How comes it then to paſs, that it ſhould know the object of a ſpiritual paſſion? On the other ſide, how are we to conceive, that the Underſtanding and Will, which are ſpiritual powers, ſuffer themſelves to be mov'd by corporeal objects? And how can Grief, for example, be ſaid to excite ſadneſs in the mind, what Sympathy ſoever may be imagin'd between theſe powers? In fine, Sympathy does always preſuppoſe ſome knowledge; for the Iron ought to feel the preſence of the Load-ſtone, that it may move towards it. And conſequently it is requiſite, that every Appetite ſhould know the judgment of the faculty, which enlightens it; whereas, in the mean time, the Appetite is a blind power, and ſuch as hath not any knowledge.

Again, if it be ſaid, that it is the ſubſtance of the Soul which ſets theſe faculties in action, which yet cannot be done without her having a knowledge of the order they ought to obſerve in their actions, and a particular cognizance of the manner, after which the Appetite

petite ought to move in every paſſion; it will follow, that the Soul ought to have in her ſelf the knowledge of an infinity of things, and that ſhe ſhould know them by her own proper ſubſtance, without the aſſiſtance of any faculty; an excellency not to be found in any created Being, and to be attributed onely to Divine Nature.

Let us therefore endeavour to find out ſome other plauſible means, whereby the Body & Soul may be ſaid to communicate one to the other, the good and evil they reſent. To do that, we are to obſerve, that the Mind, which is the nobleſt, and moſt excellent part of Man, is alſo, as it were, King of that little Monarchy, taking notice of whatſoever paſſes therein, that is worth the conſideration, and having a particular care of the Body, as being the inſtrument of moſt of its actions, and, together with it, making up a Whole, in the ſubſiſtence and preſervation whereof it is no leſs concern'd, then in its own. In ſo much that it is not to be admir'd, that it ſhould have a certain ſentiment of the good or evil things which happen to the other, and that it ſhould frame the ſame paſsions, which they raiſe in the Senſitive Appetite. And this is no hard matter for it to do, in as much as it ſees the phantaſms, which the imgination hath made thereof, upon which, it frames its idæas and judgments, and afterwards preſents them to the Will.

By this means is it then, that the paſsions of the Body are ordinarily communicated to the Mind. But the caſe is not the ſame with thoſe of the Mind, in reference to the Body, in as much as it is not by knowledge that the Underſtanding communicates them to the Senſitive Soul, for the reaſon by us before alledged; but it is immediately done by the motion,

which the Will imprints in the ſenſitive Appetite. For there is no inconvenience in affirming, that the Will moves the Appetite, becauſe motion is common as well to things ſpiritual as corporeal; but in maintaining, that the thoughts of the Underſtanding are communicated to the Imagination, there is, in regard ſpiritual things cannot ever become corporeal.

To clear up this Propoſition a little further, we are to obſerve, that the Will hath an immediate command & ſuperintendency, over all the parts of the Soul and Body, which are moved voluntarily. For it is in its power to move the members, without any interpoſition of the Senſitive Appetite; it being unlikely, for example, that, in a reſolution which the Underſtanding hath made to ſtretch forth the hand, it ſhould be requiſite, that that motion be made by the directions of the ſenſitive Soul, which hath not any apprehenſion of the object, or the motive of that action. Now, if it hath this power over the members, with much more reaſon ſhall it have the ſame over the Appetite, which being nearer, and more apt to move, then they are, ought accordingly to be the more ſubject thereto; and conſequently, the Will may ſtirr it, and imprint in it the ſame motions which it hath given it ſelf.

Hence it alſo follows, that all thoſe things which are in motion, as well the corporeal as the ſpiritual, produce, in thoſe others whereto they are apply'd, a certain motive quality, which may be called Impetuoſity, and that is, as it were, an impreſſion and communication of their motion. For, it is by this communication, that the bodies, which are forced or darted, continue the motion they have receiv'd from the hand, though they be at a diſtance from it. By the

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same communication is it also, that Angels do enforce bodies, & chase away evil Spirits, in regard they have not any vertue or means to act really and physically on things, other then the motion they imprint in them.

This being certain, it follows, that the Will, which moves, should imprint its motion in the sensitive Appetite, and that it should stirr, yet so, as that the latter stand not in need of any precedent knowledge of the imagination. For, though it be true, that the sensitive Appetite cannot move, but it must receive a previous illumination from that Faculty, yet is this to be understood onely when it moves of it self, and suffers no violence, by any other strange cause, as it is here.

Now, as the Will imprints in this Appetite the emotion it gives it self; in like manner, when this latter is stirr'd, it communicates its motion to the Will, in regard that, whatsoever moves may imprint its motion on the things which are near it, if they do not oppose it either by the weight, or some contrary motion. For the Will and Appetite do many times oppose one the other, by their contrary agitations; Nor do the members, and other bodies, always obey them, by reason of their weight, which is stronger then the motion imprinted in them by the Will and Appetite.

All that may be said hereupon, amounts onely to this, that, in this case, the motions of the Will and Appetite would not be vital actions, which cannot be forc'd, nor proceed from without, but ought to issue from the ground of that power, by which they are performed. But it may be answer'd, that the Will and Appetite, having receiv'd that external motion, move

themſelves, and produce their own proper, immanent and vital actions, after the ſame manner, that a man, who is thruſt forward, moves afterwards and goes of himſelf; or as he who is forc'd to do ſomething againſt his will; For his Will is immediately ſhaken, by the violence that had been done him; but at laſt it conſents thereto, and moves it ſelf, in order to the performance of the action. So that thoſe external motions which the Appetite and Will reciprocally give and receive, one from the other, are not real Paſſions, while thoſe powers move not of themſelves. But as there are ſome ſprings, or reſorts, which immediately move upon the leaſt touch; in like manner, theſe faculties have ſuch an aptitude to motion, that as ſoon as ever they have received the impreſſion one from another, they are ſtirr'd, & produce real Paſſions. Not but that it happens very often, they are ſhaken, yet do not move themſelves; and no doubt, when the Will, which would not be tranſported with any Paſſion of the ſenſitive Appetite, does nevertheleſs feel a ſweet violence, which gives her a certain bent towards it, it may be ſaid, that the Will then ſuffers the impreſſion of the motion, which it receives from the Appetite; but not that it does ſtirr, or that any emotion can be attributed thereto.

Now the difference there is between the Paſſions, which are thus excited, conſiſts in this, that the Underſtanding hath an immediate ſight of the object, whereby the ſenſitive Appetite hath been moved; But the Imagination, which cannot know the object of the Will, obſerving the motion excited by this latter in the Appetite, frames to it ſelf an object and motive conformable to that motion, and ſo renders

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the Paſſion compleat, juſt as it does in dreams, in that kind of Love which proceeds purely from Inclination, and in thoſe Paſſions, which Muſick inſpires, as we have ſaid elſwhere. For we have ſhewn, that, when the Soul obſerves, in the Appetite or Spirits, ſome motion, which is proper to Paſsion, though ſhe be ignorant of the object, which raiſes that motion, frames to her ſelf another of it, which is proportionable to that Paſsion. Hence it comes to paſs, that a man, who falls aſleep upon his anger, repreſents to himſelf, in his dreams, enemies and fighting, in regard the diſturbance rais'd in the Spirits is obſerv'd by the Imagination, which afterwards frames to its ſelf objects, conformable to that motion.

The ſame thing may be ſaid of Muſick, and the forementioned Love of Inclination; for both of theſe imprint in the Spirits ſuch motions, as being like thoſe of the Paſsions, cauſe the Soul, which takes notice of them, to repreſent to her ſelf ſuch objects, as are proper to thoſe Paſsions, and ſo to frame the Paſsions themſelves.

However it be, this is deducible hence, that when the Imagination hath felt the emotion excited by the Will in the Appetite, it frames to its ſelf ſuch an object, as is requiſite, for the producing of that Paſsion. But it is an uncertain, and confuſed object, which does not preciſely determine it; and therefore it many times happens, that in ſuch a caſe, a man cannot give any reaſon why he is ſad or merry, and though he be ſenſible of the Good or Evil, yet can he not ſpecifie which it is.

SECT.

SECT. 6.

What is the Seat and first Subject of the Appetite.

BY all we have hitherto said, it is sufficiently apparent, that the Appetite is the first Subject of the Passions, because they are motions, and that the Appetite is the only part of the Soul, which moves. But as the Soul is the Form of the Body, and the faculties have certain proper Organs, wherein they reside, and where they act, we are now to examine, what part of the Body it is, which serves for a Seat to the Appetite, and where it frames its first motions; for this examination is necessary to our design, since we shall be ever and anon oblig'd, to speak of the place, whence the Passions have their first rise.

We are then in the first place to suppose, that the Faculties of the Soul are inseparable from its substance, and that whereever she is, they also are. But in regard that, of these, there are some, which stand in need of Organs, in order to action, though they are in all places where the Soul is, yet they act only in their own Organs.

Those Faculties which are Spiritual, being not confin'd to matter, do not stand in need of Organs, and consequently, they are, and act, in all places, where the Soul is, as the Understanding and Will. For though the actions of the Understanding are more apparent in the Head, and those of the Will, in the Heart,

Heart, then they are any where elſe, yet is it not to be conceiv'd, that theſe two parts are the Organs thereof; but, becauſe the faculties, ſubſervient to them, are in thoſe places, and that we commonly attribute, to thoſe high powers, the actions of thoſe faculties which are ſubſervient thereto, as we attribute to the Prince, what is done by his Miniſters.

But the caſe is otherwiſe in the Corporeal Faculties, for it is requiſite, that they ſhould be reſtrain'd to ſome part of the Body, which ſerves them for a ſubject, and inſtrument, in order to the performance of their functions. And it is out of all doubt, that the Senſitive and Natural Appetites are of that order; but there is a great diſpute among Philoſophers, to know, which is the proper ſeat of either of them.

Art. I.

What is the Seat of the Senſitive Appetite.

AS to the Senſitive Appetite, we find by experience, that, in any Paſſion whatſoever, the Heart is troubled and mov'd, and that there are very few, how ſecret ſoever they may be, which may not be diſcover'd, by the beating of the Arteries. The ordinary manner of ſpeaking, nay indeed Religion it ſelf, will have it, that this part ſhould not only be a ſource of all the Paſſions, which cauſe any alteration in the Body, but alſo, of all the affections and motions of the Soul; ſo that we may affirm it to be the Seat, Subject, and principal Organ of the ſenſitive Appetite.

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But we see further, that in Insects and Serpents, the parts, after separation from the Heart, discover sense and motion, when they are touch'd. Nay some have observ'd, that, in the more perfect Animals, the Members move for a certain time, after this part hath been taken away from them. And we are assur'd, by our late observations, that, before the formation of the Heart and Brain, there is motion and sentiment in the Embryo. To be short, Hunger and Thirst are two sensitive Appetites, and it is generally acknowledg'd, that the mouth of the Stomach, and not the Heart, is the real subject thereof. Nay, there is no sensible part can be so slightly wounded, as not to move at the same instant, and yet it cannot be said, that the Heart is the cause of that motion. And therefore, it seems probable, that the Appetite ought to be whereever there is sentiment, since the Sense enlightens the Appetite, and that the latter cannot move without it. And thence some have imagin'd, that the Brain, which is the principle of sentiment, and the Organ of the Imagination, should also have the same relation to the sensitive Appetite.

From all these observations it may be concluded, that there are two kinds of sensitive Appetite; one, which is *general* and *common*, regarding the conservation of the whole Animal, such as is that which frames the ordinary Passions of Love, Hate, &c. the other, *particular* and *proper* to every part. The *first*, no doubt, is plac'd in the Heart, which is the spring of Life, and the Centre, from which do proceed all the powers, whereby the Animal is govern'd. The *second* hath its seat in every part, as Hunger and Thirst, in the Stomach.

But considering further, that these two Appetites are

are of one and the same nature, having the same motions, the same objects, and the same end, and that they differ one from the other, but as homogenial parts of the same whole, it is accordingly requisite, that they should have one subject, which ought also to be of the same nature; And consequently, it is necessary, that there should be in the Heart, and in every part, some Organ, which may be common, in order to its being the chief Subject of that Faculty, which is common to them.

To discover this, we are to remember, and reflect on what we said before, to wit, that all the powers of the Soul are inseparable from her substance, and that, nevertheless, they do not act whereever she is, but only in certain parts. Now, this cannot proceed from any thing, but the particular disposition, which those parts have, to be assistant to their actions, whether they be more proper to receive the Impression of the objects, as for instance the Eye, which ought to be transparent, that it might give passage to Light, and the visible Species, and so of the other Senses; or that they are more proper to execute the motion, which the Soul ought to make; as the Muscles are the instruments of voluntary motions, in regard they consist of tendons and flesh, which are capable of contraction, without which these motions cannot be made.

This presuppos'd, as a truth not to be brought into dispute, it is requisite, that the part, wherein the Appetite hath its immediate residence, should be proper to the action it ought to do; and whereas there is no other action then motion, it is also necessary, that the said part should have the dispositions proper to motion. Now there is not any disposition more

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proper to motion then Levity and Rarity, and consequently, it is requisite, that the Organ, and first Subject of the Appetite, should be of a rare and light matter, and that it should be present in all those places, where all the motions of the Appetite are made. So that there not being any part, whereto this may be attributed, but only the Spirits, it follows, that the Appetite hath its residence in them, as its first and chiefest subject.

But in regard there are two kinds of Spirits in general, those that are *fixt* and restrain'd to some part, which are the first Bonds, whereby the Soul and Body are joyned together; and those, which are *errant* and unconfin'd, which distribute to all the members, the heat particularly assign'd them by the heart: it is requisite, that they should be the fixt Spirits, that have the Prerogative, of being the first subject of the Appetite, for it is the part the most apt to motion, of any that enter into the composition of the Members; one that hath a durable and permanent consistence, as the Appetite, and is without dispute animate; it being certain, that the faculties of the Soul cannot be in a subject, which is not animate. For it is not to be imagin'd, that the errant Spirits, which are not only depriv'd of Soul, and Life, as it is commonly held, but also have not any durable subsistence, no more then the Flame, which assoon as lighted is thence-forward continually decaying, can support a Faculty of the Soul, which is fixt and permanent, as the Appetite is.

Whence it may be concluded, that the Heart is indeed the Seat of the generall Appetite, but it is, by reason of the fixt Spirits, which enter into its composition; and the case is the same of every Member,

ber, in reference to the particular Appetite.

Art. 2.

The Seat of the naturall Appetite.

ALl that we have said of the *Sensitive* Appetite may be apply'd to the *Naturall* Appetite. For of this also there are two kinds; one, *Generall*, which hath a care of the whole Body, and is accordingly plac'd in the heart; and this is the same with that which disperses the Spirits and humours into all the parts, which shakes them in Fevers, and makes the Crises, and such like motions, which regard the whole Body. The other is *Particular*, and hath its Seat in every part; it attracts what is good for it, it drives away what is hurtfull, it causes the contraction of the Fibres, the convulsion of the Nerves, &c.

But whereas the *Sensitive* Appetite is not plac'd in the Heart and other parts, but upon the accompt of the fixt Spirits, which enter into their composition, the case is the same with the Naturall Appetite; they are also the same Spirits, which serve it for a first subject, and first Organ, upon the same grounds as they are so of the other. For since that part is the most apt to motion, of any of the Vegetative Soul, it should accordingly have a Subject, furnished with the dispositions proper to make its motions, and there are not any other then these Spirits, as we said before.

I question not but some will make this Objection against what hath been deliver'd, That diverse Faculties require diverse Organs, and that these two Appetites

petites, being different, not only in the Species, but also in the Genus, as belonging to several orders of the Soul, cannot have for their subject the same Spirits. But it is easily answer'd, since we have experience on our side, and opposite to these maximes: for the same animal Spirits dispose of sentiment and motion; the same Substance of the Brain becomes the subject of all the superiour powers of the Sensitive Soul; and the flesh, as simple as it is, hath both the sensitive and vegetative vertue.

But after all, the motion of the sensitive Appetite is not different from that of the naturall Appetite, as to the nature and species of motion; it is made after the same manner in both, and all the diversity found therein is accidental, and not relating to the motion. For it proceeds only from the cause and condition of the object that moves it, which are things not relating to the motion. For it proceeds only from the cause and condition of the object that moves it, which are things not relating to the motion. In the one, it is the Sensitive faculty, that moves for the sensible good or evil; in the other, the natural faculty moves, for the natural good or evil: but both move after the same manner, and frame the same Passions; as we have shewn, and consequently, there is not any inconvenience, that these two powers should have the same Subject, in order to the same action.

We have not any thing to add hereto, save that, according as the parts have a greater or lesser portion of these fixt Spirits, they have proportionably one or the other Appetite more strong and vigorous. As also, that the general Appetite and particular Appetite, do many times assist one the other, and many times also they act distinctly. But we shall ever and

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anon have occasion to hint at these matters, when we come to treat of the Passions in particular.

Art. 3.

How the Passions are compleated.

NOw to put a period to that which appertains to the general discourse of the Passions, we are to consider all the passes in the body, after the emotion of the Soul, and the fixt Spirits. For though the nature of every Passion consists in this emotion, yet may it be said, that it is not compleat, if there be not joyn'd thereto the agitation, which the Heart endures, and the alteration which is occasion'd in the whole body.

We are therefore to observe, that, after the Soul hath been mov'd, the Heart and vital Spirits follow her motion; and if she would execute without, what she hath propos'd in her self, she at last causes the Muscles to move, in the Passions of the Will and sensitive Appetite, and the Fibres, in those of the natural Appetite; in regard the Muscles are the instruments of voluntary motion, as the Fibres are of that which is made by the natural Appetite. But how these motions are made, we shall treat more at large in the ensuing Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Motion of the Heart, and Spirits, in the Passions.

THE motion of the Heart is made for the Spirits, and that of the Spirits, for the whole Body. For the Heart is mov'd in order to the production and conservation of the Spirits, and these are also moved, for the communication of the vital heat to all the parts, to bring into them the aliment, whereby they are to be nourish'd, and to transport the humours from one place to another, as the Soul thinks it necessary; as it happens in the Passions, as also in Crises, and upon other occasions.

That this may be the better comprehended, it is requisite, that we ascend to a higher disquisition of things, and since there is so much spoken of the Spirits, our next examination must be, to find out, what they are, of what matter they are compos'd, and how they are framed. And indeed, it may be affirm'd, that neither Philosophy nor Medicine have sufficiently explain'd themselves, upon this Subject, and the difficulties they have left therein give every man the liberty, to propose his conjectures, in order to the clearing up of a thing so obscure, and so intricate.

Art.

Art. 1.

Of the Nature of the Spirits.

WIthout engaging our ſelves upon an exact diſquiſition of the Elements, whereof bodies are compos'd, it is a thing both certain, and ſenſibly acknowledg'd, that there are three ſorts of parts, which enter into the compoſition of all mixt bodies. Of thoſe parts ſome are ſubtile, active and volatile; others groſs, paſsive, and heavy; and the third are moiſt, as being deſign'd to joyn together thoſe two ſo oppoſite extreams. For they have ſomewhat of the ſubtilty of the firſt, and of the groſſneſs of the others; and when theſe are reſolved, the whole mixt body is deſtroy'd, in regard they are the cement, whereby all the parts are united together.

Thoſe ſubtile parts are called Spirits; inaſmuch as they have ſo little matter, and ſo much activity, that they ſeem not fit to be ranked among bodies; and while they are united with the others, they ſerve for principal Organs to the forms, as being the moſt active parts; and they are as it were the bond, which keeps them within the body. The reaſon whereof is, that Nature, which ever joyns the extreams by a certain mean, that hath ſome rapport thereto, employs the ſubtile parts, which have little of matter, to joyn and unite the forms, which have not any, to the groſſer parts, that have much.

True it is, that they may be ſeparated, and yet be afterwards conſerv'd, as we find by experience, in diſtillations; for ſo it is, that the Spirit of Wine, Sul-

phur,&c.is extracted. And being so extracted,though they lose the use they had when they were united to their natural forms, yet do they not lose any thing of their substance, or subtilty.

Art. 2.

Of the matter of the Spirits.

NOw as Plants are nourish'd by the juices which they draw out of the Earth,so have these juices their subtile and spirituous parts,as well as all the other Mixt bodies: which parts, not being lost, as we said before, pass into the Animals, which feed on those Plants as those of the Animals pass into such, as they become nourishment to. So that it is not to be doubted but that the blood is full of these subtile essences, which the natural heat afterwards digests and refines in the veins, to be made the instruments of the Soul: and that they are the matter us'd by Nature to frame, and entertain the vital Spirits; since subtile things are to be made of those which are of the same nature with them.

Art. 3.

How the Spirits are framed.

BUt to find out the secret of all this Oeconomy, we are to represent to our selves, that the blood, which

which is in the *Hollow Vein*, enters into the right ventricle of the Heart, where it is warm'd, by the heat and motion of that part, which is the hotteſt of any about the body. After its being warm'd there, it iſſues out boyling and reeking, and enters into the Lungs, where it meets with the air, attracted in by reſpiration, which by its coolneſs thickens the fumes, which it exhales from all parts, which fumes are no other then the ſpirituous parts, wherewith it is fill'd, and which, upon the acceſſion of the leaſt heat, are ſeparated and evaporated. So that Nature does, in this, what commonly happens in the diſtilling of *Aqua-Vitæ*, in which work, there is cold water caſt about the Recipient, as it were, to gather together, and reduce into a body the ſpirits of the wine, then chang'd into vapour, and to promote their paſſage along with the others. Thence it comes, that the vein, which carries this reeking blood into the Lungs, is as big as an Artery, as it were to prevent the diſſipation, which might be made thereof, before it be ſo cooled. On the contrary, the Artery which receives it, after it hath been cool'd, is as ſmall as any vein; there being not then any fear of diſſipation. And it is not unlikely, that this is the reaſon, why that Artery hath but two *valvulæ*, whereas the other Veſſels which enter into the Heart have three. For as theſe *valvulæ*, whatever ſome others may be pleaſed to ſay, were made only to prevent the impetuoſity of the blood, which is to enter into the heart, and afterwards to come out of it; ſo was there not any neceſſity that the veiny Artery ſhould have ſo many obſtacles, to retain the impetuoſity of the blood it carries, in regard it muſt needs have left much thereof,

after it hath been cool'd, and temperated, by the air, which is in the Lungs.

But however it be, hence proceeds the indispensable necessity of respiration; for if those parts of the blood, which are so reduc'd into fumes, should not be condens'd, and reassume a kind of body, they would be immediately dissipated: And whereas this must be the matter of the Spirits, as being the most subtile, and most pure portion thereof, there would not be made any new generation, if nature had not found out a means to condense these vapours, by the coolness of the air, which is continually attracted by the Lungs. Thence it comes, that there is no possibility of continuing long without respiration, in regard that, all parts of the body standing in need of the continuall influence of the Spirits, it is requisite, the Heart should continually repair them, and that cannot be done without respiration, for the reason we gave before.

Art 4.

An Objection against the precedent Doctrine answered.

I Know well enough that the common Doctrine would have the Air to enter into the composition of the Spirits, and that natural heat, nay indeed fire it self, stands in need of air to moderate them, as not being able to conserve themselves without it; And that this is the reason why respiration is necessary, in regard it conducts air to the Heart, and moderates the

the exceſſive heat thereof. But we are taught by Anatomical obſervations, that there is not any veſſel, which conducts the air into that part, and that the veiny Artery, which was heretofore conceiv'd to ſerve for that uſe, is alwaies full of blood, and does undoubtedly convey, to the Heart, all that which is entered into the Lungs. Beſides, it may be urged, that Fiſhes have their vital Spirits, though there be not any air, which may contribute to their production. True it is, they have the motion of the Gills, as alſo of the holes, at which they ſprout out the water, and that is anſwerable to that of the Lungs, and cauſes the ſame effect, with the water, which they ever and anon attract, as the Lungs do, with the air they reſpire.

Yet is there not any thing to be deduc'd hence, which may imply my not being of opinion, that the air reſpir'd, which is all full of theſe ſpirituous parts exhal'd by all bodies, do not furniſh the vitall Spirits, with ſome portion of themſelves, which being mixt therewith, paſſes and inſinuates it ſelf into the Heart and Arteries, through the Pores of the Veſſels. Hence it comes, that Animals are ſenſible of the qualities of the air, which they reſpire; and *Hippocrates* affirms, that the moſt ſudden nouriſhment is wrought by odors. But this is a thing happens by chance, and is not to be admitted into the deſign of Nature. And as to the cooling or refreſhment, which is cauſed by the air, it is not intended to moderate the exceſs of the heat; but for the reaſon given by us before, which is common to fire and the ſpirits: For the coldneſs of the air condenſes the exhalations which ſhould be enflam'd, it gathers them together, and hinders their rarefaction and diſperſion. And therefore, when it

is very cold, the fire is the more violent and scorching, in regard the matter of the flame suffers a greater contraction; And the light of the Sun diminishes the heat of the fire, in regard it rarifies and disperses the exhalation, which feeds it. Not but that the air does moderate the heat of the Heart, when it is violent; but that is not the main end, at which Nature aims; it is only a slender service, and convenience, which she derives, by the by, from her principal design.

But howere it be, this is certain, that after the blood, which came out of the right ventricle, hath travers'd the Lungs, it is discharged into the left, where, it may be said, it is return'd into the furnace, and is stirr'd and agitated afresh, and where its more subtile parts are so refin'd, that they acquire all the dispositions, necessary to Spirits, to make them vital; and then they are endu'd with the form and vertue thereof, and assume the place and function of those, which have been distributed to the parts.

Art. 5.

Why the heart moves.

FRom what hath been deliver'd, it may be inferr'd, that the motion of the Heart serves for the generation of Spirits; But that that should be the principal motive, which oblig'd Nature to give it that motion, is what cannot be easily affirm'd. For, in a word, all Animals have those sorts of spirits, but all have not that motion; so that this may be stood upon,

on, that it is not absolutely necessary to their generation.

For my part, I am of opinion, that, in this, Nature had a greater regard to the conservation of the Spirits, then to their production. For whereas things are conserv'd, by that which is conformable and natural thereto, and that motion is natural to the Spirits, which are of a fiery nature, and proportion'd to the Element of the Stars, as *Aristotle* speaks; it is accordingly requisite, that they should be in perpetual motion, as those bodies are. And in effect; we cannot stop the motion of fire without quenching it, and all those things, which hinder the Spirits from moving, as Narcoticks, and fulness, deprave them, and destroy the Animal. It therefore concern'd the providence of Nature to find out some artifice, whereby the vital Spirits should be continually stirr'd, to the end they might be conserv'd, by that which is most proper and natural to them. And there could not be a more commodious way found, then the motion of the Heart and Arteries, which ever and anon excites and awakens the Spirits, which are intermix'd with the blood; For that humour being gross and heavy, there would have been some danger of its smothering them by its weight, if that miraculous resort, which gives a continual motion to the arterial blood, should not hinder that disorder. Hence it comes, that the arteries alwayes accompany the greater veins, that their agitation might excite the Spirits, which are mixt with the blood; the lesser veins standing not in need of that attendance, by reason of the small quantity of humour which they contain, as such as is not capable of hindring their motion. And in those Animals, which have no blood, that motion is neither so sensible

ſible nor ſo neceſſary, in regard the humours there are more ſubtile, and for the moſt part are only ſeroſities, which are in a more eaſie ſubjection to the Spirits.

It was therefore the principal intention of Nature, to beſtow motion on the Heart, in order to the conſervation of the Spirits; yet with this precaution, that it hinder not, but that ſhe may employ it to other uſes. For, as a frugal and provident Houſewife, ſhe makes that which is neceſſary to her main deſign, to be ſubſervient alſo to other conveniences, which, were it not for that, ſhe might have been without: Upon this account is it, that ſhe employes the motion of the Heart, to ſubtilize the matter of the Spirits, to force away the impurities that are therein, to moderate the heat thereof, which might become exceſſive, and to force the Spirits to the extremities of the Arteries, ſo to diſperſe the heat and vital vertue into all parts. Now of all theſe employments there are certain advantages, yet are they not abſolutely neceſſary, ſince all this is done in many Animals, without any motion of the Heart.

Art. 6.

That the Spirits are moved for three ends.

TO reſume our diſcourſe of the motion of the Spirits, we ſaid before, that it was deſign'd for the communication of the vital heat to all the parts, to convey into them the blood, whereby they are to be nourith'd, and to tranſlate the humours from one place

place to another, as it happens in the Passions, in Crises, and upon such other occasions.

As to the first, it will be no hard matter to prove it; for it is generally acknowledg'd, and sense and reason teach us, that all the heat and vigour of the parts proceeds from the vital Spirits, which are produced by the Heart, and as soon as this influence ceases, they become cold and languishing.

Art. 7.

That the Spirits convey the blood into the parts.

But for the conveyance of the blood into the several parts, there are not any Philosophers that have made it the employment of the Spirits, but it is generally attributed by them, either to the impulsion which it receives from the beating of the Heart, or to some attractive vertue, which draws it forth into every part. It is therefore requisite we make it appear, that these opinions cannot be maintain'd, and that it is the proper work of the Spirits, to dispose it into the veins. For there is a necessity, that it should be either forc'd out, or attracted, or convey'd; so that when it shall have been shewn, that there is not any thing whereby it is either forc'd out, or attracted, it will follow, that there must be something to convey it, and that only the Spirits can be capable of the employment.

Most of those, who maintain the *circulation* of the blood, do not admit of the Spirits, at least as bodies distinct from the blood, and affirm, that it is not mov'd

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in the veins, but only by the impulsion which it receives from the beating of the Heart, and that it admits not of any motion, but that which proceeds from the effort of that part. We shall not make it our business to oppose this *circulation*, and, though it be accompany'd with great difficulties, yet may it nevertheless be affirmed, that it is true, and that it is effectually wrought, though haply not after the same manner, as is held by the maintainers thereof. It is sufficient, for the prosecution of our design, to shew, that the beating of the Heart is not the cause of the blood's motion, especially that which comes into the veins. For, that done, it will be easie to make it appear, that they are only the Spirits, which can transport it to the places whither it goes, and consequently, that they are bodies distinct from the humours, which follow the motions of the Soul, and not that of the Heart, and may be mov'd by an agitation different from that of the latter.

Art. 8.

The beating of the Heart forces not the Blood into all the Parts.

IT being suppos'd then, as the Patrons of this opinion would have it, that the Heart, by a certain compression, or contraction of it self, drives out, into the arteries, the blood, which it hath receiv'd into its ventricles, and that, by the violence of that motion, it forces it even to their extremities, so to make its passage into the small veins which are near them, and thence into the hollow vein, and at last to the Heart, whence

whence it afterwards passes back again into the arteries, and then into the veins, perpetually running out of one into another, by a continuall circulation:

This, I say, being suppos'd, it might be said, that there is some probability, that this impulsion, which it receives from the Heart, may cause it to flow along into the arteries, but it can never be conceiv'd, how this impulsion should be continu'd even into the veins, after that its force hath been check'd and broken, by so many windings, and so many obstructions which the blood must needs meet with in its way.

What! it shall open the mouths of the vessels; it shall force its passage through the fleshy parts, as they pretend; it shall surmount the impressions which the air and other external causes every moment make in the parts; and after all this, by vertue of that first impulsion, it shall reascend to the Heart with the same agility that it descended thence? But this is a thing cannot enter into a man's imagination. I am content, that, as it passes through the small vessels, the compression it suffers therein may continue the impetuosity of its motion; but that it should be so when it flows into the greater veins, and the spaciousness of their channels gives it more liberty, is a thing which cannot be affirm'd, without a defiance of experience and reason; and there is a necessity, it should have the same fate, as rivers and torrents, which, flowing out of a narrow into a broad channel, abate much of the impetuosity of their course.

And certainly, if the beating of the Heart and arteries causes the blood to be thus moved, Nature hath forgot her self extreamly, that she gave not the same

ſame agitation to the veins, eſpecially thoſe in the lower parts, where the blood is more groſs and heavy, and hath ſo great a way to get up to the Heart. For there it is, that the cauſe and inſtruments of this miraculous tranſportation ought to be the more powerful, having a greater and heavier weight to conduct, nay indeed to force upward, then is the arterial blood, which is more ſubtile, more ſuſceptible of motion, and, at that time, only deſcends downwards.

It may then be conceiv'd, that thoſe, who firſt advanc'd this opinion, never conſider'd, that fluid bodies cannot long conſerve the vertue and impulſion, if it be not extreamly ſtrong, and that that which is made in the Heart is too weak, to maintain the motion of the blood in ſo long a courſe, and through ſo many obſtacles; That if it were forc'd out, as they pretend, it would ſo much ſwell the veins, that they would alwayes ſeem full and ſtretch'd out, eſpecially when it ſhould be forc'd to aſcend: And, in fine, that, opening the veins, it ſhould iſſue out by certain ſallies and reiterations, as that which comes out of the arteries, ſince it is the ſame impulſion that makes both move, and that we find in Water-Engines, that the water alwayes flows proportionably to the violent ſhocks it received at the entrance of its channell.

But why ſhould there be imagin'd in the veins a motion of the blood, different, not only from that which is made in the bones, into the depth whereof it penetrates, in order to their nouriſhment, but alſo from that which conveys the ſap of plants to all their parts? For this ſap, and the blood, we ſpeak of, is the laſt Aliment, whereby they are ſuſtein'd, and there-

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fore it is but one and the same Faculty, that hath the direction and conveyance thereof; and Nature, who loves uniformity in all her operations, will not easily change this, since it may, and ought to be performed, after the same manner.

Moreover, if the impulsion be the only cause of the motion of the blood, it must be also the same of all the natural motions, whereby it is agitated. And yet that transportation of the humours, which Nature makes in Crises, and the regularity punctually observ'd by her, when she conveys them from one place to another, depends on another principle. For the violence done in the Heart, ought to be equally communicated to all the vessels, and cannot determine the blood to flow towards one part rather then another. How shall it then cause it to ascend to the left nostril, in Inflammations of the Spleen, rather then to the right? Shall it be also the impulsion that shall force choler to the Intestines, in Fluxes without inflammation? And convey the serosities to the skin, in critical sweats? For all these sorts of motions proceed from nature, and are made, or at least begun in the veins, though the beating and impulsion of the Heart and Arteries contribute nothing thereto.

To conclude, since Nature multiplies not the ways of acting, in those operations, which are of the same kind, it is necessary, that she cause the blood to ascend by the same vertue, whereby she causes the *chylus* to do so, making it to pass out of the Intestines into the Vessels, and afterwards conducting it, to those places, where it is necessary. Now, I do not think there is any body will affirm, that the beating of the Heart contributes ought to this motion, as having no communication

munication with the Inteſtines, at leaſt ſo great as to force the *chylus* upwards; and conſequently, it may be ſaid, that the blood is no more mov'd then it, by that impulſion.

We muſt therefore find out ſome other cauſe then that, whereto we may referr not only the ordinary tranſportation of the blood, and all its other motions, which, though they ſeem extraordinary, are nevertheleſs natural thereto, as thoſe which happen in the paſſions; but alſo thoſe of the *chylus*, and the other humours which are mov'd in the body. Now after we have throughly examin'd all the reſſorts and inſtruments which Nature may make uſe of, to that purpoſe, it will be found, that ſhe cannot employ any other then the Spirits.

Art. 9.

That the blood is not attracted by the Fibres.

WE ſhall not here bring any thing upon the ſtage, concerning Attraction, though it were the only means, whereby the Antients were of opinion, that the motion of the blood was to be wrought, inaſmuch as it is an imaginary motion, which oppoſes reaſon and experience.

Nor indeed can it be conceiv'd to be done but two wayes, to wit, either by ſome *Body*, which, touching the blood, brings and draws it to it, or by ſome *Magnetick vertue*, which may be in the parts, and ſpreading it ſelf into the veſſels, ſeizes on, and drags it towards them, much after the ſame manner, as the quality of the Loadſtone draws iron, and cauſes it to approach

approach it. And these two wayes of attraction have bred two opinions, which ever since the birth of Medicine, even to the present age, have been follow'd by some or other.

For some have imagin'd that the streight Fibres, which enter into the structure of the veins, had the power of attraction, and that it was by their means the blood was convey'd to the several parts. But they never consider'd, that when some body is to attract a fluid and slippery thing, there is a necessity it should touch it, that it should seize on it, and retain it in all its parts; otherwise those which shall be at liberty will escape, and will not be attracted. Of this we have an experiment, when we would take any liquor with our hand; for those parts which shall not be comprehended within the hand will get away and not be gather'd in with the rest. Now it is certain that the Fibres touch only the superficies of the humour which is in the vein, and so whatsoever is in the bottome of the vessel will slip away, notwithstanding all their endeavour to retain it.

To this we may add, that the Fibres have no other way of attraction, then by straining and compressing the veins; and if so, then would the senses perceive something of that motion, as they do of that of the Intestines, which is made after that manner. Whence it follows, that, since we do not see any sign thereof, how strong soever that contraction and compression of the veins might be, for the making of that motion, there is just ground to imagine, that it is not made after that manner.

But what absolutely decides this question, is, that the aliment of Plants is convey'd by their channels after the same manner, and by the same vertue as the

blood may be in Animals, and yet their Fibres suffer no such contraction as is imagin'd in the veins. It is requisite therefore, that we find out some other means, whereby the moisture, which nourishes them, may ascend into the branches, and withall such as may be found also in Animals, to convey the blood into all the parts.

I add further, that the bones attract (as the common expression hath it) their nourishment, without any assistance of the Fibres, and that sometimes the blood is so violently mov'd in the Passions, that this pretended motion of the Fibres cannot be any way answerable to that swiftness, as being made but slowly, and by successive contractions, which require much time, in so long a transportation and conveyance, as that of the blood is.

Art. 10.

That the blood is not attracted by any Magnetick vertue.

As to the other opinion, which admits a Magnetick vertue, though it hath been more generally receiv'd, yet is it not confirm'd by any other reason then the weakness of the precedent, and the impossibility it imagin'd to it self, of finding any other means then these two to make the blood flow into the veins. So that it is maintain'd only upon the accompt of certain examples and instances, as that of the Loadstone, which draws iron to it, and those of some purgative Medicines, which attract the humours, and some others of the like kind. But this

this is a very weak proof, and such as the very ground thereof is of little certainty; since we pretend to make it apparent, that neither the Loadstone, nor purgatives, nor any other thing whatsoever, have any attractive vertue.

But whether it be maintainable or not, the Patrons of this opinion ought to suppose, as they have done, that this vertue is in every particular part, since there is not any but does, as they affirm, attract blood for its nourishment. The case being thus laid down, they may be asked, Whether all parts have this vertue equally or not? For if it be equal in all, there being superiour and inferiour parts, it is impossible the blood should march up into the superiour parts, in regard the inferiour have as powerful an attraction as the other; there being no reason, why they should follow the impression of the one rather then that of the other. On the other side, if there be any parts have this vertue in a higher degree then others, they will attract all the blood to themselves, and that just distribution, which ought to be made thereof all over the body, will never be perfected and compleated, since it must needs be obstructed, where that Magnetick vertue is most vigorous. For, to explain it by the example, it must be done in the same manner, as is observ'd in the iron, which being plac'd near several Loadstones will alwayes make towards that which is most attractive. Besides, if it be true, that the influence of natural vertues is performed by direct lines, How is it to be imagin'd, that the Attractive vertue shall observe that regularity in the innumerable turnings and windings of the veins and arteries? What intermixture, or, to say better, what confusion will there not be in the vessels, wherein every part will spread its Magnetick vertue?

To conclude, if the conformity of ſubſtance be the ground-work of this Attraction, as is affirm'd by the maintainers of the foreſaid opinion, how is it to be conceiv'd, that the blood, which is alter'd and corrupted, ſhall be able to flow into the veins? By what means ſhall the mineral waters, which admit not coction, and are incapable of receiving the form of blood, be able to paſs wholly pure into the veſſels? What conformity or ſympathy can we imagine between all theſe ſubſtances, which are ſo different among themſelves, and the Liver, or the Heart, or any other part, which attracts them to it ſelf? And laſtly, why ſhould the blood ever go out of the body, ſince that quality attracts it inwards, and that it ſhould be like the powder of ſteel, which the Loadſtone holds faſt and ſuffers not to fall?

Art. 11.

That there are not any Attractive vertues.

But I ſhall proceed further, and affirm, that it is an errour to imagine, there are, in Nature, any of theſe Attractive vertues; ſhe acknowledges not any other then that which is wrought by the motion of the body, and ſo all thoſe things which are ſaid to be attracted by theſe qualities, are mov'd by another kind of motion, then that of Attraction. And indeed, who can eaſily conceive, that a ſimple quality ſhould be able ſo of a ſudden, and ſo powerfully to offer violence, to things ſolid and weighty? What motion can have an incorporeal vertue, to go, and find out, and bring away maſſy bodies? How is it to be apprehended,

hended, that, contrary to all other qualities, which advance forward, this only ſhould return back? Would there not be a neceſsity, that, while it brings back the bodies, which it draws after it, it ſhould quit the ſpace where it found them, which yet continues ſtill full of the ſame quality?

True it is, and muſt be acknowledg'd, that the Loadſtone hath a magnetick vertue, which it diffuſes out of it ſelf. But this vertue is not attractive, it only cauſes in the iron a certain feeling of its preſence, and thereupon, the iron makes towards it of it ſelf, as it is in like manner inclin'd towards the iron. For if they be both ſet on the water, ſo as that they may freely ſwim on it, they will approach one another, if they be of equal force; and if the iron be the more weighty, or that it be ſtopp'd, the Loadſtone only will move towards it. So that it is clear they draw one another no otherwiſe, then as it is ſaid the Sun draws the vapours, which, by reaſon of their lightneſs, aſcend of themſelves, after they have felt the heat.

Art. 12.

That there is not any attractive vertue in Purgative Medicines.

NOr is it by Attraction that purgative Medicaments do operate. For, of theſe, there are ſome, which cauſe vomiting, being apply'd to the ſoals of the feet, and other inferiour parts; then which there cannot be a more certain argument of their not attracting the humours, ſince that, inſtead of obliging

them to come to themselves, they cause them to make a contrary motion. Besides, the purgative vertue, being a natural Faculty, should attract the humours which are conformable and consonant to it self, in what subject soever they are found; whereas, far from that, it attracts them not at all in bodies which are weak or depriv'd of life. And indeed those, who have more exactly examin'd the manner how purgation is wrought, have shewn, that purgatives have no other vertue then that of dissolving and separating the humours, as the Rennet does the parts of the Milk; And that the separation being made, Nature, being incens'd thereat, expels and drives them out; So that the evacuation thereof is wrought, not by Attraction, but Impulsion.

Art. 13.

That Grief and Heat are not attractive.

THere are yet others who affirm, that grief and heat are attractive; but they are only the Spirits, which Nature sends with the blood, into the parts, for their support and assistance: And this is no true attraction, no more then that which is made by a *vacuum*. For a privation, which, in effect, is nothing, cannot have any vertue. But in this case, the bodies put themselves forward, to prevent a disorder, which Nature cannot bear withall.

There are not therefore any Attractive vertues, and consequently, we are not to look for any in Animals, in order to the causing of any conveyance of the blood into the veins.

But

But there remains this yet to be urg'd, to the particular in diſpute, that it is true, the Blood is not attracted, but that it moves of it ſelf, as does the iron, which is ſenſible of the magnetick vertue of the Loadſtone, and that having in like manner a certain feeling of the ſympathetical vertue, inſpir'd by the parts, it is, of it ſelf, inclin'd towards them. It muſt be acknowledg'd this expedient would do pretty well, if this ſympathetical vertue could be well eſtabliſh'd. But how ſhall we imagine it can ſubſiſt in ſuch different ſubjects, as Plants and Animals are, or members of a different conſtitution and temperament, ſuch as are thoſe of ſound and unſound or diſeas'd parts? Nay, though it ſhould be granted in them, What allyance can there be imagin'd between that vertue, and the blood, which is often alter'd or corrupted; between it, and the mineral waters which are drunk; in fine, between it, and the poiſons, which are diſpers'd all over the body?

Nay, when all is done, neither this means, nor any of the others that have been propos'd, doth ſatisfie the regularity which Nature obſerves in the motions of the blood, nor moſt of the agitations it ſuffers in the Paſſions of the Soul; nor yet the tranſportation of the *chylus* and other humours, which is wrought in the body: So that there is a neceſſity of having recourſe to the Spirits, as the general cauſe of all theſe effects.

And certainly, whereas the Blood moves not of it ſelf, and that whatſoever is mov'd by another muſt be either forc'd, or attracted, or inclin'd; neither impulſion nor attraction having any place here, it is accordingly neceſſary, that ſome Body, which hath the vertue of moving it ſelf, ſhould combine with it, and

convey it whereever it goes. Now, since we know that the Spirits are the chief instrmments of the Soul, sent by Nature to all the parts, to dispose them to action, mixt by her with the blood to render it fluid, and which she insinuates even into the humours against Nature, as well to concoct, as force them away; there is no question to be made, of their being the transporters of the moisture which is in the Vessels, since they are beforehand in them to keep them fluid, and that there are not any other substances, which may be mixt with them, to convey them to the places, whereto they ought to go; And consequently, that they are bodies most susceptible of motion, which, being animated, or immediately mov'd by the Soul, are the only instruments that can move the blood, in all the differences of situation, which we observe therein.

Art. 14.

That the Blood is convey'd to the parts only by the Spirits.

FRom what hath been deliver'd, it is apparent, that in the ordinary course of the Blood, the Spirits are the only instruments, which cause it to ascend without trouble, descend without precipitation, and direct and convey it into all the parts, nay even to the depth of the Bones, for their nourishment. By the same Spirits it is diversly stirr'd in the Passions, according to the different designs, which the Soul proposes to her self; they convey it to the wounded parts to relieve them, and confine it to an exact observance of

of that rectitude and regularity which is remarkable in all its motions. In a word, Nature is the principle and source of all these operations, and that Nature is no other then the Soul and her Faculties, all which stand in need of Organs, in order to their action, and can have no other then the Spirits, whereto all these effects may be referred.

They are therefore intermixt with the Blood; and as the Air, being stirr'd, carries along with it the vapours that are got into it; or as the exhalations of the Earth raise up the matters that are join'd with them; so the Spirits, having receiv'd the motion and direction of the Soul, carry away the blood and humours to all those places which they have orders to convey them. For it is not to be doubted, but that an œconomy so just, and so regular in the variety of its operations, is guided and govern'd by some power which hath a preheminence above the elementary vertues, and participates of that secret intelligence, which God hath been pleas'd to entrust the Soul withall, for the conservation of the Animal. It is therefore she alone that causes the Spirits to move, and gives them orders for the conduct of the humours.

SECT I.

Of the animation of the Spirits.

THe difficulty now remaining is, to know, how the Soul causes the Spirits to move; whether it be,

be, as instruments, separated from the Body, or as Organs, animated by her. In a word, the question is, to know whether they are animated or not. The common opinion is for the Negative, and maintains, that they are only distinct instruments, which communicate the vertue of the Soul to the parts, and are themselves guided by the direction they receive from her, as the Arrow, which is shot by the Archer, and flies towards the mark, at which he took his aim. But if we consider this Direction a little more narrowly, as also the manner whereby it may be made, we shall find all this to amount to no more then fair words, which do not explain the thing, but leave in the mind a thousand difficulties inducing it to affirm the contrary.

Now, if this Motion and Direction ought to be given to the Spirits, as to distinct instruments, it is necessary it should be done in the Heart, which is the place where they have their birth, and from which they derive all their force and vertue. Nay, it is further requisite, that the whole mass of Spirits, which issue thence, should receive the same impression, in asmuch as they are not divided one from the other.

If it be so, this question will arise, How it comes to pass, that some of them go to one place rather then another? As also these others, How comes it, that in one Passion they are directed to the forehead, as in Love? How in another to the eyes, as in Anger? How in others, to the lower part of the cheeks, and the ears, as in Shame? How happens there a greater confluence of them on the indispos'd parts, then on those which are sound and well? For as in the springs, the impetuosity of the water is equally communicated,

ted to all the channels or rivulets, and that the art of the Designer cannot make the water flow into one rather then another, if they be all equally open; so can it not be conceiv'd, that the Spirits should rather go to one part then another, since the several branches of the Arteries, through which they are to flow, are all equally open.

Moreover, he who shall consider, how that, in Anger, they choose out the venome, which is in the veins, that it may be convey'd to the teeth of Animals; how that in diseases, they discern the humours, from which they have proceeded, to the end they might be forc'd out; will easily find, that there is not any direction of the Soul, which can satisfie all these effects, and there is requisite a vital knowledge and discernment, such as cannot proceed from any other then an animated instrument. For if any should affirm, that the soul makes this discernment and choice, there will follow a necessity, that she should be mixt with those humours, that so she may be able to separate them, and they will be forc'd to acknowledge, that the Soul is in those humours, which will be a far greater inconvenience then to maintain the animation of the Spirits. Now, we have already shewn, that it is by their means these motions are wrought.

We may adde further, that the Direction of things forc'd or thrust forward does only regulate their motion towards the mark, whereto they are to tend; it does not diminish ought of the impetuosity which hath been imprinted on them and it is necessary their motion should persist to the end, with all the force the mover hath given them. And yet the Spirits go many times to other places, then those whereto the

Soul

Soul had ordered them to repair, when they receiv'd her first impulsion; And sometimes, in their course, they move more vigorously, or more faintly, then the impetuosity they had receiv'd might require. For example, in Shame, they have order to spread the blood over the whole face, as it were to cover and conceal the Soul from the infamy ready to fall on her: and yet they cast themselves on the extremities of the eares, and the lower part of the cheeks, contrary to her first design. Many times they begin a Crisis of sweats, which they end by Urine, and some times they grow faint and retreat, in the conflict wherein Nature had engag'd them.

It may be more closely urg'd, that the Soul does not only cause the Spirits to advance, but she also makes them retreat; she dilates them, and contracts them. And if so, what shall this pretended Direction do upon all these occasions? How shall it cause them to rally about the heart, when they have straggled from it? There must then be suppos'd some Attractive vertue, whose work it shall be to seize on them at the extremities of the Body, and bring them back to their first rendezvous. But we have made it clear, that this vertue is but an imaginary one, and that, however the case stands, there must be some subject to convey it to the place, where it ought to do its operation; which is not to be imagin'd.

There is yet a greater difficulty, in assigning the manner, how the soul is able to dilate and contract them, when they are at some distance from the heart. For there is not in nature any impulsion or direction whereby these motions may be communicated. There is is only Heat and Cold that can do it; and whereas these qualities require a considerable time, for the per-

performance of their action, it follows that they cannot be causes of that dilatation and contraction of the Spirits, which are wrought of a sudden. Adde to this, that there is a necessity, the Soul should send these qualities into the vessels, to produce that effect; and that in Fear, for example, she should cause Cold to rise, to make a contraction of the Spirits; which can neither be said, nor imagin'd, without absurdity. For if the Cold be discover'd in some Passions, it is not a cause of the contraction of the Spirits, but the effect of it.

In fine, it is generally acknowledg'd, by all the great masters of Medicine, that the vital, sensitive, and motive faculties are convey'd to the parts by the Spirits. And Experience confirms this truth, in as much as life, motion, and sentiment cease in them, when they have not a free passage into them. How can this be done, unless they be animate? for the faculties of the Soul are not separated from her. Some indeed have maintain'd, that they convey'd not the faculties, but only a certain quality, which put them into the exercise, and without which they could not act. But they do not make it out, of what nature that quality is, and there is no great probability, that one single quality should relate to so many different faculties and functions.

But how ere it be, the greatest Philosophers, who have examin'd these matters to the bottome, have found themselves so much at a loss, to give a reason of the motion of the Spirits, according to the common opinion; have ingenuously acknowledg'd, that it is one of the hardest things to comprehend of any in Nature; and all they have said thereof hath neither satisfy'd themselves, nor those who would have follow'd their sentiments. What

What inconvenience then is there, in maintaining, that the Spirits are animate, since that position takes away the difficulties which arise in others, and that there is a necessity, the Organs, which act with so much discernment, and move in all situations, and perform so many different actions, should have in themselves a principle of life?

Art 1.

Objections answered.

ALl this presuppos'd, there remain yet two things which hold the mind in suspence, and keep it from giving an absolute consent to this truth. One is, that there is no likelihood, that bodies, which are in perpetual motion, and disperse themselves every moment, can be animate. The other, that life, which ought to be common to all the parts, cannot be found in those that are separated from their whole; and that the Spirits are of that rank, as having not any union or continuity with the solid parts.

As to the former, it is not certain, that they alwaies disperse themselves, so suddenly as is affirm'd. Those Spirits, which conduct the blood through the veins, are conserv'd a long time, and make the same circulation as the other doth; and it is frequently observ'd, that after they have apply'd themselves to some part, and there acted, according to the orders of the Soul, they fall back, and return to their source. But be it granted that they should so disperse themselves, why may they not be nevertheless animate? The long continuance is not a disposition necessary to life, and

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there are some parts, as the softest pieces of the Flesh, which, in a short time after they have been animated, may be resolv'd and dispers'd by a violent heat. As soon as the Spirits have acquir'd the dispositions necessary for their being instruments of the Soul, she insinuates her self among them, and animates them. When they are dispers'd, or have lost the continuity which they ought to have with their principle, she leaves them, after the same manner, as she does other parts that are separated from the Body.

But what! Can the Soul animate such a simple and homogenious body as the Spirits are? Why not, since she animates the radical moisture, the Flesh, the Fibres, and all the other similar parts? When it is said, that the Soul requires an organical Body, it is meant of the whole Body, which she is to animate, and not of its parts, which ought to be simple. Nay, indeed there was a necessity, that, as most of these parts are fixt and solid, so there should be some apt to motion and subtile, to perform the severall functions, for which it is design'd; and since the Soul is alwaies in action, it was requisite she had an Organ that should continually move.

Art. 2.

The union between the Spirits and the Parts.

AS concerning the union there is between the Spirits and the other parts, there is no doubt to be made of it, since the least interruption that happens therein causes an immediate cessation of the actions of life. For hence proceed faintings and

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swoundings, and *Syncopes*, in the excess of joy and grief, the Spirits being forc'd with such impetuosity, that they lose the continuity, which they ought to have with the Heart. Hence also proceed Apoplexies, by the interception of the veins, as *Hippocrates* speaks, the matters which are therein contained obstructing the fluxion of the Spirits, and interrupting the union which was between them and the others.

But with what can they be united so as to participate of the union which is common to the whole body? It is no doubt with the spirituous parts, which enter into the composition of the Heart: it is with the fixt Spirits, which are of the same nature with them. And 'tis possible this may be the end for which the beating of the Heart serves. For by the agitation it gives them, it makes them penetrate one into another, it binds, and soders, and cements them together, if we may use such expressions of things so subtile.

Art. 3.

How the foresaid union is consistent with the intermixture of the Spirits, with the blood and humours.

ALl that is now left to give occasion of doubt, is, that the Spirits are intermixt with the blood and humours, and that it is a hard matter to comprehend, how, in this intermixture, they can conserve the union which ought to be between them. But to take away this, we are only to represent to our selves the light,

light which passes through the clouds, for it hath certain beams, which cannot pass through them, and those that make their way through, appear at certain distances one from another, yet so as that not any one of them loses the continuity which it hath with the luminous body. Or, not to go out of the order of Bodies, the case is the same; as in those exhalations, which are intermixt with the Air; they have several lines which are diffus'd of all sides, but those lines have commonly a continuity with the matter, from which the exhalation proceeds.

The same thing is to be imagin'd in the Spirits; for they issue out of the heart as a mass of beams and spirituous lines, which scatter themselves on all sides, and penetrate into the humours, yet without any division from their principle. And this is the more easily imagin'd, in that, besides the difficulty which things of the same nature find to be separated one from the other, the Soul, who knows, that this interpretation of the Spirits must cause a cessation of all actions, does all that lies in her power to prevent it.

But whether the Spirits be animate or not, certain it is that they move, and that it is the Soul which gives them their motion. For though it may be said that they derive their agitations in the Passions from the Heart, by reason it opens, shuts, dilates and contracts it self, as they do, and that it is most likely, that it, being the principle both of life and the Spirits themselves, should also be the same principle of all their motions: yet we know by experience, that there are many Passions rais'd in the Soul, so as that there can be no change observ'd in the beating of the Heart and Arteries, though no doubt but the Spi-

fits are therein agitated. And indeed they are bodies so light, and susceptible of motion, that the least agitation of the Soul must needs stirr them. Which thing cannot be said of the Heart, which is massy and heavy of it self, and hath a function so necessary to life, that it ought not, without great necessity, or a great effort, to interrupt or disturb it.

In light Passions therefore the Spirits only are agitated and stirr'd; but when they become strong, not only the Spirits, but the Heart also follows the emotion and disturbance of the Soul.

SECT. 2.

Why the Heart and Spirits move in the Passions.

BUt what end does the Soul propose to her self in all these motions? What advantages can she receive thereby? It is not to be doubted, but that as she hath a design to be united to the good, and to shun or oppose the evil, so does she imploy these Organs to attain those ends, and believes, that the motions she puts them upon are absolutely necessary thereto. And it is true, there are some which produce the effect she expects from them; but there are also some, that contribute nothing to the obtaining of her desires. For example, when, in *Anger*, the Spirits separate the venome and the choler, and convey them into the teeth and tusks of animals, it is cer-

certain, they are so many offensive arms fit to assault and destroy the enemy. When, in *Love*, and *Joy*, the Spirits stirr the purest and gentlest part of the blood, that is conformable to the condition the Soul is in, which then requires only agreeable objects, & would not be disturbed by the agitation of choler and melancholy, which are troublesome and malignant humours. And so it may be affirm'd, that, in all the other Passions, the Spirits are put upon such motions as are conducible to the designs of the Soul, as we shall make it appear, when we come to discourse of every one of them in particular.

But, for one of this nature, there are a thousand others which are no way advantageous, and which rather serve to discover the precipitation and blindness the Soul is in, then to obtain what she proposes to her self. For, that the Heart opens and dilates it self in Love and Joy, that it shuts and contracts it self in Fear and Sadness; That the Spirits should diffuse themselves, and issue out in the former, and that they should retreat and draw up together, in the latter; all this contributes nothing towards the attainment of her end. I know, her perswasion is, that opening the heart, she makes a freer passage for the Good to enter in; that, shutting it, she excludes the Evil; that, commanding the Spirits to march out, she imagines, that she comes neerer the objects, and ordering them to retreat to the Heart, she is at so much the greater distance from them.

But the troth on 't is, that neither Good nor Evil enter into the Heart; and the motion of the Spirits causes not a greater or a lesser distance between the Soul and them, then there was before. For, it being acknowledg'd, that she is spread over the whole

Body, she is already where the Spirits conduct her, and quits not those places, from which they endeavour to remove her.

Yet are we not much to wonder at the errour she falls into upon those occasions; for having not an exact knowledge of all things that concern her, she is surpris'd, by the unexpected arrival of the Good and Evil, which present themselves to her, and in the distraction they put her into, she does all that lies in her power, she bestirs her self, and sets her organs in motion, according to the aim she takes; and, among many things which contribute to her design, she does an hundred others, that are of no advantage thereto, nay may be prejudicial. In the actions which are ordinary to her, and have been ascrib'd her by Nature, she is very seldom deceived; for she regularly commands the Spirits into the parts, to inspire them with vital heat, to supply them with the blood whereby they are to be nourish'd, to make the evacuations which are necessary; it being the instinct which guids her, and justly appoints her what she ought to do. But when this assistance fails her, she does as a man who punctually executes what he finds in his Instructions, but is extreamly at a loss, when he is to do something which he finds not in his papers. He then regulates himself, according to what he had done before upon the like occasions, and being in hast, he hazards the success of the affair, which sometimes comes to a good period, but most commonly happens otherwise then the man had imagin'd.

The case is the same with the Soul, when Good and Evil surprise her. For she, not finding, in the instructions of the Instinct, what she ought to do, upon such occasions, proceeds according to her ordi-

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nary manner of action; she causes the Spirits to advance forwards or retreat, as she is wont to do, in the necessary actions of life; and considering the precipitation she is in, and the little knowledg she hath, she has neither the time nor discernment, to see whether they will be advantageous or disadvantageous to her design.

SECT. 3.

What Faculty it is that moves the Spirits.

IT is therefore manifest, that the Soul causes the Spirits to move, to the end they should communicate the vital heat to all the parts, that they should supply them with the blood, whereby they are to be nourish'd, and that they should transport the humours from one place to another, when she thinks it necessary, as it happens in the Passions, in Crises, and others. The question now is, to know, what part of the Soul gives them their motions, whether the Vegetative or the Sensitive? As to the distribution of the vital heat, and aliment, as also, for the transportation of the humours in diseases, it is most certain, that the Vegetative soul is the principle of all these actions. But the difficulty still remains, concerning the motions of the Spirits in Passions. For, on the one side, it seems, that the sensitive Soul ought to move them, since she it is that excites the Passions, that they move in effect, with a respect to the sensible

Good and Evil, and that they propose to themselves the same end as she does. On the other side, the motions of the sensitive Soul are voluntary, and may, or may not, be made, at the pleasure of the animal, as may be seen in the motion of the Members. In the mean time, that which the Spirits suffer is necessarily made, and the Soul can neither excite nor hinder it, when she pleases. So that it seems, that belongs to the jurisdiction of the Vegetative Soul, and that in the association there is between the faculties, and the mutual assistance they give each other, this latter is joyn'd with the Sensitive, to promote its possession of the good, or recession from the evil, which presents it self to her.

Notwithstanding these last reasons, whereto it is no hard matter to answer, we must stick to the former, which prove, that it is the Sensitive Soul that causes the Spirits to move in the Passions. True it is, that the motions of the Vegetative are many times joyn'd with hers, as we find by experience, in extraordinary Griefs: but it is, when the Good and Evil are considerable, and make so deep an impression, that they force their way quite to her: for when they are light, she is not mov'd thereat, and leaves the Sensitive part to act alone, which yet fails not to stir the Spirits.

In effect, they are the general Organs of all the functions of the Soul, and all the faculties, what order soever they are of, equally employ them in their service. They are serviceable as to life, sentiment, motion, nay reason it self, and in the highest meditations, they are stirr'd, as well as in natural actions. They are like an Instrument, whereof divers Artizans make use, in several works. For as the same pair of Com-

Compasses, wherewith a Mason hath taken his measures, serves the Geometrician, to draw his figures; and the Astronomer, to measure the Heavens and the Stars. So the Spirits, which have serv'd the natural faculty, for the meanest actions of life, are employ'd, by the sensitive Soul, in the animal functions, and the Understanding it self makes use of them, in operations of the highest consequence.

But what! their motion is not free in the Passions, as it might seem it ought to be, if the sensitive Appetite were Director thereof, as it is of voluntary motions. It matters not, since even the Animal Spirits, which flow through the nerves, to make those motions, and no doubt are mov'd by the sensitive Appetite, have not their motion more free, then that which is made in the Veins and Arteries. The necessity of motion is many times found in the sensitive faculty, as well as in the natural; and though the Muscles be the Organs of free motion, yet we find, that respiration, which is wrought by their means, is necessary; that the motion of the Heart, which is as it were a compositure of several Muscles, and receives a Nerve from the Brain, to give it sentiment and motion, is not to be ranked among those that are voluntary. Nay the Will it self, notwithstanding that Soveraign liberty which it hath, is not free in its first sallies, and what time soever it may take to consider of the Good and Evil, yet is it not in its power, to hate the Good, and love the Evil.

Whence then proceeds this diversity? Doubtless from the Instinct, which is a Law that forces the Soul to do what it commands for the welfare of the Animal. It is this Law that guids all the actions of the Natural faculty, that asigns the sensitive Soul the

motions which she ought to make, not only those that are not to be balked, as those of the Heart and Lungs, and those of the Animal Spirits; but also all those that are done casually, wherein the knowledge of the Senses is of no advantage. For though the motion of the Spirits in the Passions be not made precisely by it, yet does the Soul cause them to do it, according to the coppy which the Instinct gives her upon other occasions, as we have shewn elsewhere.

Art. I.

Of what kind the motion of the Heart and Spirits is in the other Passions.

THus far as to what concerns the motion of the Heart and Spirits in the Pasions of the sensitive Appetite; we now come to examine, whether it be performed after the manner, in those of the Will and natural Appetite.

We may in the first place affirm, that there are many Pasions rais'd in the Will, so as that neither the Heart, nor Spirits are thereby stirr'd, in regard it is a spiritual Faculty, which may act of it self without the assistance of any Organ. But it is to be observ'd, that they must be very slight ones; for when they come to be of any force, they fail not both of them to be mov'd thereby, as well as in the Pasions of the sensitive Appetite.

Not but that the Will, consider'd in it self, might be able, alone, to excite the most violent Pasions, as we know it does in Angels. But in Man, in whom there is an union between the Corporeal and Spiritual

tual faculties, it is impoſsible, but that one muſt aſsiſt and relieve the other, when any conſiderable Good or Evil preſents it ſelf to either of them. Which happens either hence, that there is a neceſſary communication of their motions one to the other, as we have declared; or that the Soul, upon ſuch occaſions, is diſtruſtful of her own ſtrength, and would rally together all the forces ſhe hath. Thence it comes, that ſhe thinks it not enough to move the ſenſitive Appetite, in extraordinary Griefs, to ſhun the Evil that preſſes hard upon her, but ſhe alſo excites ſadneſs, in the ſuperiour part, in order to the ſame deſign: and as if all that were not ſufficient, ſhe many times raiſes a Fever in the natural Faculty, to force away and deſtroy that enemy.

As to the Paſsions of that inferiour part of the Soul, there is not any one, wherein the Spirits are not ſtirr'd. but it is requiſite, they ſhould be violent ere they can move the Heart. For the caſe is not the ſame in them, as in thoſe of the other Appetites, which, though ever ſo much inclining to mediocrity, are nevertheleſs capable of altering her motion. Accordingly, we find, that, in wounds and ſwellings, the Spirits have their recourſe thither, with a certain impetuoſity, yet ſo as there happens not any change in the beating of the Heart and Arteries; and there are conſiderable evacuations made in Criſes, without any alteration in thoſe motions. But, in a Fever, which is the choler of the natural Appetite, in the Conſternation, which Nature is ſometimes ſubject to, in malignant diſeaſes, and in the agonies immediately preceding death, there may be obſerv'd a remarkable alteration in the Pulſe

The reaſon of this difference proceeds from the nature

nature of the Vegetative Faculty, which is more material, and consequently more heavy, then the Sensitive. For as a slothful person engages himself only in those things, that are most easily done, and never undertakes the more difficult, but when he is thereto constrain'd by necessity: So that faculty, which is mov'd with some trouble, thinks it enough, in the lighter Passions to stirr the Spirits, because they are easily mov'd; but it attempts not therein the moving of the Heart, by reason that is an Engine stirr'd with greater difficulty, unless it be when the Evil seems considerable, and that it thinks it requisite to imploy all its organs, and all its force, towards the resistance thereof.

Sect. 4.

How the Soul causes the Body to move.

But we are not yet come to the most difficult point of any, in this whole matter, to wit, how the Soul gives motion to the Heart and Spirits, and, to express it in a word, how she causes all the parts to move. For it is hard enough to conceive how a thing, which hath no body, is able to move a Body, and yet much more, to imagine, that, what is it self immoveable, as it may be thought the Soul is, can cause the members of the Animal to move. It is indeed easily seen, that they move, by the means of the Muscles, and that the Muscles act by the contraction of the Fibres, which enter into their composition. But the question is, how the Soul causes that contraction of the Fibres.

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Let not any one think to urge here, that the Appetite commands the motive vertue, which is in the members, and that the ſaid vertue executes what commands it hath received from the other. Theſe are but words, which, inſtead of clearing up the thing, render it more obſcure and hard to be comprehended: And he who ſhall narrowly conſider the nature of that command, and the manner how it may be made by the Appetite, as alſo, that, whereby it ought to be receiv'd by the motive vertue, will be no further inſtructed in what we enquire after, then he was before, and ſhall not find how the Fibres meet together and are contracted.

To expreſs our ſelves therefore clearly, and in few words, in order to the clearing up of theſe difficulties, we affirm, that all the parts are mov'd, in regard the Soul, between whom and them there is a ſtrict union, moves her ſelf, and that ſhe forces them to follow the ſame motion which ſhe hath given herſelf: So that the Fibres are contracted, becauſe the Soul, by whom they are animated, cloſes and reinforces her ſelf firſt, and afterwards cauſes them to contract.

The ſame thing is to be ſaid of the Spirits, for when they go from one place to another, when they dilate or contract themſelves in the Paſſions, it is the Soul that gives them theſe motions, conſequently to her giving of them to her ſelf.

This will not be hard to conceive, if we reflect on what was ſaid in the fourth Chapter of this work, where we have ſhewn, that the Soul was movable in all her ſubſtance, and, having a proper extenſion, ſhe had alſo ſome parts, which ſhe might move as ſhe pleas'd. For, this preſuppos'd, it is certain, that being united with the members, it is impoſſible ſhe ſhould

give

give her self any motion, but she must also give the like to them.

But it may be said, that, if the case stands thus, there is no necessity, the Animal Spirits should flow into the Muscles, to cause them to move, in asmuch as the Soul, being wholy in every part, hath no need that those Spirits should convey into it that vertue, which it is already possess'd of. We have already touch'd at this difficulty, which hath put all the Scholes into so much distraction. For some would have the Animal Spirits carry the motive faculty along with them; and others affirm, that what they do so carry with them, is only a certain quality, which is not animal, and serves only for a dispostion, to set the motive faculty, residing in the parts, upon action.

But the maintainers of both these opinions are, no doubt, mistaken, though it were only in this, that they suppose, as they do, the Spirits not to be animate; the former, in that they assign animal vertues to Bodies, which they conceive have no life; the latter, in that they advance an imaginary quality, whereof they make no explication, and which leaves the thing as doubtful at is was before.

We must therefore affirm, that the Animal Spirits do not convey the motive vertue to the parts, but that the command of the Estimative faculty does it, without which there can no motion be made.

That this may be the better understood, we are to remember, what hath been delivered in the precedent discourses; to wit, That the Appetite moves not but upon the command of the Estimative faculty, which orders what things are to be done; That the said command consists in the Image, or Idæa, which that faculty frames in it self; And that after such an Image

Image hath been therein produced, it is multiplicable and diffusive, as a light, into all the parts of the Soul.

Now it is by the Spirits that this communication is wrought. For, as corporeal actions are done by means of the Organs that are proper thereto, so knowledge ought to be made in the Brain, in which are all the Organs necessary for that action. And whereas the parts, which ought to execute what the Estimative Faculty commands, are remote from it, there is a necessity, the Soul should have certain ministers, whose work it is, to carry about the resolutions she hath taken in her Privy-councel, without which, as in a well-govern'd Commonwealth, nothing either ought or can be done.

And this is the proper imployment of the Animal Spirits, which communicate the orders and decrees of the Estimative Faculty to the parts, which, upon receipt thereof, move, as we said before.

CHAP. V.

Of the Vertues and Vices, whereof the Art how to know men may judge.

SInce *The Art how to know Men* pretends to the discovery of *Vertues* and *Vices*, how secret soever they may be, it may be also expected from it, that it would acquaint us, what Vertues and Vices are thereby meant; and withall, whether it hath that prerogative as to all in general, or only as to some

some of them. In order to the prosecution of that design, it ought to make an enumeration thereof, that it may afterwards give us a particular account of those which are within its jurisdiction, and falls under its cognizance.

But before we come to that, this is to be premis'd, as of necessary knowledge, that the Vertues and Vices are certain Habits, fram'd in the Soul, by several Moral actions, which, often reiterated, leave in her an inclination and facility to do the like.

Art. I.

What Moral actions are.

FOr the clearing up of this doctrine, we are to observe, that our Souls may do two kinds of actions, whereof some are *necessary*, the others *free*. The former are called in the Scholes the *Actions of Man*, and those which are free, *Humane Actions*, in regard they are proper to man, as he is *Rational*, he only, of all Animals, having liberty.

There are some who confound the latter with the Moral Actions, which have a reference to good and evil manners, which deserve praise or dispraise, reward or punishment. But if among the free actions, there are such as may be called indifferent, which are neither good nor bad, as many Philosophers are of opinion, it is necessary there should be some difference between Humane Actions and Moral Actions, and that the former should be as it were the Genus of the latter; so as that all Moral Actions may be Humane, in regard they are free, and that all Humane

Actions

Actions may not be Moral, in regard there be some, which are neither good nor bad.

Art. 2.

What Right Reason is.

But howere the case stand, as to the distinction of Actions, it is to be noted, that the Moral are good or bad, according to their conformity or contrariety to Right Reason. Now Right Reason is a just knowledge of the end and means, which Man ought to have, to arrive to his perfection. And his perfection consists in two points; that of the Understanding, to know the Truth, and that of the Will, to attain the Soveraign Good, for which he is design'd. In a word, it is said, that Art is a habit of the Understanding, causing a man to operate according to Right Reason; and that Vertue is a habit of the Will, which makes a man act according to Right Reason. So that there is one Right Reason for the Understanding and another for the Will; one, leading to Truth; the other, tending to Good.

This Right Reason, or Knowledge, proceeds either from God, or from Nature, or from Ratiocination. For God makes Men to know what he desires they should do; and that knowledge is the Soveraign rule of our thoughts and actions. Nature also does inspire men with a general knowledge, which is as it were the first guide she gives us, to conduct our mind whither it ought to go. Under this knowledge do fall the common Notions, which contribute to the attainment of the Speculative Sciences; as also those

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natural Laws, whereby our manners are regulated. In fine, Ratiocination, assisted by these first apprehensions and experience, hath found out Rules for Arts and Sciences, civil Laws, for the maintenance of society among men, and Maxims, for the conduct of every one in particular: And he, who acts according to any one of these lights, acts according to Right Reason. But to keep as close as may be to our subject, we are, from all we have said, to conclude, that Moral Actions are conformable to Right Reason, when they are regulated either by divine Law, or by natural and civil Laws, or by the Ratiocination of Moral Philosophy.

Art. 3.

Why the Vertues are in the mean.

NOw, among the many rules, which this part of Philosophy does furnish us withall, there is one that hath an influence almost over the whole matter whereof we treat. This is, that the actions of the Will and sensitive Appetite, and the Vertues themselves, which they produce, ought to consist in a mediocrity, not inclining to either excess or defect. Hence it is that Vertue alwaies keeps the mean between two Vices, which are opposite one to the other. And though there are some, which seem to be exempted out of this rule, as for example, Justice and Charity, and some others; yet is there a certain mediocrity which even those ought to observe, as we are taught by the Scholes.

The reason upon which this mediocrity is grounded

ded is hard enough to be found. For that which is commonly alledged, to wit, that the conformity of actions to Right Reason, consists in this, that there is neither more nor less in the actions, then ought to be, and that the disconformity observable therein proceeds from the addition of some thing or some circumstance, which is not suitable thereto, or the substraction of those that are; and that this Addition and Substraction makes the excess and defect of the actions: This reason, I say, presupposes what is in the Question; for it may be ask'd why these things and these circumstances are or are not suitable thereto; and a man may maintain which side he pleases.

I conceive it therefore much more pertinent, to affirm, that the mediocrity of actions is grounded on the Indifference, which is proper and natural to the Soul. For an action being nothing but a progression, and as it were an efflux or effusion of the Active power, ought accordingly to be conformable to that power; And consequently the humane Soul being indifferent and indeterminate, in regard that, in power, she is all things, it is requisite that her actions should be so too: and thence does proceed, not only the liberty she hath to do them, or not do them, but also the mediocrity, which she gives them, when they are done by her. For though she be then determin'd by the action, whereto she applies herself, yet does she therein preserve her indifference by the mediocrity, wherein she disposes it, in asmuch as what is in the midst is indifferent, as to the extremities, and what is in the extremity, is more determin'd then what is in the midst. Hence it comes, that the motions of the sensitive Appetite, which, in all other

Animals, are the more perfect, the more they are inclin'd to the excess and defect which is natural thereto, ought to be moderate in Man, in regard that he being subject to Reason, it is requisite they should be conformable thereto as we said before.

Those Moral Actions therefore, which are dispos'd according to that mediocrity, which is prescribed by Right Reason, are good and commendable, and those that are chargable with any excess or defect, are evil, and destitute of moral honesty, and cannot pretend to commendation. They are called Vertuous and Vicious, yet so as that they do not communicate that denomination to the persons, by whom they are done. For a man is not called vertuous or vicious, upon his doing of a good or bad action; but, to gain that name, it is requisite, he should do many, and that he should acquire the Habit thereof; in asmuch as he he cannot be so called, but upon his having of Vertue or Vice, which, as we said before, are Habits.

Art 4.

Of the Seat of Moral Habits.

But where shall we find these Habits, and in what part of the Soul are they framed? The difficulty lyes not, in reference to the Understanding, nor the Will, in regard it is necessary that the Habits should have their rise in those Faculties, whereby the actions are done, since the actions produce the habits. And there is no doubt to be made, but that those Moral Actions, which ought to be done with liberty and election, proceed from the Under-

Understanding and the Will, which are free powers, and consequently, that Vertues and Vices are in those Faculties, as in their true and proper subject. The Question then is only in reference to the sensitive Appetite, to wit, whether it be capable of Vertues and Vices, since it is such a faculty as is not free, nor can take cognizance of Right Reason, which is the rule of all Moral actions? And what breeds the difficulty as to this point, is, that the sensitive Appetite is subject to the Superiour faculties, and that its motions enter into Vertuous or Vicious actions, according as it moderates them, or permits them to be chargeable with excess or defect. So that if these motions, often reiterated, do leave therein an inclination and facility to do the like, it shall be a Habit, which, as it seems, can be no other then a Vertue or Vice. And thus the sensitive Appetite shall be susceptible of either of them, as well as the Will.

Now it is certain, that there are habits fram'd in the sensitive Appetite, as may be deduced from the instruction given to beasts, as also from the facility, wherewith our Appetite is inclin'd to certain actions after it hath done them several times. To this may be added, that, being a power, which is not determinated to one peculiar manner of acting, and hath its motions sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker, towards the same object, it is impossible, but that it should be capable of some habits, and that the actions, it often reiterates, should leave in it the same facility, which all the other faculties, acting after the same manner, are acknowledg'd to have.

To rid our hands of these doubts, we are to lay it down as a certain ground, that the habits, which

Beasts acquire, cannot be ranked among Vertues and Vices, and consequently, that the sensitive Appetite of man, which is of the same order with that of Beasts, is not, of it self, capable of having any other habits then they are.

But if it be further considered, that in Moral actions, the Will ever acts along with it, there is fram'd, at the same time, one habit in the Will, and another in the sensitive Appetite. The former is really vertuous or vicious; the latter, indifferent, as being neither good nor bad. And in regard they are not distinguish'd, there is attributed to the sensitive Appetite what belongs only to the Will. So that all may be said of these last habits, amounts only to this, that they serve for matter and body to the vertues and vices, whereof the form and essence is in the Will; And that the vertues, which are in the Will, are living and animate vertues, and the productions of them are, merit, esteem and praise, whereas those of the sensitive Appetite are (if we may be permitted so to express our selves) but rude draughts and pictures, without life and soul, having not the vigour to produce any of those things, unless it be when they are accompany'd by the other.

For, when any person is naturally inclin'd to Temperance, he may acquire the habit thereof, but it shall not be a vertue, deserving either praise or reward, if the Will do not contribute somewhat thereto. Nay it is further requisite, that the Will be illuminated by Right Reason, otherwise the habit, which it shall have contracted, shall be of the same order with those of the sensitive Appetite. Whereto this may be added, that the said Habit shall be vicious, since it is conceiv'd, the Will hath not made the advantages it ought

ought of the illumination, whereby it should have been guided. It is not sufficient that it should do *good* actions, but requisite that it should do them *well*. And thence comes it to be commonly said, that Vertue consists rather in *Adverbs*, then *Adjectives*, and that to deserve the name of just, it is not only expected, that the things be *just*, but also that they be *justly* done.

Now in order to their being so done, there is a necessity of having knowledge, of making choice of the means & circumstances; in a word, of following the directions of Right Reason, which are actions, whereto the sensitive faculty cannot attain, unless it be indirectly. For it is to be observ'd, that Right Reason being a knowledge, fram'd by intellectual Images, cannot have any connexion or reference to the sensitive Appetite, and cannot excite it to motion, in regard it is not susceptible of those kinds of Images, as the Will, upon the accompt of its spirituality, is. But when this latter hath been thereby illuminated, it moves, and afterwards imprints its motion on the sensitive Appetite, which implicitely suffers it self to be carried away whithersoever it is driven. So that if it happen, that its motions then prove conformable to Right Reason the Appetite is not the cause thereof, but it is the Will which forces it: & its procedure may be compar'd to the motions of a Clock, which ow all their measures and regularity to the Art, which is in the mind of the Maker.

Art. 5.

That there are four powers which may be regulated by Right Reason.

But after what manner soever the sensitive Appetite be moved, certain it is, that it may be regulated by Right Reason, either directly or indirectly, and consequently, it may be affirmed, that, since it is twofold, and hath its concupiscible and irascible parts, there are, in Man, four Powers, which ought to be regulated by Right Reason, to wit, the Understanding, the Will, and these two Appetites. And as Vertue is the settled and constant rule of Right Reason, so is it requisite, that every one of these powers should have its particular Vertue, as well to guide, as prevent it from falling into evil, which is against Right Reason. Thus there shall be four general vertues; to wit, *Prudence*, for the conduct of the Understanding; *Justice*, to direct the Actions of the the Will; *Temperance*, to regulate the Passions of the Concupiscible Appetite; and *Fortitude*, for the regulation of those of the Irascible; whether these or any of them be rais'd in the sensitive Appetite, or in the Will. For the Will hath two sorts of actions, whereof some are referrable to the Good and Evil of the person who acts, and these have appropriated to themselves the name of *Passions*; and the others relate to the Good and Evil which may be done to others, and these are simply called *Actions* or *Operations*, that is, *just* and *unjust* actions.

To these four Vertues are referr'd not only all those others, which are as it were species of them, but also the Vices, which are opposite thereto. We shall therefore divide the ensuing discourse into four parts,

or

or Sections, in each whereof we ſhall treat of one of theſe Vertues, of all the ſeveral ſpecies of it, and laſtly of the Vices contrary thereto.

SECT. I.

Of PRUDENCE.

Prudence and *Syndereſis*, or Remorſe of Conſcience, are two habits of the Underſtanding, whereby Moral Actions are regulated. But they are different in this particular, that the Syndereſis preſcribes to all the vertues the end which they ought to have; and Prudence treats only of the means whereof they ought to make uſe, in order to their arrival thereto.

Now, all the employment which the latter hath in this buſineſs may be reduc'd to three general actions; the firſt whereof is to find out the means; the ſecond, to make choice of that which is beſt; and the third, to preſcribe: And this is properly to deliberate, or conſult; to judge, or conclude; to enjoyn, or preſcribe. And theſe things are ſo different one from the other, that, many times, there are ſome men fit for one of them, who are not for the others. Some will propoſe all the expedients imaginable in a buſineſs, and yet will not be able to judge, which is the beſt; and another will do his work well enough as to that, but will come ſhort of the ingenuity to put it in execution.

This difference proceeds from the defect of ſome one of the intellectual faculties, which hath not the diſpoſitions requiſite to produce thoſe actions. For,

to *deliberate* well, a man ſhould have a *vivacity of Spirit* to find out expedients; and *Docility*, to underſtand and follow good counſels. To *judge* well, a man muſt dive into the bottom, and unravel the intricacy of affairs, which requires a ſmartneſs of *Apprehenſion* and ſoundneſs of *Judgment*; and to ſee, at a diſtance, the ſucceſſes, which things may have, and that is *Perſpicacity*, or *Foreſight*. To *enjoyn* well, he muſt examine all the circumſtances of the actions, and that is *Circumſpection*; he muſt conſider the inconveniences and obſtructions, which may happen; and that is *Precaution*. In fine, all three make their advantages of *Ratiocination* and *Memory*; for nothing is to be ſaid without reaſon, and that, which is grounded on experience, is the moſt certain.

But in regard it is not ſufficient to have conſulted well, judged well, and enjoy'd well, if things be not ſpeedily put in execution, we muſt add, to all theſe qualities, *Diligence*, which is the final perfection and accompliſhment of *Prudence*.

Moreover, if theſe actions be apply'd to the conduct of a mans *Perſon*, *Family*, the *Countrey* wherein he lives, or that of *Warre*, they ſpread into thoſe particular Species of Prudence, which are called *Monaſtical*, *Oeconomical*, *Political* and *Military*. And theſe are the true Species of Prudence, the reſt may rather be called the integral parts thereof.

Now though it be commonly affirm'd, that Vertue lies between two vicious extremities, yet is it not eaſie to ſet them down here. For there are ſome, whereto there cannot any thing be oppoſite, but the defect, as for example, *Memory*. Nay there are ſome, which have for their contraries the ſame vices that are oppoſite to others.

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He therefore, who is endu'd with a vivacity of Spirit, hath for his extreams the Extravagant person and the Stupid. He who is Docile, the Credulous, and the Obstinate. He who is Judicious hath the same extreams as the Ingenious. The Fore-seeing or perspicacious person hath the Distrustful and the Stupid. The Circumspect hath the Inconsiderate and the Negligent. The Well-advis'd hath the Subtle and the Simple, he who hath a good memory hath, for opposite, only him that hath a bad one; as also he who hath the experience of things, only him who hath it not. The Diligent hath the Precipitate and the sloathful.

These are the Vertues and Vices which have some relation to Prudence, according to the distribution which Moral Philosophy hath made thereof, and which the Art we treat of promises to discover. But it considers them not as they lie in that division, nor under the same names. For it makes no difference between the Circumspect, the Perspicacious, and the well-Advis'd person. And whatever appertains to Ingenuity, Judgment, and Memory, it comprehends under the name of Fortunate birth, which ought to bring along with it vivacity of Spirit, soundness or strength of Judgment, and goodness of Memory; it being requisite that he who is called Εὐφυὴς, well, or fortunately born, should have all these qualities together. True it is, that it particularly examines those who have only one of these endowments, as we shall shew anon. Now the reason why this our Art does not alwaies follow the order of Moral Philosophy, is, that all its knowledge is grounded upon signs, and that there are not such for all these habits, so exactly distinguish'd. For there being some of them, which

which are diversify'd only by certain external circumstances, they give not any precise marks, whereby they may be distinguish'd one from the other, it being sufficient, that the Principle, on which they depend, should be known. And when it shall be known that a man is Judicious, it will be easie to conclude, that he is well Advis'd, Circumspect, and Provident, which are the effects of Judgment, which considers both present and future circumstances.

The order therefore, which our Art shall observe in this matter, stands thus:

A person well or fortunately born hath for his opposites	*The Extravagant.* / *The Stupid.*
The Ingenious, and the Judicious, have	*The same opposites.*
He who hath a good memory	*Him who hath none.*
The Wise or Considerate person	*The Heedless.* / *The Sottish.*
The Prudent or well-Advis'd	*The Crafty or Subtle.* / *The Simple.*
The Docile.	*The Credulous.* / *The Obstinate.*
The Diligent.	*The over-Hasty.* / *The Sloathfull.*

SECT.

SECT. 2.

Of JUSTICE.

JUSTICE is a Vertue which renders every one what belongs to him. For, as we are not born of our ſelves, nor only for our ſelves, ſo muſt we be oblig'd to thoſe, from whom we derive our Being, and alſo to thoſe, for whoſe ſake we have receiv'd it. And therefore both theſe have a certain right over us, and we ought, in Juſtice, to render them that which belongs to them.

As therefore there are two Cauſes, to whom we are oblig'd for our Being, God and our Parents, ſo is it requiſite there ſhould be two kinds of Juſtice, whereby we ought to render what we ow them, and theſe are *Religion* and *Pity*.

Now, in regard we are born in order to Society, and that Society is conſider'd as a Whole, whereof every one makes a Part, it is accordingly requiſite, that every one ſhould have that reference to Society it ſelf, and all thoſe, who contribute to the compoſition thereof, which ought to be between the part and the whole, and all the parts taken together: otherwiſe the connexion and order, which ought to be therein, would be wanting, and there will be nothing but diſorder and confuſion. Whence it comes, that the common Concernment, and that of every one in particular, oblige us to render them, what we ow them, upon this relation and union. That Juſtice, which

which regards the publick concernment, is called *Policy*, whereby we render to the Community, what we ow it.

As to that which concerns particular persons, there being some who are design'd to govern and command, either upon the account of their dignity, or by reason of the Excellence they have, the Justice we ow them is, *Obedience* and *Respect*.

In all others we are to consider what we may ow them upon a rigorous account of Justice, or meerly upon a pure Moral obligation. The former consists in *Distributive* and *Commutative* Justice; of the other, there are six Species; to wit, *Friendship* and *Gratitude*; *Affability* and *Truth*; *Fidelity* and *Liberality*; whereof the two first are answerable to the *Heart*; the two subsequent, to the *Words*; and the two last, to *Actions*; whatsoever we ow being to be derived from the *Heart*, *Words*, and *Effects*.

Thus it is that our Art makes use of these Maxims. In the first place it considers the Honest, Just, or Upright person, under whom is particularly comprehended whatsoever appertains to Politicall, Commutative, and Distributive Justice. And to the Just person it opposes the Simple and Mischievous; but it examines not the Simple person upon the same account, as he makes one of the extreams of Prudence. In the next place comes Religion, which we call Piety, for now that word is reduc'd to the business of Religion: and the Justice we ow to our Parents is comprehended under Goodness. The opposites to Piety, are the Superstitious, and the Impious person. As to Obedience, it does not assign any markes of it, since those of Docility may serve instead thereof. Respect may also have a certain reference to Prudence

dence, or the other Species of Juſtice: for he who does not pay the Reſpect he ows, is either fooliſh or proud. So that it places the Friend in the third Claſſis, to whom it oppoſes the Flatterer and the Enemy. Next follows the Grateful perſon, who hath, for his oppoſite, onely the Ungrateful. The Affable comes in the firſt rank, who hath for oppoſites, the Cajoler and the Ruſtick. In the ſixt, comes the Tell-troth, or Sincere perſon, who hath for his oppoſite the Lyar. But in regard Lying may be referr'd to words, actions, a mans own affairs, and anothers; thence it comes that there are five kinds of Lyars, the Vain perſon, the Diſſembler, the Arrogant, the Hypocrite, and the Evil-ſpeaker. Then follows Fidelity, whereto there cannot any exceſs be oppoſed, but only the defect, which is Perfidiouſneſs. In fine, the laſt of all is the Liberal perſon, who hath for oppoſites the Prodigal and the Covetous. But in regard Compaſſion and Clemency come ſomewhat neer Liberality, the former relieving thoſe that are in want, and the other remitting the puniſhment which was due, our Art adds the Merciful and the Charitable, to the former whereof there is but one oppoſite, to wit, the Unmerciful; and of Clemency, the exceſſive Vice is Indulgency, or Fondneſs, and the defective, Cruelty. Magnificence hath alſo ſome relation to Liberality; for it ſeems to be a ſumptuous and excelling Liberality; and that hath for its oppoſites, ſuperfluous Expence, and Miſerſhip.

Theſe, reduc'd into the order obſerv'd in the precedent Section, will ſtand thus.

The Honeſt and Juſt perſon hath for Oppoſites { *The Simple.* / *The Unjuſt, or miſchievous perſon.* } *The*

The Pious, or devout { The Superstitious. / The Impious.

The Friend { The Flatterer. / The Enemy.

The Grateful person { The Ungrateful.

The Affable { The Cajoller. / The Rustick.

The Tell-troth { The Lyar { In Words { The Vain person. / The Dissembler. / The Evil-speaker. / In Actions { The Arrogant. / The Hypocrite.

The Faithful person { The Perfidious.

The Liberal { The Prodigal. / The Covetous.

The Magnificent { The superfluously Expensive. / The Miser.

The Compassionate { The Unmerciful, or Uncompassionate.

The Clement { The Indulgent. / The Cruel.

SECT.

SECT. 3.

Of TEMPERANCE.

THE perfection of every power consists in the force of its action, so that the Passions, how violent soever they may be, are so many perfections, respect being had to the Appetite, whereby they are produc'd. But in regard the Appetite was bestow'd on the Animal, for its conservation, and that, in Man, it ought to be subject to the superiour Faculties, the actions of it should not be defective, since perfection consists in the force of the action; nor should they on the other side be excessive, because they would destroy health, and disturb the noblest actions of the Soul. And therefore it is requisite, they should be moderate, that so they may be conformable to Reason; for, to be conformable to Reason, amounts to no more, then to be convenient for Man, that is, for his Nature. Nay, those very Passions, which are excited in the Will, ought to admit the same temperament or moderation: for though they cannot alwaies cause an alteration in the Health, yet may they find the Soul work about objects, which ought not to move her, or keep her too long engag'd about such as are not bad. Thence it comes, that over-earnestness of study is vicious, in regard it employes the Spirit too much in Contemplation, and diverts it from that Activity, and those lawful cares of Life, which justly

justly pretend to a share in the actions of man. Howere it be, all the Passions are regulated by two Vertues, those of the Concupiscible Appetite by *Temperance*, and those of the Irascible, by *Fortitude*.

As for Temperance, there are but two kinds of Passions about which it is employ'd, and which constitute the Species thereof, to wit, Pleasure and Desire. For though Love be the first, and most powerful of them all, yet is it impossible to make any conceit or apprehension thereof, otherwise then as it is inclin'd to some Good, which is either present or absent. If it be present, it causes Pleasure; if it be absent, it frames Desire: so that Love is, as it were, involv'd and confin'd within these two Passions, and that Vertue, whose business it is to moderate them, does also at the same time regulate the Pasion of Love. Nay if things be narrowly examin'd, we shall find, that Pleasure comprehends the two others, and that, in effect, Temperance hath no other design then to moderate the Pleasures, derivable from the Goods of the Soul, the Body, or External things. But in regard, that, of these Goods, there are some, which are consider'd rather as Absent then Present, and others on the contrary: accordingly, Desire is more manifest in some, and Pleasure in others, and therefore we have though to separate them.

For there are three things in generall, wherein our Desire may be vicious, to wit, Knowledge, Wealth and Honours: and there are two others which contribute to immoderate Pleasures, that is, the Senses, and Divertisements.

As to *Knowledge*, there being some things evil and unprofitable which may be learnt, and that too much or too little time may be spent about such as are good

good and profitable, the Vertue which regulates our desires in the pursuit thereof may be called *Study*, or a commendable *Curiosity*.

For *Wealth*, if we regard the dispossall, which is to be made thereof to others, the Vertue employ'd to that purpose is called *Liberality*, and belongs to Justice: But if it be desired for a mans private use, the Vertue which moderates the cares, which a man takes in the acquisition and use thereof, is called *Frugality*.

The Desire of *Honour* is regulated by *Humility*, *Modesty*, and *Magnanimity*. Humility keeps a man from falling too low in the pursuit thereof; Magnanimity, from attempting things too high; And Modesty moderates the desires a man may have for meaner honours.

Pleasure does principally regard the *Senses*, especially those of the Tasting and Touching, in asmuch as the irregularity of those two is most prejudicial to Health, and the Functions of the Understanding. The Pleasure of Eating and Drinking is moderated by *Sobriety*, and *Chastity* gives a check to the enjoyments of the flesh.

Now whereas there is a necessity of *Divertisement*, for the relaxation of Mind and Body, and for the recruiting of them with new forces; and that some abuse may be made of the Pleasure found therein; there is a particular Vertue design'd for the regulation of them, to wit, *Eutrapelii*, whereof there are several Species, according to the diversity of the objects, wherein diversion may be found; such as are *Conversation*, *Gaming*, *Musick*, *Hunting*, *Walking*, and others, whereto there have not yet any names been given, unless it be to that which

moderates the pleasure taken in *Raillery*.

THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN is not, as to this particular, more exact then Moral Philosophy, which hath not been able to make a discovery of all the Species of Temperance. For there are many Passions of the Concupiscible Appetite, whereto it hath not assign'd particular Vertues, for their regulation, as for example, Hatred, Aversion, and Sadness. Nay it hath not express'd all the differences of Desires and Pleasures, wherein there may be some failing, as well as in what concerns the use of the superiour Senses, since the same excesses which happen in the Tasting and Touching, do also occur in the Sight, Hearing, and Smelling. But as Moral Philosophy hath, by the general tearm of Temperance, made provision for all the particular Vertues requisite for that purpose: So our Art hath assum'd the freedom, to comprehend, under moderation, all that concerns the ordering and direction of these Passions.

We therefore place the Moderate person between the Voluptuous, and the Insensible. The Studious is comprehended under the Curious, the extreams whereof are, the Over-curious and the Negligent. The Frugal person lies between the same opposite Vices as the Liberal; those two being distinguish'd only by the different ends which they have in the disposal of Wealth. The Humble, the Modest & the Magnanimous, have in a manner the same extreams. There be only the Proud and the Ambitious which are different. That Modesty, which consists in the Gesture, is confounded with the character of the Wise, or Discreet person: That which relates to Cloaths is called Handsomness, which hath for opposites the Gawdy,

dy, and the Slovenly. But our Art considers not that Vertue, which is only in the external part, as being easily perceiv'd of it self. The Sober person is attended by two Vices, both which are in the excess, and hath not any defect at all. The rest may be seen by the ensuing Table.

The Moderate person hath for opposites	*The Voluptuous.* *The Insensible.*
The Curious	*The over-Inquisitive.* *The Negligent.*
The Frugal	*The Prodigal.* *The Covetous.*
The Humble	*The Proud.* *The Abject.*
The Magnanimous	*The Presumptuous.* *The Pusillanimous.*
The Modest	*The Ambitious.* *The Over-bashful.*
The Sober or Temperate	*The Glutton.* *The Drunkard.*
The Chast	*The Unchast.* *The Impotent.*
The Cheerful	*The Ridiculous.* *The Austere.*

To these may be added { *The excessive Gamster.* / *The excessive Huntsman*

SECT. 4.

Of FORTITUDE.

FORTITUDE moderates the Passions of the Irascible Appetite; for this is the Vertue, which regulates the Soul, upon the occurrence of things troublesome and difficult Now, though there be three kinds of Passion in this Appetite, to wit, Hope, Audacity, and Anger, yet are the two latter the more violent, and the least tractable; so that this Vertue is more apparent, in Anger and Audacity, then it is in Hope. And whereas Audacity relates to Dangers, and particularly that which is most to be fear'd of any, to wit, Death; thence it proceeds, that most of the Philosophers assign this Vertue to moderate that Pasion alone. But following the Order we have propos'd to our selves, it is to be extended to all those Pasions. Nevertheless, before we come to treat of the Species of it, this observation is to be premis'd, to wit, that there are three sorts of Fortitude, that of the *Body*, that of the *Mind*, and that of the *Appetite*. The first is purely natural; the last is acquir'd by Study and Reason; the other is partly natural, partly acquir'd. All these three have two principal functions, which are, to assault or set upon, and oppose.

Now

Now as Anger is the ſtrongeſt, and moſt ordinary Paſſion of this Appetite, Meekneſs is accordingly put in the firſt place, as being the Vertue, by which this Paſſion is moderated. There are ſeveral Species of Audacity, according to the ſeveral objects which oblige it to attack or oppoſe. For, in attacking the Evil, if it be done in Arms, it makes *Valour*; in all other caſes, it is *Audacity*, or *Confidence*. But if it ſlight and contemn great Dangers, it is tearmed *Magnanimity*, or Greatneſs of Courage. On the contrary, in oppoſing, it is *Conſtancy* and *Patience*.

As concerning Hope, it is regulated by Patience and Perſeverance. The latter hath a reſpect to the delay, the former conſiders all the other difficulties, which may occur in the expectation of Good.

According to this Order, our Art ought in the firſt place to examine the Strength and Weakneſs of the Body and Mind; then ſpeak of Meekneſs, which hath for its oppoſites, Anger and Inſenſibility, and ſo of the reſt, as may be ſeen in the enſuing Table.

A Perſon of a ſtrong Conſtitution of Body hath but one contrary, which is { *The Weak of Body*

A ſtrong Conſtitution of Mind hath alſo but one, which is { *Weakneſs of Mind*

The Meek or Courteous { *The Angry.* / *The Inſenſible.*

The Valiant { *The Raſh.* / *The Coward.*

The Bold	*The Impudent.* / *The Timorous.*
The Magnanimous	*The Presumptuous* / *The Pusillanimous.*
The Constant	*The Unconstant.* / *The Obstinate.*
The Patient	*The Impatient.* / *The Stupid.*
The Perseverant	*The Self-will'd.* / *The Faint-hearted.*

The End of the First Book.

THE ART How to know MEN.

The Second Book.

Chap. I.

Of the Means whereby Men may be known.

HAving, in the precedent Book, explicated the Nature of the *Inclinations*, the *Motions* of the *Soul*, and the *Habits*, which *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* pretends it self able to discover; our design call upon us now, to an examination

of the *Means*, whereby this Knowledge is to be attain'd.

Now, whereas it is impoſsible to come to the knowledge of things obſcure, otherwiſe then by that of thoſe which are already known to us, there is a neceſsity, that if there be an Art, whereby may be taught what lies hid in men, it ought to make uſe of ſome manifeſt and known means, between which and the things it would know, there ſhould be ſuch a rapport and connexion, as that ſome certain conſequences might be drawn from the one to the other. And whereas there is not any rapport of this nature, other then what is between the cauſe and its effect, or the effect and its cauſe, or between one effect and another, upon this account that both of them proceed from the ſame ſource, it follows, that there are three means whereof this Art may make uſe, to arrive at the end, which it propoſes to it ſelf, and that it may diſcover a ſecret effect, by the cauſe which is known to it, or an obſcure cauſe by a manifeſt effect, and an unknown effect by another which is evident. And theſe means are called *Signs*, becauſe they denote, ſignifie, and deſign the things that are obſcure.

Thus, when we know a man to be of a Temperament ſubject to Melancholy, it may be ſaid, that he hath an inclination to Sadneſs, in aſmuch as that Temperament is the cauſe of ſuch an Inclination; and then the cauſe is the ſign of the effect. On the contrary, by the natural inclination which ſome man may have to Sadneſs, it is preſum'd, that he is of a Melancholick Temperament; and in that caſe, the effect is the ſign of the cauſe. In fine, by the Timorouſneſs, which may be obſerv'd in both theſe perſons, it may be judg'd that they are Diſſemblers, in

regard

regard that both Timorousness and Dissimulation proceed from the weakness which attends the melancholick Temperament, and then it is, that the effect is sign of an effect. Now, since causes and effects serve for Signs to the Art we treat of, the next thing to be known is, what these causes and effects are.

Art. I.

What Causes they are which serve for Signs.

IT is not to be doubted but that the Causes, which contribute to the discovery of men, must be such as have an influence over Man, and are in him; that is, such as cause some alteration in the Body and Soul, and promote and change the actions of both. Of these there are two Orders; some are *Internal*, some *External*.

The *Internal* causes are the Faculties of the Soul, the Temperament, the Conformation of the parts, Age, Nobleness or meanness of Birth, the Habits, as well Intellectual, as Moral, and the Passions. The *External* are Parents, the Celestial Bodies, the Climate, the Seasons, Aliment, prosperous or adverse Fortune, Example, Advice, Punishments, and Rewards. For all these Causes make different impressions upon Man, and according to the strength they have, they produce in him different effects, and dispose him to such and such actions. So that every Faculty of the Soul, every Temperament, every Age, every several kind of Birth, hath its proper actions, its particular dispositions, its inclinations, and aversions.

Parents

Parents do many times derive to their children those qualities of body and mind, which are natural to themselves; the Climate, Health and Sickness, course of Life, Prosperity and Adversity, Good and Bad Example; in fine, the different aspects of the Celestial Bodies cause an alteration in the Body and Soul, imprinting in them divers qualities, and making them inclinable to certain Actions.

Art. 2.

What the Effects are which serve for Signs.

THe Effects which proceed from these Causes are also of two kinds; for some are *Corporeal*; others, *Spiritual*.

The *Spiritual* are the qualities of the mind; the Inclinations, the Habits, all the actions and motions of the Soul: for, that they have been numbred among the Causes, was in consideration of the Effects which they produce; as here they are ranked among the Effects, by reason of the Causes from which they proceed. For instance, the Inclination which a man hath to Anger, is the cause of the Anger; but it is also the effect of the cholerick Temperament, which gives birth to that Inclination.

The *Corporeal* Effects consist in the Bulk of the Figure of the parts, in the first and second Qualities, in the Air of the Countenance, in the Carriage and motion of the Body, as we shall shew more particularly hereafter.

So that upon cognizance taken of these Causes, and a knowledge of the power they have, some judgment may

may be made of their preſent or future effects; And on the other ſide, upon an obſervation of the Effects, and a knowledge of that whereto they ought to be referred, the preſent or paſt cauſes may be gheſs'd at. Thus are they Signs one of the other, and *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN*, hath a priviledge to make its advantage of them, in order to the performance of what it promiſes.

But in regard all theſe *Signs* create not an equal knowledge of the things whereto they are referr'd, & that ſome of them denote the ſame with more certainty then others, it is requiſite there ſhould be a careful examination taken of their *Strength* and *Weakneſs*, ſince that is the chiefeſt and moſt ſolid ground of this Art.

CHAP. II.

Of the Strength and Weakneſs of Signs.

Art 1.

What Judgment is made by the Cauſes.

GEnerally ſpeaking, the judgment which is made by the Cauſes, is more uncertain then that which is made by the Effects, in regard that from the knowledge of the cauſe of ſome thing, it

it does not follow, that it ſhould produce the effect it is imagin'd to do, by reaſon of divers obſtructions, which may happen in the production thereof: But when an effect is ſeen, it muſt of neceſſity be, that the cauſe did precede. Thence it comes, that the knowledge which is had of the Temperaments, by the marks they leave upon the Body, is more certain then that which is had of the inclinations by the Temperament, in aſmuch as theſe marks are the effects of the Temperament, and that the Temperament is the cauſe of the Inclinations.

Art. 2.

Of the next Cauſes.

MOreover the cauſes are of two kinds; ſome are termed the *Next* Cauſes, others are *Remote*. From the former, a more certaine judgment may be deduced, in regard they have a ſtricter connexion with their effects. Accordingly, the knowledge which is had of the Temperament, better diſcovers the inclinations, then any thing that can be inferr'd from Birth, Age, or the Climate, &c. But there is not any Cauſe, from which there may be a more certaine judgment deduc'd of a mans actions, then the Habit: For he who ſhall know one to be a juſt perſon, will be the more apt to affirm, that upon ſuch or ſuch an occaſion, he will do an act of juſtice.

Into this rank may alſo be reduced the Paſsions themſelves, in reference to thoſe others which are wont to accompany them; for the Paſsions never march alone, and there is not any of them but produces

duces some others which either appear with it, or follow it very closely. Thus Arrogance, Impatience, Indiscretion, accompany Anger; and therefore he who knows a man to be sometimes transported with the latter, may affirm that he is apt to fall into the others. And this observation is so considerable, that it makes way for the Noblest rule of all *Physiognomy*, whereof Aristotle is the author, and which he calls *Syllogistick*; and of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

The Qualities or Endowments of the mind do also give a certain judgment of the good & bad productions, which shall proceed from them. And it may be affirmed, that when some man shall conceive himself oblig'd, out of the bent of his own inclination, to embrace some opinion, or to speak to some business, he will judge and discourse of it, answerable to the opinion the world hath of his capacity and endowments.

Art. 3.

Of the Remote Causes.

AS to the remote Causes, if there were so great certainty in Astrology as some imagine to themselves, no question but the judgments, which might be made upon consideration of the Celestial Bodies, would be the most certain of any. But we do not acknowledge so great a power in those Bodies, as is attributed to them, and we can grant them, at most, but some small advantage over the Climate, which gives some ground to judge of the Inclinations, upon the accompt of the Temperament, whereof it is a Remote

mote cause as well as they. Age and Sickness may be put in the some rank. But good and bad Fortune, Nobleness or meanness of Birth, Examples (under which I comprehend Counsels, Advice, Rewards, and Punishments) afford but very doubtful conjectures. Lastly, the Seasons and Aliment make the most uncertain judgments of any.

Art. 4.

What Judgment that is which is made by the Effects.

AS to what concerns the discovery which may be of the Causes by the Effects, we are to presuppose the distinction we have already made thereof, that is, that of these latter, there are some Spiritual, some Corporeal. For, generally speaking, the judgment which is made by the Corporeal, is more certain then that deduc'd from the Spiritual, in as much as the former immediately proceed from the Temperament, and the Conformation of the parts, which are the Next Causes of the Inclinations; or they (viz. the effects) proceed from the Passion it self, which produces them on the Body, when the Soul is stirr'd thereby.

And as to the Spiritual, which are the Qualities or Endowments of the mind, the Inclinations, the Actions and Motions of the Soul, and the Habits; as there are many several Causes, whereby each of them may be produc'd, so the judgment made thereof is the more indeterminate and uncertain. For the Passion may be caus'd by divers objects, by the Weak-

ness

nefs of the Mind, by the Inclination, &c. In like manner, the Inclination may be the product of the Inſtinct, to the Temperament, and of Cuſtome. The Habits alſo have diverſe Principles as well as the Qualities of the mind, ſo that it is no eaſie matter preciſely to aſſigne the Cauſe, from which each of theſe Effects proceeds.

Now, ſince there may be a more exact knowledge deduted from the Corporeal Effects, and that it is of them only that Phyſiognomy makes uſe, in order to the diſcovery of the Inclinations, it concerns us to engage upon a more careful examination of them, and to ſee what their number may be, what the cauſes thereof are, and what Strength and Weakneſs they have, that ſo we may judge, not only of the Inclinations, as Phyſiognomy does, but alſo of the Qualities of the mind, the Paſſions and Habits, which *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* pretends it ſelf able to diſcover by them.

CHAP. III.

Of the Natural Signs.

IN the firſt place, we are here to preſuppoſe, that there are two kinds of *Effects*, or *Signs*, which are imprinted on the Body. Of theſe, one is the *Natural*, which proceeds from the conſtitution of the Body, and the other Elementary Cauſes: the other, the *Aſtrological*, which proceeds from the Stars or Cele-

Celestial Bodies, whereof *Metoposcopy* and *Chiromancy* make use. We shall hereafter examine, whether there be any certainty in those Sciences, and whether the Signs, upon which they have fram'd their Rules, may contribute any knowledge of the Inclinations, the Passions, and the Habits, as they pretend to do.

As to the Natural Signs, *Aristotle* hath reduc'd them to nine Heads or Articles, which are these:

1. *The Motion of the Body, as the Gate, the Gesture, and Carriage of it.*
2. *Beauty, and Deformity.*
3. *Colour.*
4. *The Air of the Countenance.*
5. *The quality of the Skin.*
6. *The Voice.*
7. *The Fleshiness of the Body.*
8. *The Figure &* } *of the Parts.*
9. *The Largness* }

All these Signs proceed from Internal or External Causes. And this distinction is so necessary, that it makes in a manner, the whole difference there is between those which are advantageous and those that are otherwise, as we shall make appear.

The Internal Causes are, the Conformation of the Parts, the Temperament and the Motive Vertue; the External are all those things, which come from without, and work some alteration in the Body. Thus a man may go slowly, either out of his natural Inclination, or out of Design, or through Weakness. Beauty and Deformity proceed from Nature, Artifice,

ce, or Accident. The Colour ought to be consonant to the Temperament; but the Air, and such other things may alter it. The Air of the Countenance, and the Voice, the Skin, and the Fleshiness of the parts, may receive alteration upon the same account. In fine, the Figure of the Parts s either Natural or Accidental, for a man may become crooked, and crump-shoulder'd, either by a Fluxion, or by a Fall, or by Nature. True it is, that, of these Signs, some are not so easily changed by the External Causes, as the Figure, the Air of the Countenance, and Motion; but the Colour, the Skin, and the Voice, do easily receive the impressions thereof.

But it being suppos'd, as it is certain, that the Internal causes are those which produce the most certain Signs; we make this further observation, That the Figure and Largness of the Parts proceed from the Conformation; the Temperament gives the Colour, the quality of the Skin, and the Fleshiness of the Parts; The particular kind of Gate, and the other Motions proceed from the Motive Vertue: But Beauty, the Voice & the Air of the Countenance proceed from all these three Causes joyned together. For Beauty consisting in a symmetry, and just proportion of the Members, as to colour and grace, the proportion proceeds from the Conformation; Colour, from the Temperament; and the grace, from Motion. The Voice is answerable to the Conformation of the Organs, their Temperament, and the motion of the Muscles. In fine, the Air of the Countenance, and the Carriage of the Body, have their principal dependence on the Motion: for in the disturbance of the Passions, the Air, which accompanies them, is nothing else then a certain proportion of

the parts, resulting from the diverse motions they make in pursuit of Good and Evil, which moves the Appetite. But that disturbance of the Passion being calm'd, and taken away, the Air, which remains fix'd on the Countenance, relates to the Conformation and the Temperament, as may be observ'd in those, who naturally have the same constitution and disposition of the Parts, with those, which the Passion is wont to cause.

Art. I.

Of the Difference of Signs.

OF the Signs before-mentioned some are *Common*, others *Proper*. The *Common* Signs are not determinated to any one quality, but may signifie many; on the contrary, the *Proper* are determinated only to one.

Moreover, there are some Signs, which, in a manner, never change, as the Conformation; all the rest may be chang'd. And among these last, some are *Stable* and *Permanent*, others are *Transient*, and continue but a short time. Thus those which proceed from *Age* and the *Climate*, are Stable; but such as proceed from Sickness and the Passions, are of small continuance.

From these Distinctions, something may be deduc'd, which may contribute to the discovery of the Strength and Weakness of the Signs; for those which proceed from external causes do not denote any thing certain. And of those which the Internal causes have produc'd, the Stable are significators of Permanent

manent Inclinations; the others may poſsibly denote the preſent Paſsions, but not the natural Inclinations, unleſs it be by accident, as *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks.

Beſides, the ſigns which are the leaſt eaſily chang'd by the External cauſes, are the moſt certain; ſuch as are the Figure, the Air of the Countenance, and Motion; but the Colour, the Skin, the Fleſhineſs of the parts, and the Voice, are conſequently the leſs certain.

Whereto this may be added, that the Common Signs do not ſignifie any thing certain, unleſs there be ſome proper Sign, whereby they ſhould be determinated.

Art. 2.

Of the Means aſſign'd by Ariſtotle *to diſcover the efficacy of Signs.*

Ariſtotle propoſes another Maxim, to find out the efficacy and certitude of Signs. For he affirms, that, ſuch as are obſervable in the principal, and moſt excellent parts, are accordingly the moſt certain, and that, among thoſe, the Head is the moſt conſiderable; but, in that, the Eyes challenge the preheminence, the Forehead hath the next place, and then the Face, comprehending all that is below the Eyes. Next to the Head, are accounted the Breaſt and ſhoulders; in the third place come the Arms and Legs; The Belly is the laſt of all, and the leaſt conſiderable.

But this Rule ſeems ſomewhat diſconſonant to the Maxims of *Ariſtotle*, nay indeed to Reaſon it ſelf. For he, who aſsigns the Heart for the principle of all

Actions, as being that part, wherein he affirms the Passions to be framed, should have bestow'd the first and most excellent place on the Breast, and not on the Head, and have maintain'd, that the most certain signs of the Inclinations and Passions are derivable from that part, which encompasses the place, where they have their first birth. But it is to be observed, that *Aristotle* does not there pass his judgment, of the excellency of the parts, as a Philosopher or Physician would do; he considers them only upon this reflection, that the Passions are more discoverable in those, then others. And accordingly, he places the Arms and Leggs before the Belly, though they be much less excellent and less considerable, as to the essence and nature of the Animal. Now it is certain, that there is not any part, wherein the Passions are sooner, and more apparently observable, then they are in the Head: as we shall shew more particularly in the next Article.

Art. 3.

That the Passions are most apparent in the Head.

THe first reason we shall give for the more remarkable manifestation of the Passions in the Head, is this, that they are not fram'd without the use of the Senses, from which is derived the first knowledge of those things, that move the Passions, and that all of them, Touching only excepted, are placed in the Head. Add to this, that the *Estimative Faculty*, whose work it is to conceive the things which

which are good and bad, and gives the first shock to the Appetite, is in the Brain; and that the strength and weakness of mind, which have also a dependence on the same part, hath a great influence over the Inclinations and Passions. For it is certain, that Children, Sick persons, and Women are ordinarily enclin'd to Anger, out of pure weakness of mind, as having not that heat of blood and heart, which is requisite for a disposition to that Passion.

But the principal reason hereof proceeds from the impression, which the Passions make on that part. For as the Soul hath no other design in the motions of the Appetite, then to bring the Animal to the enjoyment of that Good, which she conceives necessary thereto, and to remove the Evil, whereby it may be injur'd; so, to compass her desires, she employs all the parts, that are under her jurisdiction, and causes them to move answerably to the intention she hath. Now, of these, some being more susceptible of motion then others, they accordingly make a speedier discovery of the agitation wherein she is, and the progress she makes therein: for there are several degrees in every Passion. In the first place, there is the emotion, or first stirring, of the Appetite, which does not issue out of the Soul, as being an immanent action: Then the Heart and Spirits are stirr'd, as being the chief Organs of the sensitive Appetite; and, if the Passion increase, the eyes, the forehead, and the other parts of the Head, are shaken: but if it still advance, and come to execution, and that the Soul would really arrive at the enjoyment of the Good, and shun the Evil, she moves the parts design'd for that purpose, till at last, she puts the whole body into motion, if she be not prevented.

So that it is to be hence obſerv'd, that the Heart and Spirits are thoſe parts of the body, which are firſt moved in the Paſſions. But the motion of the Heart is not ſenſible, as that of the Spirits, which is immediately to be ſeen in the Countenance, in regard they carry the blood along with them, the ſudden arrival or departure whereof alters, in a moment, the colour and figure of the face; which alteration happens not to the other parts, and that for two reaſons. One is, becauſe the Spirits make their recourſe to the face more abundantly then to any of the other parts, upon this account, that the Senſes are lodg'd therein, which ſtand in need of ſpacious channels, whereby the Spirits may flow thither in greater quantities, and with more eaſe. The other is, that the skin of the Face is of a particular conſtitution, which is not to be found in any of the other parts. For all elſwhere, unleſs it be in the palms of the hands, or the ſoals of the feet, the skin may be ſeparated from the fleſh: But in the Face, they are both ſo united together, that they cannot be ſeparated one from the other, without tearing and rending it. Whence it comes that the colour, which proceeds from the motion and quality of the blood, is more manifeſt there, then in all the reſt of the body; and this alſo ſo much the more, for that the skin there is very thin and delicate; which is not to be found in the hands and feet. So that, it being ſhewn, that the Paſsions do principally and more eaſily change the colour of the Face, then that of any of the other parts, it is to be maintain'd as certain, that, in ſuch a caſe, it muſt be the place where they appear ſooneſt and moſt evidently.

Moreover, whereas the Soul, being ſtirr'd, moves, not

not onely the Heart, the Spirits, and Humours, but alſo thoſe parts, which move voluntarily; it is not to be queſtion'd, but that thoſe which are moſt apt to motion are the firſt ſtirr'd by her, though their motion contribute but very little to the execution of her deſign. For, to what end ſerves the wrinkling of the forehead, the lifting up of the Eye-brows, and the widening of the noſtrils in the Paſſion of Anger; or, in Baſhfulneſs, the caſting down of the eyes, bluſhing, and being out of countenance? And yet it is not to be doubted, but that all theſe motions proceed from the diſturbance caus'd by the Paſsion in the Soul, and whereby ſhe is hurried, to make uſe of whatever ſtands in her way, though it be no advantage to her, as we ſaid before.

Since therefore that, of the parts, there are not any ſo ſuſceptible of motion, nor ſo ſuddenly betray their reſentment of the Paſsions, as thoſe which are in the Head, *Ariſtotle* had reaſon to aſsign it the firſt place, as to what concerns Phyſiognomical Signs; and to diſpoſe the eyes in the moſt excellent place therein, then to bring in the forehead, and ſo conſequently the others, for the reaſons we have alledged.

Art 4.

That the Inclinations are moſt apparent in the Head.

IT might be ſaid, that all this Diſcourſe does indeed demonſtrate the appearance of the Paſsions more remarkably in the Face, then any where elſe; but that the ſame thing is not to be concluded as to the Incli-

nations, and that all this alteration, and all these motions, which are consequent to the agitation of the Soul, are only transient Signs, incapable of denoting permanent dispositions, such as are those of the Inclinations and Habits. But we conceive it no inconsiderable advancement to have shewn, that the Characters of the Passions are principally apparent in that part of the Body, since that, according to the rule of conformity, whereof we shall speak hereafter, those who naturally have the same air, which the Passion causes, are inclinable to the same Passion.

However it may happen, if the Temperament, the Conformation of the parts, and the Motive vertue, be the causes of permanent Signs, it is consequently certain, that there are not any parts, wherein the Formative vertue acts more efficaciously, then it does in the Head, by reason of the excellency of its Operations, and its Organs; no parts, wherein the Temperament can be more easily discover'd, by reason of the particular constitution, which the skin is of; in fine, no parts, wherein the motive vertue is stronger, and more free in its motions, since there it is in its proper seat and vigour.

To these reasons, this may be added, that the great variety of the organs, which are in the Head, supplies us with a greater number of Signs, then any other part whatsoever, and that, Audacity and Fear taken away, as also some others which have dependance on them, there is not any Passion that leaves its marks on the parts, whereby the Heart is encompass'd. So that, without any further difficulty, we may allow the Head the preheminence, as to what concerns the Signs observable in physiognomy.

Art.

Art. 5.

That the Inclinations are discoverable by the Arms and Leggs.

IT may seem deducible from these last reasons, that we are willing to allow the second rank to the Arms and Leggs, and admit them to be the places, from which, next to the Head, there may be drawn such Signs, as may pretend to most certainty, and whereof there are a greater number; and consequently, that the Breast is not so considerable as they are. And indeed, if the Air of the Face, the Behaviour, and motion, be more certain Signs then the Figure, as *Aristotle*, in these words seems to affirm, ἰσχυρότεραι ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι, καὶ καλὰ τὰς κινήσεις καὶ τὰ σχήματα, placing the Figure after the Motions, it is certain, that they are much more apparent in the Gesture and Gate, then in the Breast, where it may be thought there is only the Figure to be consider'd.

But we are here to call to mind, what we have said elsewhere, to wit, that the Passions may be consider'd in their first stirring, and in their execution, and that the execution is not alwaies consequent to the stirring and emotion. Now the Arms and Legs are the principal organs in order to the execution of what the Appetite commands, and the Heart is the principle and source of the emotion. So that the marks which this latter gives are more universal, and more certain, then those of the others, it being affirmed, that the Heart is alwaies mov'd in the Passions, and that every Passion comes not to execution.

I add further, that the Breaſt and Shoulders have alſo their particular carriage and motion, as well as the Arms; beſides, that the motion of the Arms, and the manner of Going, may be chang'd by cuſtom, whereas the ſame thing cannot be ſaid of the Figure of the Breaſt, which alwaies denotes the Temperament of the Heart, and, conſequently, the Inclinations. And as for *Ariſtotle*, we are to affirm, that he does not make any compariſon between the Air of the Countenance, and Motion, and Figure; but he compares theſe three together with the other Signs, as, for example, the Colour, the Voice, the quality of the Skin, and the Fleſhy parts, which no doubt are much leſs certain then the former, as we ſaid elſewhere. So that it is to be maintain'd, as manifeſt, that the moſt excellent place, from which the moſt remarkable Signs of Phyſiognomy are to be drawn, is the Head; the next to that, the parts which encloſe the Heart; the third; the Arms and Leggs; and the laſt, the Belly. For though this laſt hath ſome right to diſpute the precedence with the Arms, by reaſon of the many Signs found therein, eſpecially as to what concerns the Temperament; yet it is moſt certain, that modeſty does not eaſily permit that part to be conſider'd, whence it muſt needs follow, that the Signs are ſo much the leſs manifeſt; whereto may be added this alſo, that they do not principally denote the operations of the ſenſitive Soul, but only of the Vegetative, and that it is only by accident, that it makes any ſignification of the other.

Art.

Art. 6.

From what places the Signs are taken.

THe moſt conſiderable places from which the Signs are to be taken, are, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, thoſe ἐφ' ὧν ἡ φρονήσεως πλείστης ἐπιφάνεια γίνεται, *In quibus ſapientiæ multæ apparentia fit*; which aſſertion may be explicated two ways. The former, that the parts where Wiſdom and Modeſty ought to be moſt apparent, are thoſe which diſcover the moſt certain marks of the Inclinations. So that the air of the countenance, and the carriage or deportment of the Body, making the principal diſcovery of Wiſdom in a man, it is accordingly from thoſe places, that we are to derive the moſt aſſured Signs of Phyſiognomy. For, as Prudence brings along with it a general diſpoſition to all the other Vertues; So, on the other ſide, Imprudence inveſts a man with a ſuſceptibility of all ſorts of Vices and Imperfections. So that the places, where thoſe two qualities are moſt remarkable, muſt of neceſſity furniſh us with the Signs of all the other Inclinations.

The ſecond Explication of that Aſſertion, and, in my judgment, the better, is, that the external parts, whereof the Soul ſeems to ſtand moſt in need, and wherein ſhe imploys the more art and conduct, whether as to the framing of them, or keeping them after they are fram'd, are thoſe from which we are to extract the moſt certain Signs of the Inclinations. The reaſon, this, that the Soul, making a fuller diſcovery of her ſelf, and, in ſome ſort, more manifeſtly producing her ſelf in thoſe parts, than in the others, may in them

them also make a greater discovery of her Inclinations. Now, it is generally acknowledg'd, that there are not any, wherein her cares, her conduct, and her industry are more apparent, than in the eyes, and in the other parts of the Head; in regard that all the Senses, nay, Reason it self, are lodg'd therein; and, next to them, in the Breast, upon this account, that it comprehends the source of life, and that the Appetite hath its residence there; And lastly, in the Arms and Leggs, as being the instruments of voluntary motion, which, next to Sentiment, is the noblest quality of the Animal.

From the precedent Discourse, it is easily seen, that there cannot be an assured judgment made of the Soul's Inclinations, otherwise than by the proper and permanent Signs, and that these are commonly drawn from the Figure, the Air of the countenance, the Motions, and the Fleshy parts of the Body. So that among the Signs propos'd by *Aristotle*, the Figure, and Air of the countenance have the first place. Then follows the Motion, in as much as the Animal does not move, but answerably to the motion of the Appetite; and so it is easie to judge, of what quality the Appetite is, by Motion, which is one of its effects. The fleshy parts of the body have the third place, in regard they denote the matter, whereof the body consists: Now, every matter requires its particular form, and so, by the qualities of the matter, the qualities of the form may be known. The Skin and Hair come next, in as much as they are certain discoveries of the fleshiness. In fine, Colour and the Voice bring up the Rear, and have the last place, in regard they may be easily alter'd, especially the Voice, which is chang'd in a moment, by the Passi-

ons,

ons, by the leaſt fluxion, and by an hundred other ſuch accidents.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Rules, which Phyſiognomy hath fram'd upon the natural Signs, in order to the diſcovery of the Inclinations.

AS all the Signs, whereof we have treated, taken diſtinctly one from the other, afford us not a very certain judgment of what we would deduce from them; and that it is requiſite, there ſhould be a concurrence of ſeveral of them, to make a perfect denotation of what we would diſcover therby; ſo Phyſiognomy hath reduc'd them into divers Claſſes, wherein are comprehended all thoſe which have any relation to the ſame end and ſignification. And the number of theſe Claſſes is drawn from four rapports and reſemblances, which may be between Men & other things; it being conceivable, that one man may have ſome reſemblance to another, who ſhall be mov'd by ſome paſſion, or to Men of another Climate, or to Women, or to Brutes. Now, upon theſe four reſemblances, Phyſiognomy hath made four general Rules, which, beſides that they promote its particular deſign,

design, do further discover the initials of that Science, and the improvements it hath made, in several Times and Ages.

Art. I.

Of the Progress of Physiognomy.

I Conceive then, it may be laid down as a thing not question'd, that Physiognomy had its beginnings and advancements, as the other Sciences had, which have not of a sudden, and, as it were, at the first start, nor yet in the same Age, attain'd the perfection and accomplishment, which Time and after-experiences have brought them to. And it is very probable, that the first observations made thereof, were taken from the effects, which the Passions produce in the countenance; and that it having been observ'd, that a Man transported with Anger, or cast down by sadness, had his countenance in such or such a posture, some observant Person inferr'd the likelihood there was, that those who naturally had their countenances so, were accordingly inclin'd to the same Passions. For this manner of judging of the Inclinations is more consonant to common sence, and the most easie to be observ'd. Afterwards there was taken into consideration the resemblance which may be between men, and other Animals, and a judgment was made of the conformity of their Inclinations, by the resemblance there was between them. Then was there notice taken of that which is between the Sexes; and, at last, that between men of different Climates. For it is certain, that the Sexes, in each Species, have the Figure of the Body and the Inclinations different,

as

as well as men of different Climates; and that if there be a resemblance, as to Figure, between any two of them, there ought to be also the same, as to their Inclinations.

Art. 2.

That the Syllogistical Rule was added by Aristotle.

THus far went the Antient Physiognomy. To these observations *Aristotle* hath since added the Rule which he calls *Syllogistical*. Now, though the rules which the antient Professors of Physiognomy made use of were not bad, yet were they not certain enough, to establish a Science upon them, in regard they did not employ them all in their judgments, nay, indeed us'd them not as they should have done, and that they wanted the *Syllogistical Rule*, without which, the other are defective. And thence it came, that *Aristotle* found fault with them, and hath shewn, by solid reasons, that there was no certainty in their Science.

Art. 3.

The defect of the first Rule of Physiognomy.

FOr, as to what concerns the first means, which they call apparent Conformity or Resemblance, ἐμφασιν, they minded not, that there are many contrary Inclinations, which cause the same constitution of countenance, as, for instance, Fortitude, and Impudence.

Besides,

Beſides, the Air of countenance is chang'd in a moment, according as the Soul is mov'd; and ſo a man naturally ſad, may expreſs a certain cheerfulneſs in his countenance, upon the occurrence of ſome agreeable object. In fine, this Rule is very imperfect, and confin'd the ſtudy of Phyſiognomy to too narrow limits.

Art. 4.

The defectiveneſs of the ſecond Rule.

THe ſecond Rule, which they draw from the reſemblance there may be, between Man and other Animals, is yet more doubtfull, eſpecially conſidering the manner, how they made uſe of it. For there is not any man, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, who hath an abſolute reſemblance with any other Animal whatſoever, but onely in ſome particular part; and there is ground to doubt, whether any one part is capable of creating a judgment of an Inclination, proper to the whole Species. Secondly, it is to be conſidered, that there are few Signs proper and peculiar to any one Species, and that there be many common ones; and therefore the reſemblance which is made between a man and ſome other Animal, by the common Signs, will be defective, and ſignifie nothing, ſince it may be alſo made to another different Species. Nay, if the reſemblance be made by Signs proper to ſuch a Species, there will ſtill be reaſon to queſtion, whether thoſe Signs do determinately denote ſuch an Inclination, ſince it is to be conceiv'd, every Animal hath ſeveral others. Thus the Figure, proper to a Tygre, is,

to have a very ſpacious mouth, ſhort ears, and the skin ſpotted; But this cannot deſign a particular Inclination, in regard that being a ſtrong, cruel, and indocible creature, it cannot be determined to which of theſe qualities that Figure may have any correſpondence. And therefore the antient Phyſiognomiſts, could not, by this Rule, make any judgment of the Inclinations, whether they made uſe of thoſe Signs, which are common, or thoſe which are proper to the Animals.

Art. 5.

How Ariſtotle *makes uſe of the ſecond Rule.*

IT will be ſaid, that, by this reaſon, *Ariſtotle* deſtroys as well his own doctrine, as that of the Antients, it being found, that, in other places, he makes uſe of this very Maxime, That ſuch, or ſuch a Figure denotes ſuch, or ſuch an Inclination, and that this is applicable to Lions, Eagles, Ravens, *&c.* It is true, that *Ariſtotle*, in appearance, makes uſe of the ſame Rule, but it is after another manner then the old Phyſiognomiſts had done. For theſe conſider'd not the marks and ſigns of Animals; and thereupon they concluded, that he who reſembled them in that, had the ſame Inclinations, as were found in the Souls of thoſe Animals.

On the contrary, *Ariſtotle* conſiders not the Signs as proper to the Animals, but as proper to the Inclinations; which having not been obſerv'd by *Baldus*, occaſion'd that great perſon to fall into a manifeſt contradiction. And accordingly, he afterwards teaches, how that obſervation is to be made, and affirms, that

we ought to consider several persons who have the same natural habit, such as may be, for example, Fortitude, and mark, in what particular Sign they agree: and it shall be found, that their resemblance will be in these particulars, in having the mouth large, and the extremities thick and strong. Then you are to make your reflection on those Creatures, which are known to be naturally strong, as Lions, Bulls, Eagles, and Tigres, and finding that all these kinds of Animals have those parts after the same manner, it will be very probably judg'd, that they are the marks of Strength or Fortitude.

But this is not yet sufficient, it is further requisite, that we examine, whether there may not be some other Creatures, which, though they be strong, yet have not those marks: for if there be not, the Sign is certain, otherwise, some doubt may be made of it. And the same course is to be taken, in order to the discovery of all the other Inclinations. But after what manner soever we may make use of this Rule, yet is it not of extent enough, to perform what may be made out by Physiognomy, in regard there are but very few Creatures, whereof we can have the knowledge of their particular inclinations, and the Figure of the parts correspondent to those Inclinations. So that it it is then only to be accounted certain, when it is confirmed by the others, and particularly by the Syllogistical Rule, which supplies the defect of these four.

Art.

Art. 6.

What the Syllogistical Rule is.

NOw, this Syllogistical Rule denotes the present inclinations and passions, in a way contrary to the others, in as much as it does not require proper Signs; but, from an inclination and a passion known by those marks, it deduces the discovery of another, which hath not any. And this Rule is grounded on the connexion there is, between the Inclinations, the Habits, and the Passions. For one being the effect of the other, it may be judged, that a man hath an inclination to such a passion or habit, though there be not any Sign proper thereto, and which may make any discovery of it, as being onely known, that the man hath that which is the cause of this. Thus having once known, that a man is timorous, it may be said, that he hath a natural inclination to Avarice, and consequently that he is a Miser; that he is guilty of artifices and dissimulation; that his fearfulness causes him to speak with a certain mildness and submission; that it renders him distrustfull, apt to suspect, hard of belief, a bad friend, *&c.* Thus *Aristotle* gives an example of this kind of Judgment, affirming, that, if a man be subject to Anger, and of small stature, he is Envious. But I conceive there is an errour in the Text, and that instead of μικρὸς, which signifies little, it should be read πικρὸς, which is as much as froward, humoursome, and one who is not pleased at any thing, as we shall shew in its proper place.

As to the other four rules, those which are taken from the Air of the countenance, and the resemblance

there may be between the Sexes, are the most certain, and the most generally acknowledg'd. For there is hardly any Sign but may be referr'd to them, as *Aristotle* affirms; καλῶς ἔχει πάντα τὰ σημεῖα ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἰς ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ. That of the Climates is more general then the other, which is taken from the resemblance of Animals: but it is not so certain, in regard that all those who are of the same Climate, are not of the same Temperament, and have not the same Conformation of parts; and therefore this is no necessary consequence, that because a man is born in *Greece*, he must be vain, unconstant, and a lyar: and so of the rest.

Chap. V.

After what manner THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN, makes use of the Rules of Physiognomy.

Art. 1.

How the said Art makes use of the first Rule of that Science.

THus have we given an account of the Means which Physiognomy makes use of, in order to the discovery of the Inclinations, and which the

the Art we teach ought also to employ, in prosecution of the same design. But besides that there are some others besides those, and that it hath many more things to discover than the other, it will not propose its Rules nakedly, as Physiognomy hath done, but establish the grounds thereof, before they be reduced into practice.

When therefore the first Rule tells us, that those, who naturally have the same Air, and the same Characters attending the motion of a Passion, are inclin'd to the same Passion; it is to be noted, that the ground on which this Rule is establish'd, is the knowledge of the Characters of the passions. For, it were to no purpose, to affirm, that he, who naturally hath the Characters of Anger, is inclin'd to Anger, if it be not known, what the Characters of Anger are. This Art therefore pretends to draw a pourtraiture of every passion in particular, to design the Air and Figure it gives to all the parts of the Body, and all the motions it excites in the Soul. For, besides what it will contribute to the design the Art hath to make known the passions, which cannot remain secret after so many *indicia* given thereof; It will also, by that means, declare those which are consequent one to another, and between which there is a connexion, the ground of the Syllogistical Rule; and by degrees, make that rule conduce to the discovery of the passions. It must therefore divide the Treatise of the Characters, into two and twenty Chapters, whereof the first eleven shall treat of the *Simple Passions*, comprehending among them Desire, Laughter, and Weeping; and the other eleven shall treat of the *Mixt Passions*, according to the order we have set down before.

Art. 2.

How it makes use of the second Rule.

AS to the second rule, which teaches, that those men, who have some parts resembling those of some other Creatures, have the same Inclinations with those Creatures; it is to be examin'd, what Creatures those are, which may give a ground for this rule. For all are not fit to be admitted into that predicament, either in regard that sufficient observations have not been made of them, or that they are at too great a distance from the nature of man, as Insects, Serpents, Fishes, *&c.* *Aristotle* therefore in his Physiognomy hath pitch'd upon twenty seven, to wit, fifteen four-footed Beasts, and seaven Volatiles. The former are the Lion, the Panther, the Horse, the Hart, the Ox, the Ass, the Dog, the Wolf, the Swine, the Goat, the Sheep, the Ape, the Fox, the Cat, and the Frog. The other are, the Eagle, the Hawk, the Cock, the Raven, the Quail, Sea-Fowl, and small Birds. Others have added to these, the Owl, and the Ostrich. It is therefore requisite, there should be so many Chapters design'd, wherein must be treated, of the natures of these Animals, and especially of those parts of them, whereto those of men may have any resemblance, and of the Inclinations they denote.

Art.

Art. 3.

How the ſaid Art makes uſe of the third Rule.

AS to the third Rule, which ſhews, that he, who hath any ſemblance to Men of ſome other Climate, hath the ſame Inclinations as they have; this is grounded on the Figure of the Body, and ſuch Inclinations of the Soul, as that Climate cauſes. But in aſmuch as the Climate is to be conſider'd, not only by the poſition of the Heavens, but alſo by the nature of the Soil, by the Scituation, by the Winds reigning there, it is requiſite in the firſt place to treat of that Conſtitution of the Body, and the Inclinations, which a hot, dry, cold, or moiſt Climate may cauſe; and afterwards of thoſe, which may proceed from a moiſt, or dry, fruitful or barren ſoil. In the third place, of that which is conſequent to the ſcituation, as it is oriental or occidental; high, or low; maritime, or mediterranean. In fine, what contribution may be made thereto by the ſeveral Winds, Eaſt, Weſt, North and South.

Thence it muſt deſcend to the Figure and Manners of thoſe Nations, which depend partly on theſe cauſes, partly on the original of the people themſelves, whereof they ſtill retain ſome tincture, as alſo on the good or ill fortune which hath attended them, and cauſes them to change their former diſcipline, and their antient courſe of life. This Treatiſe muſt needs be long, and will require great pains to bring it to a period. For, beſides that there muſt be ſome

reason given of the particular Figure of every People, and its Inclinations, which is a thing very hard to do, it must also give an account of the Laws, which are proper thereto, in regard that the Law, as *Plato* sayes, is the finding out of Truth; all sorts of Laws being not convenient for all manner of Nations, but only such as are conformable to their natural dispositions; and he who hath lighted on that Conformity and Correspondence, hath met with Truth. But howere it may be, this Discourse is to be divided into so many Chapters, as there are Climates, and those subdivided again into so many Sections, as there be Nations inhabiting each of them.

Art. 4.

How the said Art makes use of the fourth Rule.

THe fourth Rule teaches us, That those men who have any thing in their countenances approaching the Beauty of Women, have the same Inclinations as they have, and on the contrary. This is grounded on the Beauty, which is peculiarly answerable to either Sex, as also upon the Inclinations, which are natural to each of them. It is therefore requisite, there should be a discourse concerning Beauty, and that it should be divided into two Treatises; whereof the former shall shew how all the parts ought to be made which frame the Beauty of Man, and the Inclinations attending it. And the other is to give a particular account of the parts whereof the Beauty of the Woman consists, and the Inclinations correspondent

ſpondent to her Sex. All this ſhall be treated in fifty Chapters, there being no leſs then twenty five parts in each Sex, whereby they are repreſented as differing one from the other; the Colour and Proportion, which ought to be between them, being comprehended therein.

Art. 5.

Why The Art how to know Men *treats of the Temperaments.*

BUt in regard theſe two laſt Rules are principally grounded on the Temperament, before we come to the examination of them, it is requiſite there ſhould be a previous Treatiſe of the Temperaments, and a diſcovery made of the Inclinations, which each of them cauſes in the Soul, and the Figure it gives to the parts of the Body. And this is to be done in fifty two Chapters, wherof the firſt ſixteen ſhal treat of the Temperaments which are conformable to the whole Body; and the other thirtyſix, of thoſe of the Nobler parts. For there are ſome principal temperaments correſpondent to the four Humours, when they are only predominant, to wit, the Sanguine, the Cholerick, the Melancholick, and the Flegmatick; then each of theſe hath ſome one of the other humours predominant under it, as the Cholerick-Sanguine, the Melancholick-Sanguine, &c. and that makes up the number of ſixteen. In fine, every noble part is either temperate, or hot, cold, dry, or moiſt; or is hot and moiſt, hot and dry, cold and moiſt, cold and dry. So that there being four noble parts, and each of thoſe having

having nine differences of Temperaments, all put together, make up two and fifty kinds of Temperaments which must be known, in order to a judgment of the Inclinations.

Art. 6.

That there are other Rules besides those of Physiognomy, whereby the Inclinations may be discover'd.

THus is it, that *The Art how to know Men* makes use of the Rules of Physiognomy, for the discovery of the Inclinations, and how, upon small foundations, it designs the greatest superstructure, whereof Science ever attempted the carrying on. But it does not think that sufficient, as having added thereto some other means whereof Physiognomy makes no advantage. For, besides that it makes the very effects of the Inclinations to contribute to the discovery of them, to wit, the desire of doing the actions, and the pleasure there is in doing them often; it being a thing out of all dispute, that if a person be observ'd to be often desirous to do the same thing, or that he does it many times with a certain pleasure, it is a certain sign of the Inclination he hath thereto. Besides this, I say, it very advantageously makes use of the remote causes, whereof we have made mention before; for though the judgments, which may be deduced from them, be not absolutely certain, yet do they either fortifie or weaken those, which proceed from the next causes, which are, as we said, the Instinct, the Temperament, and the Conformation of the parts. Accordingly, if a man be of such a Temperament

perament and Conformation, as may be proper for courageous actions, and that he be withall a person well descended, that he be young, fortunate, and rich; that he have some military imployment, and that he be of a warlike nation, it is certain, that the judgement which may be made of his being inclin'd to courageous actions shall be more creditable, then if these circumstances did not occur.

But if with that fortunate Constitution, he be of a mean extraction, if he be poor and unfortunate, and stricken in years, if he be of a Profession that abates his courage, and keeps it down; if he be of a Climate over-hot, or over-moist, the Inclination which Nature hath bestow'd on him to courageous actions shall be much weakned by these causes, how remote soever they may be, and the judgment to be made thereof ought to be the more reserv'd.

It is therefore necessary that there should be a previous knowledge of the Inclinations, which these causes produce, that they should be compar'd together, and that it be examin'd how far they fortifie or weaken the others. Whence it comes, that, having treated of the Inclinations of the Inhabitants in general, it must discourse of those of Children, Young persons, perfect Men, and Old men. Thence it must descend to the Moral Causes, which are in number seventeen; to wit, Nobleness and Meanness of Birth, Wealth and Poverty, Soveraignty and Subjection, Prosperity and Adversity, and the course of Life, to wit, the Art Military, Medicine, Musick, Hunting, Dancing, Philosophy, Mathematicks, the study of the Laws, Oratory and Poetry, observing the Inclinations and Manners which accompany each of these Professions: so that this will be the work of

one

one and twenty Chapters. And after all these disquisitions, it may well be confident, that it is able to discover, not only the present Inclinations, but also those which are past, and those which may yet be to come, through the change, which either hath been, or shall be made, in the Temperament and the Moral Causes.

CHAP. VI.

How the Actions and Motions of the Soul are known.

THE next work of our *Art how to know Men* must be, to shew how the actions and motions of the Soul are to be known, we mean not those which are evident and manifest; for it were ridiculous to give Rules, to find out, whether a Man be in Anger, when he is seen transported with the fury, which that Passion inspires; or whether he be sad, when he complains, and laments, and seems to be over-whelm'd with affliction. But in regard there are some Passions, which are to be foreseen before they are framed; and that of those which are so, there are some that are not produc'd to any great height, as Hatred: that some of them are theatrical and feigned, as those of Flatterers; Nay, that there are some cloak'd with contrary appearances, as when a man would have it thought he loves another person, though

though he hates him; when one makes shew of a certain joy, when he hath much ado to smother his grief; in fine, Designs closely carried on, secret Actions, the unknown Authors of known actions: All these things, I say, are the main subject of the Art we speak of, and the Rules it gives for the knowledge of them. And no doubt but there are such Rules, since there is not any thing considerable fram'd in the Mind, which may not be discover'd by the Countenance, by a mans Words, by the Effects, and some Circumstances, from which there may certain, or, at least, very probable conjectures be deduc'd.

Art 1.

That there are two kinds of Actions.

BE it observed then, that there are, generally speaking, two kinds of actions; some simple and plain, and such as they appear to be; others, deceitful, and cloak'd with dissimulation. All the difficulty to be overcome in the former, is, to discover the end for which they are done. For, in every Action, there is alwaies the apparent and manifest motion, which is the matter, and as it were the body of the Action; and the Intention, which is the form; and, as it were, the Soul of the Action, and that is ever obscure and hidden. Thus when there is a necessity of fighting against the Enemies of the State, the act of fighting is the matter of the Action, and is evident; but the End and Intention of it is a secret, in regard it is not known, whether it be for Honour, or Advantage, whether it be done out of force or by example, &c.

There

There will be therefore a particular Chapter for discovery of the Ends and Intentions of the Actions.

Art. 2.

Of Dissimulation.

AS concerning the other Actions, which are cloak'd and cover'd with Disimulation, the discovery of them is much more difficult, for that difficulty occurs not only in the body of the Action, but also in the End of it, which is shrowded in divers pretences. And among Actions, the External may be disguis'd under contrary appearances; and the Internal, which are the Thoughts and the Passions, may be easily dissembled. Besides, Disimulation insinuates it self into the Words, the Countenance, and the Effects, whether it makes its advantage of them distinctly, or altogether, as we shall shew more at large in the Treatise of Disimulation.

Now the means, whereby the Art, we teach, pretends to the discovery of it, are twelve in number.

The first is, to examine the disimulation by it self, and to see whether there be any likelihood or probability, the thing should be as it is pretended; whether the countenance of the Dissembler belyes his words, and whether the Effects are consonant, or contrary one to another.

The second, to oblige him who hath been caught in it, to discover it himself by fair words and persuasions.

3. To oblige him to it by punishments.

4. By.

4. By Rewards.

5. By present punishments or rewards.

6. By a threatning of future punishments, and promises of future rewards.

7. By importunity.

8. By Wine and Good-fellowship.

9. By a consideration of the person who acts, as whether he be of a timorous or confident disposition, whether he have the reputation of being sincere, or be a noted dissembler, whether he be an inferiour person who speaks, &c.

10. By a like consideration of the person against whom the disimulation is acted, as whether he be one who is dreaded, whether a Prince, Master, &c.

11. There is yet a further way of discovering the Disimulation, by a sudden motion of some Passion, which breaks forth, and betrayes what is in the Soul, such as may be that of Anger.

12. The same discovery may be made by a sudden sally of Joy.

And upon all these several means, there are certain particular Rules, which shall be explicated in so many Chapters.

Art. 3.

How Actions may be foreseen.

But we now come to examine, whether there be any Rules, whereby the Actions of the Mind, and the Passions of the Soul, may be foreseen, before they are fram'd; and whether it may be affirm'd, that, upon such or such an occasion, a man will have rational appre-

apprehenſions, if he ſhould chance to be tranſported with Anger, or fall into Fear, &c. As to the Actions of the Mind, as they muſt be neceſſarily conformable to the ſtrength or weakneſs of the Faculties, whereby they are produc'd; ſo is it certain, that a man, who ſhall have the organs, ſubſervient to thoſe Faculties, well or ill diſpos'd, ſhall have good or bad productions of the mind, and that it may be aſſur'd, that, when he ſhall be oblig'd to the reception of ſome ſentiment, or to ſpeak of ſome affair, he will judge and ſpeak of it, according to the capacity, which the world was perſuaded he had, as we have ſaid elſewhere. The Habit and Inclination do the like; for if it be known a man is Juſt, Magnificent, Valiant, &c. it will be undoubtedly ſaid, that, when any occaſion ſhall preſent it ſelf, his ſentiments will be conſonant to the Vertue and Inclination he hath.

Art 4.

How the Paſſions may be foreſeen.

BUt as to the Paſſions, there cannot ſo certain a judgment be made of them, and it may only probably be ſaid, that a man will be tranſported with Anger, and ſuffer himſelf to be carry'd away with vanity, or ſome other Paſſion, in regard that Reaſon and the Study of Philoſophy may keep him in, and correct the diſpoſitions which he might have to thoſe Paſſions.

Nay, there is this further conſideration to be made, in reference to theſe motions, that they are two-fold, primary, and ſecondary. The primary or firſt motions

tions hurry us away like torrents, and, as it is commonly said, come not within the jurisdiction of reason. The others are not so impetuous, and admit of some time to consider them; and therefore they may be the more easily check'd. But they are withall more hardly discoverable, in as much as they are more easily corrected; whereas the judgment, which may be made of the former, is more certain, it being very hard, that the Habit should be so perfect, as that it might divert Nature from those first assaults, and break that strong connexion, which is between the Inclination and the Action.

We are to make this further observation, that, of the Passions, there are some may be called the Principal and Predominant, & others, which are only the Companions & Attendants of the former. When a man is angry, his Predominant Passion is Anger, as being that which hath possess'd it self of all his Soul, and whereto are referred all the other Passions, which are framed afterwards, as Arrogance, Insolence, Obstinacy, &c. In like manner, Sadness, or Grief is the predominant Passion in him who is afflicted; but Fear, Languor, Sloath, Superstition, are its Attendant Passions. In fine, there is not any one of them, which, when it is fram'd in the Soul, does not call some others to its assistance and relief; so that, the Predominant Passion once known, there's no doubt but the others are wayting on it. But in regard the connexion there is between them, may be stronger or weaker, and that there are some, whereof the consequence is as it were necessary, and others, where in it is only contingent, (For Languor, or Dejection of Spirit, and Sloath, are in a manner necessarily attendant on Sadness; but Superstition does not alwaies

follow it.) Whence it may be thence inferr'd, that the knowledge had of the former is more certain, and that of the contingent, doubtful.

Let us therefore conclude, that there are two waies, principally, whereby future Paſsions may be foreſeen, to wit, the Inclination, and the Connexion there is between the Paſsions. Whereto may be added, the Strength or Weakneſs of his Mind, who is to reſent it, and the greatneſs of the Good or Evil, which is to happen to him. For if it be known, that a man is to receive a great injury, and that he be a perſon of a weak Spirit, ſome will not ſtick to affirm, that he will be overcome by the Paſsion of Anger.

Art. 5.

Whether contingent Actions may be foreſeen.

IT will peradventure be objected againſt us, that there is not any certain knowledge of things to come, which are Contingent, in regard they may equally either happen or not happen: otherwiſe, if a certain judgment could be made thereof, they would not be Contingent. The Anſwer to this Objection, which is made againſt all the Sciences of Divination, is this. That there are two ſorts of Contingents, ſome, which have a natural and regulated cauſe, whereby, according to the common order of things, they ought to be produced. Others have no regular cauſe, but a fortuitous or free, as thoſe things that happen by hazzard, or the election of the Will. Thoſe laſt are purely contingent, and cannot be determinately known any way whatſoever. But the former

former are not purely contingent, and the knowledge had of them may be certain in the sequel of things, as not differing from that of things necessary, save only in this, that their causes may be prevented from producing their effects. The actions and passions of the Soul are of that kind, in as much as there is a connexion between them and the Faculties, the Inclinations and the Habits: for they are effects, which, by ordinary consequence, depend on those causes; and though some of these effects be free, yet are they not absolutely such, when they proceed from the said causes, and that these concurr with the freer cause, such as is the Will.

CHAP. VII.

How the Habits may be known.

Art. I.

Of the discovery of the Moral Habits.

IN order to our satisfaction, whether the *Habits* are discoverable or not, we are to remember, that there are two kinds of them, the *Intellectual*, and the *Moral*, and that these latter are more easily known then the Intellectual. For it is more easie to

judge whether a man be Juſt or Temperate, then whether he be a Phyſician or Mathematician. The reaſon, given of this difference, is, that the Intellectual Habits make not any impreſſion on the body, and conſequently leave no ſenſible mark, whereby they might be known.

But I do not conceive this reaſon ſolid enough, in regard the Moral Habits do not alſo make any manifeſt impreſſion on the body, no more then the Intellectual. It is therefore more to our purpoſe to affirm, that the Moral habits are more certainly known, becauſe the Moral inclinations are determinated to certain Paſſions, which, often reiterated, produce Habits. And whereas there are few who reſiſt their inclinations, by reaſon of the difficulty and trouble it is to change them, and that every one commonly does what is moſt eaſie and delightfull to him: it thence proceeds, that the knowledge had of the inclinations, which is well grounded, and certain, enables us to make a more probable judgment of the habits, whereby they are attended.

Art. 2.

How the Intellectual Habits may be known.

But the caſe is otherwiſe in the Intellectual Habits, in regard the Underſtanding is not determinated to any one Art or Science, rather than another. And though that, of theſe, ſome have a greater conformity to the Imagination, then they have to the Judgment or Memory, yet the great number there is of them leaves the Mind, which cannot be naturally determinated

terminated to one more then another, in a certain indifference. For it may be said, that a man is fit for Poetry, Painting, or Musick, by reason of his having a strong Imagination, and not the like for Medicine, Policy, and the other Sciences, which require a greater portion of judgment. Yet can it not be affirm'd, that he is effectually a Poet, a Painter, or a Musician, in regard the inclination he hath to the functions of the Imagination renders him equally fit for either of them. Whereas on the contrary, the Moral inclinations are determinated to certain passions, and those passions to particular Habits. Whence it may be affirm'd, from the knowledge had of the inclinations, that a man is endu'd with such a Vertue, or subject to such a Vice; and it seldom happens that one is mistaken in those judgments, for the reasons alledged.

There is therefore a discovery made of Vertues and Vices, by the means of the inclinations which are known; and it is the onely expedient that Physiognomy makes use of. But our Art hath some other, from which a greater certainty may be derived.

Of these, the first is, to know the end of the Actions, which consists in a free, perfect, and absolute election; for he who acts by the direction of that, must necessarily act by vertue of some habit.

Secondly, the excess and defect of the passions, in reference to the objects; for he who is often angry, and that in a higher degree then he ought, must infallibly be adjudg'd to have the habit of Anger.

Thirdly, the perseverance which any person is found guilty of, in any passion.

Lastly, the effects, which the Vertues and Vices produce in the Soul and Body. And these frame the

Characters of the Vertues and Vices, which are to be described, according to the order we have set down before.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Astrological Signs.

BEsides the Natural Signs, whereof we have already treated, there are yet others, which are called Astrological Signs, in regard it is pretended, that the body receives the impressions of them from the Starrs and Celestial Configurations. These consist, for the most part, in certain Lines, which are principally to be observ'd in the Fore-head, and the Hands, and are imagin'd, to be the effects of the Planets predominant over those parts.

From some observations which have been made thereof, there are two Arts fram'd, *Metoposcopy*, and *Chiromancy*, or *Palmistry*; the former whereof considers the Signs which the Starrs have imprinted in the Forehead, and the other, those imprinted in the Hands.

It is our work to examine, whether there be any truth in either of them: For if any knowledge of the inclinations and the motions of the Soul may be deduced from them, as they boast there may, the Art we teach ought not to slight them; nay, 'tis requisite it should accept of their assistance, since they are engag'd in the same design, and that nothing is to be omitted,

omitted, which many contribute to the discovery of a thing, so intricate as the heart of Man is

But if they have not any thing of certainty, and that they are onely the recreations, or, possibly, dreams and reveries, which the spirit of Man imagines to it self, either by way of delight, or through mistake, our Art ought to discard them as vain, superfluous, and superstitious Sciences, not worthy to be admitted into the society of those of Nature, or to busie the thoughts of any man that pretends ever so little to Ratiocination.

Let us therefore begin with *Chiromancy*, for it is better known then *Metoposcopy*, and seems to have more evident principles, which may be more easily established, nay, such as, if they prove true, will serve for a ground-work to the other. Yet shall I not put my self to the trouble of any other Discourse thereof, then what shall be contain'd in two Letters, which I have already communicated to the publick, since they are pieces, which make up part of the design of this Work, and which the impatience of a Friend prevail'd with me to take off from the rest, to satisfy his curiosity. I shall not now abate so much as the civilities I thought my self oblig'd to render him, nor yet the precautions wherwith I would have secur'd my self against my Readers. For, though that contributes nothing to my Design, yet will it afford those some diversion who shall take the pains to read it, and give them the same pleasure, which is sometimes deriv'd from the sight of a strange ornament, or some antique Mode, unexpectedly brought upon the Stage.

THE FIRST LETTER TO *MONSIEUR* B. D. M. UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF *CHIROMANCY*.

SIR,

WHen you preſs me to put into writing the Diſcourſe we had together concerning *Chiromancy*, and endeavour to perſwade me, that it were an injury to the publick, to deprive it of the Arguments you heard me make upon that ſubject, I reflect on the intreaty which *Socrates*'s friends ſometime made to him, that he would ſuffer his Picture to be taken, and the confuſion he conceiv'd hereat, after he had ſatisfy'd their deſires. For before that was done, there was no great notice taken of the defects which Nature

ture had imprinted in his face, and people began not to heed them, and withall, to reproach him therewith, till after they were represented upon the Cloath. The same thing, no doubt, will happen to me, when I shall put into writing the Discourses, whereof you assure me, that you were not displeas'd at the recital. They will come to you with this disadvantage now, that they are not attended with that grace of Novelty which they had then; They will not be accompany'd with the pleasure of walking, and the conversation which then rendred them agreeable; and appearing before the Eyes, whose judgment is much more severe then that of the Ears, the defects there may be in them will soon be observ'd, and give me the shame and regret of having obey'd you. Nay, what must be my doom, when I shall have other Judges then your self, from whose friendship I derive a confidence of some favour, and whose curiosity for these kinds of Sciences may abate somewhat of your severity? And what reception can I expect, when I shall find the more ingenious part of the World prepossess'd with this opinion, that they are vain studies, and all their principles, all their promises, delusive and imaginary?

But, maugre all these hazzards, wherein you engage me, I am resolv'd to endeavor the satisfaction of your desires, and reduce, to a more serious examination, the things which I entertain'd you with only by way of divertisement. For if upon this second trial you shall make of them, you shall find them of good alloy, I shall not question, but they both may, and ought to go for current, in the commerce of Learning. And certainly, if there be any thing rational in the conjectures I have made, nay, if they do but raise the distrust

diſtruſt of a Truth not yet fully known, it is juſt the publick ſhould participate thereof, for the excitation of thoſe who make it their buſineſs to ſearch after the miracles which God hath been pleas'd to ſhut up in Man, to make a greater diſcovery of this in particular, and to add thereto their obſervations, which may poſſibly compleat what I have only begun. For how poor & low an eſteem ſoever we may have for Chiromancy, yet may Philoſophy find in it ſome things not unworthy her higheſt and nobleſt Contemplations. She thinks it no diſparagement to her, to deſcend to the moſt obſcure Arts, to clear up their principles; And as the light of the Sun faſtens it ſelf on the moſt impure things, yet is not corrupted thereby, and from them draws thoſe vapours, which it raiſes up into the higheſt regions of the air: So Philoſophy, without any derogation from her dignity, condeſcends even to the loweſt effects of Art & Nature, and thence derives ſuch diſcoveries as ſhe does not think unworthy a place among her moſt ſublime ſpeculations. And no doubt, though I do not pretend my ſelf one of thoſe, by whom ſhe ſhould execute ſo great deſigns; I may however think, that I have met with ſomething, which may not be unworthy of her cares, and ſuch as ſhould not only ſatisfie their curioſity who are lovers of Chiromancy, but alſo be advantageous to Phyſick. For if I can make good this Principle, *THAT EVERY NOBLE PART OF THE BODY HATH A CERTAIN PLACE IN THE HAND WHICH IS APPROPRIATED TO IT, AND WITH WHICH IT HATH A PARTICULAR CONNEXION AND SYMPATHY*, beſides that, it will make very much for that diſpoſition of the

the Planets, which the ſaid Science hath appropriated to the ſame places, and upon which it lays the main foundation of all its Rules, there may be ſtrong preſumptions deduc'd thence, to conclude, that the good or bad diſpoſition of the principles of life may be diſcover'd in the Hand; and that between the other parts of the body, there are as well as in this, certain reſemblances and ſympathies, which depend not on either the diſtribution of the Veſſels, or their ſtructure, but on a ſecret influence, which contributes to their union and aſſociation. And this will be no inconſiderable ſecret, in order to the opening of the veins, and the application of remedies, in certain places, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.

My work therefore, in this place, ſhall be to make good the ſaid great principle. For to deſcend to the particular rules of that Science, and to give the reaſons thereof, as you have heard me do of ſome of them; beſides, that it were a diſreſpect to the Severity of Philoſophy, for a man to amuſe himſelf about things, which, for the moſt part, are either falſe or uncertain, as being not confirm'd by juſt obſervations, would be too great a flattery of their ſimplicity, who give them more credit then they deſerve, and a miſ-expence of that precious Time, which other employments challenge.

But to prevent your complaint of this abatement, I ſhall add to the Diſcourſe, wherewith I formerly entertain'd you, the reaſons which rais'd in me the firſt ſuſpicion, that there might be ſome truth in Chiromancy, and that the grounds of it might be more certain, then many do imagine. And I doubt not but theſe reaſons of mine will, in like manner, prevail with all thoſe who ſhall conſider them without prejudice,

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in as much as the very same thing, which should have brought it into suspicion, and deterr'd those who were inclin'd to the study of it, plead for it, and invite to the knowledge thereof.

To make this out, it is to be observ'd, that the first and principal ground of *Chiromancy*, is the disposition of the Planets, which it hath diversly placed in the Hand: For it hath put *Jupiter* in the fore-finger, called also *Index*; *Saturn*, on the middle-finger; the *Sun*, on the Ring-finger; *Mercury*, on the little-finger; *Venus*, on the Thumb; *Mars*, on the palm of the Hand; and the *Moon*, on the lower part of it. This foundation, I say, which inverts the natural order of the Planets, and consequently, seems rather to be the effect of the extravagance of the first inventors of this Science, then of any reason they might have to rank them after that manner, is so far from bringing it into any mistrust of falsity, that, in my judgment, it is one of those things which have brought into question the truth there may be in it. For there is a kind of necessity, that the mind of Man, which is so much in love with proportion, and which, where-ever it can bring it in, never fails of adorning and enriching its imaginations therewith, should not without cause have omitted it here, and that it hath been constrained, by the certainty of the experiences it hath made, to change the order of the Planets, which it hath so exactly observ'd in *Metoposcopy*, and in a thousand other occurrences, wherein it hath had the freedom to make application thereof. And no doubt, had it been a pure imagination, it had been more easie and more rational to have plac'd *Saturn* on the fore-finger, *Jupiter* on the middle, *Mars* on the next, the *Sun* on the little finger, and so to have follow'd the order,

order, which those Planets observe among themselves, then to transpose them, as they now are. Or, if there had been a necessity of this transposition, me-thinks it would have been more pertinent, to have the greatest finger govern'd by the greatest of those Celestial Bodies, or to have assign'd it that which is more apt to motion, then the Ring finger is, which is both less, and less active. So that there is a great probability, that so extraordinary a disposal of the Planets is not the production of their pure fancies, who first spent their endeavours in that Science, but rather of the necessity, which oblig'd them to follow the reasons and experiences, whereby they discover'd that truth.

But the observation which *Aristotle* hath given us, in his History of Animals, adds much to this suspicion. For, in that incomparable Work, wherein it may be said, that Nature hath discover'd and explicated her self, he affirms, that there are, in the Hand, certain Lines, which, according as they are long or short, denote the length or shortness of Man's life. And this being one of the first rules of *Chiromancy*, it is to be presum'd, that that Science was not unknown to him, and that so great a person would not have shuffled into a History, which was to be one of the noblest draughts of Nature, a doubtfull thing, and such as he was not confident of the truth of. And that, if it be certain, as experience hath since confirm'd, there is no rational person, but will conclude, that the Hand ought to have a stricter connexion with the principles of life, then any of the other external parts, wherein there are no such marks to be found; That those marks are certain effects which should make a discovery of the good or bad disposition of the principles, from which they proceed; And, in a word, that

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there are in that part such miracles, as are not yet fully known, and that if the knowledge thereof could be attain'd, there would haply be acquir'd that which *Chiromancy* does so much pretend to.

Add to this, that he who shall take notice, that the Lines, which are in the Hands, are different in all men; that in the self-same person, they are chang'd at certain periods of time, and that all this diversity cannot proceed from any internal cause, to us yet known, will, in all likelihood, be forc'd to acknowledge, that all those Characters are the effects of some secret influence by which they are imprinted in that particular part; And that, nothing being superfluously done in Nature, they have their particular use, and do denote, if not any thing else, at least this, to wit, the alteration, which happens in the principles, whereby they are produc'd. For to make these impressions relate to the Articulations, and the motions of the hand, as some have done, is a thing which cannot be maintain'd; since the Articulations are equal in all men, who nevertheless have all their Lines unequal; that there are many Hands, wherein there is not any Articulation at all, as in the space which lies between the joints of the fingers: That children newly born, who have their hands shut all after the same manner, without making in a manner any motion, have nevertheless many lines, which are different in every one of them: that those who exercise the same Art, and consequently ought, as neer as may be, to use the same motions, have them nevertheless as different, as if they were of contrary professions: That, in the self-same person, they are chang'd, though there be not any change in his course of life: And lastly, that in the forehead, where there is not any Articulation, and which

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part all men move after the same manner, there are also such lines, wherein may be observ'd the same diversity, as in those of the Hand.

We may further add to these considerations the great Antiquity of the Science of *Chiromancy*, which must needs have been studied before *Aristotle's* time, in as much as what he sayes, of the Lines of the Hand, is one of its observations and rules; the work it hath found so many learned men, who search'd into the secrets of it, and have honour'd it by their Writings: And lastly, the admirable judgments which have been made according to its Maximes. For it is a thing comes not much short of astonishment, that, of forty and five persons whom *Cocles* had foreseen, by his Art, to be subject to dye violent deaths, *Cardan* observ's, that there were but two of them living in his time, to whom that misfortune had not hapned.

But to come to a free acknowledgement of the truth, all these, as we have already observ'd, are but so many slight suspicions, which conclude not for the certainty of this Science. For as to the order of the Planets, which it hath chang'd, it gives a great presumption, that it hath not been done without some reason: but the question remains still undecided, to wit, Whether it be true, that those celestial Bodies have any kind of power or influence over the Hand, and whether any one of them have some particular place assign'd it therein? The Authority of *Aristotle* may also be question'd, and all this diversity of Lines may proceed from other causes, and have other uses, different from those appropriated thereto by *Chiromancy*.

Moreover, how ancient soever that Science may be, it makes not much for its certainty, since there

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are ancient errours, whereby all the precedent Ages have been abused: And though many great Wits have thought it not unworthy their study, yet have there been, in all times, some, who have employ'd their endeavors about curiosities, as vain, as possibly this may be. In fine, all the testimonies and examples, which are commonly produc'd, in defence of it, can pretend to no more weight and validity, then those brought for *Geomancy*, *Onomancy*, and other Arts of *Divination*, all which are imaginary and superstitious, and yet neither want Patrons to protect them, nor fail of success in the judgments, which are made by them.

On the other side, neither do all these reasons absolutely condemn it, and make not any otherwise against it, then in that they render it doubtful, leaving the inquisitive person in an uncertainty, what he ought to believe, and continuing him in the desire of being satisfi'd therein. Now the only means to attain that satisfaction, is to examine the Principles of it, and to see whether there be any reasons, whereby they may be maintain'd. For if any of them be certain, and well grounded, there is not, in my judgment, any rational person, who joyning the precedent suspitions with the truth of these Principles, but will acknowledge, that if the Science, which hath been built thereupon, is not arriv'd to the highest degree of certainty, it may come to it in time, by the diligent and exact observations, which are yet to be added thereto: And that if it cannot promise as much as *Astrology* pretends it should discover by the Stars, which it hath plac'd in the Hand, it may at least judge of the good or bad disposition of the interiour parts, between which and it there is an undeniable

sympathy

ſympathy, and, by that means, conduce very much to the conſervation and continuance of Health, and the curing of diſeaſes. For when it ſhall be confin'd within theſe limits, and quit all other pretences, it will ſtill be a very conſiderable Science, and ſuch as, for the excellency of its diſcoveries, and the advantage may be made thereof, might be worthy the curioſity of the ſevereſt Philoſophers, and all thoſe who make it their buſineſs to enquire into the wonderful things of Nature.

Theſe are the conſiderations which I had, before I fell to examin the Principle before-mentioned, which is the main foundation, on which the diſpoſal of the Planets, into ſeveral parts of the Hand, is built, and in a manner, the only ſource, from which, all the judgments which *Chiromancy* can promiſe, are deduced.

The method I have obſerv'd therein, is, according to the ſubſequent Articles, to ſhew,

1. *That, of ſituations, ſome are more noble then others.*
2. *That the nobler ſituations are deſign'd for the more excellent parts, and that the excellency of the parts is deduc'd from the advantage they bring along with them.*
3. *What advantages may be deduced from the Hands.*
4. *That the Right Hand is more noble then the Left.*
5. *That motion begins on the Right ſide.*

6. *That the Hands have the greateſt portion of the natural Heat.*
7. *That the Hands have a greater communication with the nobler parts.*
8. *That ſome ſecret Vertues are convey'd from the nobler parts into the Hands.*
9. *That Nature does not confound the Vertues*, and conſequently,
10. *That the Vertues of the nobler parts are not receiv'd into the ſame places of the Hand.*
11. *That there is a Sympathy between the Liver and the Fore-finger.*
12. *That there is a Sympathy between the Heart and the Ring-finger.*
13. *That there is a like Sympathy between the Spleen and the Middle-finger.*
14. *That there is a Sympathy between all the interiour parts and the other parts of the Hand.*
15. *That the Face is an Epitome of all the exteriour parts.*
16. *That there is a mutual Sympathy between all the parts*; and,
17. *That the diſtribution of the Veins made by* Hippocrates, *for the diſcovery of that Sympathy, was not underſtood either by* Ariſtotle *or* Galen.
18. *Whence proceeds the regularity which Nature*

Nature obſerves in her evacuations.

19. *That the Planets have a certain predodominancy over the ſeveral parts of the Hand.*

20. *That the Planets have alſo a predominacy over the interiour parts.*

21. *That the Moon hath ſuch a predominancy over the Brain.*

22. *That the Sun hath the like predominancy over the Heart.*

23. *That the other Planets have the government of the other interiour parts.*

24. *That the principles eſtabliſh'd regulate many doubtful things in Chiromancy.*

Art. 1.

That, of Situations, ſome are more noble then others.

THat we may therefore give a ſolid beginning to this Diſquiſition, it is to be obſerv'd, that there are three orders of SITUATION, wherein all the parts of Animals, the Heart only excepted, are placed; to wit, *Above* and *Beneath*, *Right* and *Left*, *Before* and *Behind*. But theſe are not all equal as to their origine and dignity, and there is a diverſity of perfection, not only among them, but alſo between the tearms and differences, whereof they conſiſt. For

Before and *Behind* are more noble then *Right* and *Left*, and these last, more noble then *Above* and *Beneath*; But further, *Before* is more noble then *Behind*; *Right*, then *Left*; and *Above*, then *Beneath*.

The reason of this diversity proceeds, in the first place, hence, that these three orders of Situation, are answerable to the three dimensions, observable in every natural body, to wit, *Length*, *Bredth*, and *Depth*, as these last are answerable to the three kinds of Quantity, which are admitted in every Mathematical body, to wit, *Line*, *Superficies*, and *Solid*. For the *Line* makes the *Length*, and the *Length* produces *Above* and *Beneath*: From the *Superficies* comes *Bredth*, and from this last *Right* and *Left*; And the *Solid* body produces *Depth*, as *Depth* does *Before* and *Behind*.

Now as the *Line* is more simple, and, by nature, precedent to the *Superficies*, and this last to the *Solid* Body; in like manner *Length* naturally precedes *Bredth*, and this last, *Profundity*. Accordingly the order of situation of *Above* and *Beneath* is more simple, and previous to that of *Right* and *Left*, as this last is, in respect of *Before* and *Behind*. So that Nature alwaies making her progress, from those things, which are in a lower, to such as are in a higher degree of perfection, it follows, not only that the *Line* and *Length*, are less perfect then *Solidity* and *Profundity*; but also, that the same diversity is found in the orders of situation, which are answerable to every one of them: And that consequently, that of *Before* and *Behind* is the most noble; that of *Right* and *Left*, next; and that of *Above* and *Beneath* least of all, as being the first, and simplest of all.

In effect, we see that all these things have been distributed

ſtributed to Bodies, according to the excellence they ſeverally ought to have. For thoſe which have life do in the firſt place grow in *Length*, and as they advance towards perfection, they acquire *Bredth* and *Profundity*. Plants have indeed the ſituation of *Above* and *Beneath*, but are deſtitute of *Right* and *Left*, *Before* and *Behind*: only living Creatures are endued with theſe laſt differences; nay, there are ſome of theſe, which have them not all, that being a priviledge reſerv'd for thoſe, which have the parts better diſtinguiſh'd, and whoſe motions are more regular.

Yet is it to be affirm'd from what hath been ſaid, that all theſe kinds of ſituation may not be found in purely natural bodies, but they are uncertain and accidental; as not having any principle, whereby they are limited and determined, and it is only by way of reference to things animate, that they are admitted to be in them. For what is the *Above* and the *Before* of a Pillar, may as well be the *Beneath* and the *Behind* of it, and he who is on the *Right* hand of it, may be placed on the *Left*, yet without any change of place. But the caſe is not the ſame in things living and animate, wherein all the differences of ſituation, which the parts have, are unchangeable, as being fix'd and determinated, by the vertues and operations of the ſoul. And thus far of the kinds of ſituation, compar'd among themſelves.

But he who ſhall think fit to conſider the tearms and differences, whereof each of them conſiſts, will further find, that there is ſtill ſome one of them more noble then another, in as much as one is the principle of another, and that the principle is more excellent then that which depends on it. For the *Above* is the

principle of the *Beneath*, the *Right* of the *Left*; and the *Before* of the *Behind*.

And indeed the Beginning is a kind of Principle, and the beginning of the three principal operations of the Soul is wrought in these three differences of situation. For Nutrition begins by the *Above*, Motion by the *Right*, and Sentiment by the *Before*. And accordingly the Mouth, which is the first receptacle of the Aliment, from whence it is afterwards distributed all over the Body, makes the *Above* in all Animals, as the root makes it in all Plants. Whence it comes, that the Latin Tongue calls those roots which are *deepest* in the Earth, *high*. And it is commonly said, that Man is a Tree inverted, not upon this accompt, that his hair, which hath some resemblance to the roots, is above, and those below; but because he hath his mouth directly opposite to that of trees: for it is not to be doubted, but that the Root is the mouth of Plants, since it is by that they receive their nourishment, and that it is thence convey'd to all the other parts. The Sentiment also begins by the *Before*; for, the Sense of Touching only excepted, which it was requisite should be spread over all the parts of the Animal, all the other Senses are placed before, in regard it must have been the imployment of the Senses, to conduct and regulate Motion, which is alwaies made forward, and begins on the *Right* side, as we shall shew hereafter. Whence it follows, that the *Above*, the *Right*, and the *Before* are the Principles of the others, and that they are consequently more noble then they.

Art.

Art. 2.

That the nobler Situations are design'd for the more excellent parts; and that the excellency of the Parts is deduc'd, from the advantage they bring along with them.

NOw Nature alwaies keeps to this Maxime, that she disposes the most excellent things, into those places, which are most noble, as it may be observ'd in the order, wherein she hath put all the principal parts of the Universe; And consequently, it is requisite, that, in Man, who is the Epitome, and abbreviation, of the World, the parts should be ranked conformably to their dignity; And that it may be affirmed, not only that the most excellent are in the noblest situation, but also, that those, which are in the noblest situation, are therefore the most excellent. For, it follows thence, that the Hands, being plac'd in the upper part are more excellent then the Feet, which are in the lower; and the Hand which is on the right side is more excellent, then that on the left. But whereas the excellency of the parts is deduc'd from the advantages they bring to the Animal, we are to examine, in order to the prosecution of our design, what use the Hands may serve for, wherein they are more serviceable then the Feet, and what advantage the *Right* hath over the *Left*.

Art. 3.

What advantages may be deduced from the Hands.

IN the first place, it is certain, that all Animals, which consist of Blood, and, for that reason, have the denomination of perfect creatures, have been furnish'd with four organs, to facilitate their motion, from one place to another; which organs are answerable to the four first differences of situation before-mentioned, to wit, *Above*, *Beneath*, *Right* and *Left*. For there have not been any instruments, which might be conceiv'd answerable to the two last, to wit, *Before* and *Behind*, there being not any perfect Animal, which naturally moves backward, and the other organs being sufficient to carry on the motion, which is made forwards, as experience hath made apparent. This truth is evident, in all kinds of perfect creatures, since that most of the terrestrial have four feet; volatiles have two feet and two wings; the Fishes have four finns, and Serpents make four different folds or twinings. And all these parts are so absolutely necessary, in order to the progressive motion, which is natural to them that if they wanted any one of them, it could not be performed without some trouble. For the Volatiles are not able to fly when their legs are broken; nor can the Fish swim when they have lost any of their finns; nor can the Serpents crawl, if those parts of their bodies be cut off, which make the last twinings of their motion.

From what hath been said, it may be concluded, that

that the Hands, being of the same rank with instruments, which are design'd for progressive motion, do serve to promote that of Man, and that if he were depriv'd thereof, he would not perform that motion with so much ease. For we find, that a man cannot run without much trouble, when his hands are bound; as also that he shuts his fist when he goes to jump, and, in his ordinary gate, the arm still falls back, when the legg on the same side is put forward. To this may be added, that, in infancy, they do the office of feet; that when one is fallen, he cannot well get up without them; and that if one be to climb up, or come down some steepy places, they are no less serviceable then the legs. All which are evident signs, that these parts contribute much to the progressive motion of Man.

But whereas Nature discovers a great frugality in all she does, and makes all the advantages she can of them, she does not content her self with this first imployment she hath impos'd upon the hands; but she hath design'd them for so many other uses, as it is impossible to give a particular account of them all. So that thence came the necessity of making a comparison between them and the Understanding, and affirming, that, as this latter is the form of forms, as having them all in its power; in like manner, the Hand is the Instrument of Instruments, as comprehending alone the vertue of all the rest. For it is by the Hands that a Man receives and retains those things which are necessary and delightful to him: By them it is, That he defends himself, and overcomes those things, that are hurtful and prejudicial to him. In a word, they are the principal Agents, in the compassing of all Arts, and the general Utensils, employ'd

by

by the Mind, to bring to light the nobleſt, and moſt advantageous Inventions. And no doubt, Man derives ſo great an advantage from them, over all other Animals, that if it cannot be affirm'd, as it was by that antient Philoſopher; That *he is wiſe, becauſe he hath Hands*, this at leaſt may be infer'd, that he ſeems Wiſe, becauſe he hath Hands.

This premis'd, it is not to be admir'd the Hands ſhould be diſpoſed into the upper part of Man, as the more honourable place, and that Nature ſhould deſign their ſituation as neer as ſhe could to the Seat of Reaſon and the Senſes, between them and which, there is ſo great a correſpondence and connexion.

Art. 4.

That the Right Hand is more noble than the Left.

BUt though Nature hath plac'd the Hands in the ſame rank, as to ſituation, yet are they not equal in point of eſteem with her, in as much as ſhe treats the *RIGHT* hand as the elder, and the firſt in dignity. For, if thoſe things, which are moſt active, are conſequently moſt excellent, and moſt conſiderable, it follows, that the *Right* Hand, being ſtronger, and more nimble then the *Left*, ſhould alſo be more excellent then it. Now, that it hath more ſtrength and agility, is the conſequence of its having more heat, which is the ſource of thoſe qualities. And its having more heat, is again the conſequence, not only of its being ſited on the ſame ſide as the right ventricle of the Heart, where the bloud is more hot and fuming;

not

not onely of *its* being neer the Liver, which is the ſpring of bloud; not onely becauſe the Veins of all the parts on the right ſide are larger, as *Hippocrates* affirms; but alſo, by reaſon of its being plac'd on the *Right* ſide, where motion hath its firſt beginning.

For, as the Spirits are the principal organs of all the actions of the body, and are by Nature moſt abundantly ſent, to thoſe places, where they ought to be ſtrongeſt. and have moſt employment; ſo is it not to be doubted (ſince it is requiſite, Motion ſhould begin on the Right ſide, and that all the preparations neceſſary thereto, and the principal effort it requires, ſhould be made in that part) but that a greater quantity of Spirits make their recourſe thither, chafe, and fortifie it, by the heat they carry along with them, and by the ſecret influences of the vital principles, which they communicate thereto. Thence it comes, that even thoſe parts, which do not contribute any thing to Motion, and are on that ſide, have a reſentment of that force and vigour. which was deſign'd for that ſole action onely. For the right Eye is ſtronger and ſurer then the left; and the certitude of the ſight, which is made by both together, abſolutely depends on the former. All the organs ſubſervient to generation, which are on that ſide, are apt to frame Males, and thoſe which are on the left, Females. And, generally ſpeaking, diſeaſes commonly aſſault the parts on the left ſide, as ſuch as, having leaſt heat, are conſequently the weakeſt.

Art.

Art. 5.

That Motion begins on the Right ſide.

NOw, that Motion naturally begins on the Right ſide, is a truth which cannot admit of any diſpute, if we but take into our conſideration, what paſſes in all Animals. For thoſe which have four feet do always begin to go by ſetting the right fore-foot foremoſt; and others, which have but two, ever raiſe up the right foot firſt. Burthens are better carried on the left ſhoulder then on the right, in regard it is requiſite the principle of Motion ſhould be free and diſ-engag'd: And Painters never forget, in their Pictures, when drawn to the full length, to diſpoſe them into ſuch a poſture, as that the left Legg ſtands foremoſt, as it is commonly ſeen in thoſe that are ſtanding, whereby the right is put into an aptitude to move, when they would go from the place where they are. Nay, there are ſome creatures, which, having not been able, by reaſon of their Figure, to receive the two differences of *Right* and *Left*, as the Purple-fiſh, and all the others which have their ſhells after the form of a Snail, have not nevertheleſs been depriv'd of that of *Right*; in regard that, it being neceſſary they ſhould move, it was accordingly neceſſary, that they ſhould have the principle of motion.

All theſe truths therefore being thus eſtabliſh'd, to wit, that there are ſome places and parts in the body, more or leſs noble; That the more noble are deſign'd for the reception of the more excellent parts;

That

That the excellency of the parts is deriv'd from the advantage they bring along with them; And consequently, that the Hands, which, for the many several services they do, are plac'd in the upper part, as being the noblest Place, ought to have the precedence, in point of excellency, of the Feet.

In the next place, it will be our business to shew, that the Hands receive a more considerable assistance and relief, from the principles of Life, and that all the nobler parts do communicate a greater vertue to them, then to any other whatsoever.

Art. 6.

That the Hands have the greatest portion of natural heat.

TO make good this assertion, we are, in the first place, to observe, that Nature hath a greater care and tenderness for those parts, which are the more excellent; That, ordinarily, she frames them first; and that she uses more Art in the making of them, and more providence in the conservation of them, then she does in others. This is apparent, in the order she observes in their first conformation: for, next the Heart and Brain, whereof She first makes a draught; the Eyes, which, without dispute, are the most delicate and noblest organs, appear before all the other parts, nay, indeed before there is any designation of the Liver, the Spleen, and the Reins. The Mouth, in all Animals, is also one of the first parts that are framed next to the Eyes: Then may be seen the organs of progressive motion, and, after them, may be observ'd the Liver, the Spleen, and the other internal

internal parts; as the last and most exact observations of Anatomy have discover'd. Moreover, we find, that the upper parts are sooneſt finiſh'd, and that, in Children, they are bigger and ſtronger then the lower; whence it comes, that they have all the ſame proportion, as is in the ſtature of Dwarfs; and that it is with ſome difficulty they are brought to go, in regard their Leggs are too ſhort, and too weak.

Now, it is certain, that all the care, which Nature takes, whether in the framing of them firſt, or in promoting their perfection, depends on the natural heat, whereof ſhe communicates a greater abundance to them. For that is the general inſtrument of all her actions, and the real ſubjunct, wherein all her faculties reſide. So that, if there be any parts which are framed before others, it proceeds hence, that they muſt firſt have had their portions of that heat, which is always moſt pure, and efficacious in its ſource; And if they are brought to perfection before the others, it muſt be attributed to this, that it is done by a particular application of that quality, acting there more powerfully then in any other part, and being, for that reaſon, continually ſupply'd by the influence of the Spirits, which augment and fortifie it. Whence it muſt follow, that the Hands, which are framed before ſo many other parts, and are ſooner advanced to perfection and accompliſhment, then the Feet, have accordingly had a more advantageous diſtribution of the natural heat, and a larger proportion of the Spirits, then the other.

Art.

Art. 7.

That there is a greater communication between the Hands and the nobler parts.

But if we would consider these parts, when they are arriv'd to a more perfect state, and in a time, when they are able to execute the principal functions, whereto they are design'd, we shall certainly find, that the Heart, the Liver, and the Brain, do communicate to them a greater portion of Vertue, then they do to any of the other parts. For, not to mention the actions of the natural and sensitive life, which are common to them, with the parts afore-mentioned, progressive Motion is particularly reserv'd for them. So that, to perform that action, wherein there is more difficulty, and more strength requir'd, it is but just there should come to them a greater relief, and a stronger influence, from those principal members, then may be necessary for the other actions of life. It is accordingly requisite, that they should have more bloud, more heat, and more spirits; more bloud, to render their consistence the more firm; more vital heat, that they may be inspir'd with greater force, and a greater abundance of the animal Spirits, to convey into them not onely sentiment, but also the motive faculty. For, without these conditions, those organs are of no advantage, and no motion can be made. In a word, since instruments are not instruments, but correspondently to the vertue they derive from the cause, whereby they are employ'd, it is necessary that those parts, which are the instruments of Motion,

Motion, ſhould accordingly receive, from the principles of Motion, that vertue, whereby they are put in action. And thence it alſo follows, that they ſhould have that vertue in a higher degree then others; they ſhould have more Spirits, whereby it might be convey'd into them; and conſequently, there is a greater correſpondence between them, and the nobler parts; which are the ſources of thoſe ſpirits, and that vertue.

This reaſon indeed is common to the Hands and Feet, that is, comparatively to the other parts; but if we conſider the great advantage, with the ſituation of the upper part hath over that of the lower, as alſo the excellency of the parts, which are placed in the former, and the particular care which Nature takes, of them, as we have ſhewn already; It will be apparent, that, in the ſaid diſtribution of Spirits and Vertues, the Hands have had the beſt ſhare, and conſequently, that there is a greater correſpondence between them and the nobler parts, then there is between theſe laſt and the Feet, or any other member whatſoever.

Art. 8.

That ſome ſecret Vertues are convey'd from the nobler parts into the Hands.

But beſides this communication and correſpondence, which there is betweeen the Hands and the nobler parts, by means of the Veins, Arteries, and Nerves, there are yet others more ſecret, ſuch as have more obſcure ways and paſſages, and yet much more clearly

clearly discover the truth we search after. For, if it be certain, that the Lines of the Hand denote the length and shortness of Life, according as they are long or short of themselves, as *Aristotle* and Experience have taught us; it is necessary, not onely that there should be a greater rapport, and a stronger connexion between it and the principles of life, then there is between them and all the other parts, where those marks are not to be found: But it is further necessary, that the nobler parts, which are the sources, wherein those principles are comprehended, should communicate to it some secret influence which must have no reference to the ordinary and manifest vertues it receives from them; in as much as neither the bloud, nor the spirits, nor the heat, nor the motion, which they distribute and disperse into it, do not contribute ought to the making of the Lines therein longer or shorter, or denoting the length or shortness of Man's life.

Art. 9.

That Nature does not confound the Vertues.

THis secret Sympathy, which is between the Hand and the nobler parts, being presupposed, at least, till such time as we shall have prov'd it more at large, by more full and particular observations, we shall lay it down, as a most certain principle, that Nature does not confound the vertues, especially the formal and specifick, so there be ever so little opposition between them, and that she always distinguishes them, as much as lies in her power. For, not to bring on

the Stage the maximes of Aſtrologie, which hath divided the Heavens into ſo many Planets and Starrs; into ſo many Signs and Houſes, differing one from another in point of vertue; there is not any order of things in the Univerſe wherein this truth is not obſervable. For example, in perfect Animals, the qualities neceſſary to generation have been divided between the two ſexes; in each of thoſe, the faculties conducing to the government of life, have every one of them its particular Seat; And all the Senſes have their proper organs and diſtinct functions. Nay, let us examine Plants, Minerals, and Stones, and we ſhall find the ſame diſtinction; and, not to deſcend to the particulars which might be inſtanced, we need only direct our obſervation to the Load-ſtone, where it is ſo obvious to the Senſe, that, without blindneſs, or ſtupidity, it cannot be doubted of. For, in an Homogenial body, the compoſition whereof is equal every where, and wherein it ſeems that all the parts ſhould have one and the ſame power; yet is it obſerv'd, that, of thoſe parts, there are ſome, whereto the Magnetick qualities have been particularly diſtributed, and that there are two Poles, wherein they have been diſtinctly placed. And if what ſome perſons of late pretend that they have made it their diſcovery, be true, to wit, that there is a fixt Meridian in the ſaid Stone, it is requiſite, that all the others ſhould alſo be fixt, and conſequently, they have each of them a different inclination. So true is it, that Nature loves to diſtinguiſh the Vertues, and ſo averſe is ſhe to the intermixture and confuſion of them. And indeed, if ſhe did not exactly proceed, according to this order, things would be done many times contrary to her deſign, one quality would deſtroy another,

ther, and the effects would not be answerable to their causes, nor to the end, whereto they are design'd.

Art. 10.

That the Vertues of the nobler parts are not receiv'd into the same places of the Hand.

IF the case stand thus, and it be granted, that there are some particular Vertues communicated from the nobler parts to the Hand, it is requisite that they should not be confounded together, nor receiv'd into the same part of it; And consequently, it is necessary, that there should be one place assign'd for that of the Liver, another for that of the Heart, and so of all the rest.

But the main difficulty is, to find out, which those particular places and parts are, whereinto those influences are receiv'd. For though *Chiromancy* assures us, that there is a sympathy between the Fore-finger and the Liver, between the Middle-finger and the Spleen, between the Ring-finger and the Heart, *&c.* yet does it not produce any convincing proof of this truth; and as for the Experiences it advances, for the confirmation thereof, they still leave those unsatisfy'd, who allow nothing to be granted, but what is back'd with sound reasons, and are look'd upon by them as so many reveries and extravagances of man's curiosity. But certainly, he who could make good this Sympathy, by other observations, then those which may be deduc'd from *Chiromancy*, and such as should be built upon Medicine, or some other part of natural Philosophy, might justly make it his boast, that he

had discover'd the mysterie of this Science, and that he had found out the onely ground, upon which the truth of all Celestial configurations is supported. For my part, I do not pretend that I can produce all those, which might be necessary, to make an absolute proof thereof; yet dare I affirm, that I have some, which may, as it were, lay the foundations of such an eviction, and are such, as, having demonstrated some part of it, will leave an invincible presumption for the rest, and a hope, that it may be accomplish'd, after there hath been a carefull observation made of what happens to this admirable organ.

Art. 11.

That there is a Sympathy between the Liver and the Fore-finger.

THe first Observation then, which we have to propose, is, to shew the communication and sympathy which is between the Liver, and the Finger, commonly called by the Latines, *Index*. It is deduc'd from Medicine, which teaches us, that the Leprozie hath its source and principal seat in the Liver, and that one of the first Signs it gives, whereby it may be discover'd, appears in that finger. For when all the Muscles of the Hand, and indeed, of all the Body, are full and succulent, those which are subservient to the motion of that finger wither and dry up, especially that which is in the Thenar, that is, in the space between the said Finger and the Thumb, where all that is fleshy is consum'd, and there remains onely the skin and the fibres, which lye flat to the bone. Now this could

could not happen thus, if there were not some analogie, and secret correspondence, between the Liver and that part, since it is one of the first that is sensible of the alteration which is wrought in its substance: it being a thing may be confidently affirm'd, that there is not any disease, which so much corrupts the nature of the Liver, and destroys, not only its vertue, but also its substance, as this does; which, upon that accompt, is called the Universal Cancer of the Liver, and the whole mass of bloud. *Galen*, no doubt, was ignorant of this sympathy, as being a thing which pure Ratiocination could never have discover'd, when, to be inform'd thereof, it was requisite it should be reveal'd to him in a dream. For he relates, that, being troubled with a violent pain, which put him into a fright of being troubled with an Impostume in the Liver, he had an advice in his sleep, to open the Artery which runs along that finger, and that the said remedy immediately appeas'd the pain, whereto he had been subject a long time before. Which is a manifest sign, that there is a particular communication between those two parts, and a certain secret friendship and combination, whereby they are united together.

Art. 12.

That there is a Sympathy between the Heart and the Ring-finger.

THe second Observation shall be, to shew, that there is sympathy between the Heart and the fourth finger, which, in regard Rings are worn on it,

is commonly called the Ring-finger. For it is a thing cannot be reflected on without ſomething of wonder, that, when the Gout falls into the Hands, that finger is the laſt which it faſtens upon: And *Levinus* relates, that, in all thoſe whom he met with troubled with that Diſeaſe, the fourth finger of the left Hand, that is, the Ring-finger, was ever free from it, while all the others were extremly ſubject to pains and inflammations.

Now, whereas the parts make a ſtronger or weaker reſiſtance againſt Diſeaſes, according to the greater or leſſer force they have, and that their force depends on the greater or leſſer degree of natural heat, which is in them, it muſt needs be inferr'd, that that finger muſt have more of it then any of the others, ſince it makes a greater reſiſtance againſt the evil, then they do. And whereas the diſtribution of the natural heat proceeds either from the firſt Conformation of the parts, or from the influence communicated to them by the principle of heat; and that there is no probability, the ſaid finger, having the ſame ſtructure and compoſition with the reſt, ſhould have a greater portion then they of that fixt and original heat, whereof there is a diſtribution made at the birth; it muſt needs follow, that the divident it hath thereof ſhould proceed from the influence, which the principle of heat ſends it in greater abundance then to any of the reſt; and conſequently, that there is a greater communication, a greater dependence and connexion, between it and the Heart which, without all diſpute, is the principle of that heat, then there can be between the Heart and all the other fingers put together.

Nor was Antiquity wholly ignorant of this ſympathy, in as much as Hiſtory informs us, that the Antient

tient Physicians were of Opinion, that this finger had a certain cordial vertue, as making use of it exclusively to all the rest, in the mixture of those medicaments, whereof they made their Antidotes. And thence it came that they gave it the denomination of the medical finger, which it still keeps in the Latine Tongue, that this is one of the reasons why Rings have been ever since worn on it; and that many apply thereto remedies for the weaknesses of the Heart, as *Levinus* affirms, that he had often made experience, as also for the curing of intermittent Fevers, as some do still, with good success.

Nor is it of late onely, that some have made it their business, to find out the cause of this intelligence and relation between these two parts. For some, as *Appion*, in *Aulus Gellius*, have affirmed, that there was a nerve which, proceeding from the Heart, ended at the said finger; others, that that connexion was wrought by an Artery, and that it is manifestly perceiv'd to beat in Women during the time of their Travel, as also in those, who are wearied with overworking, and in all the Diseases, which assault the Heart. But, though this last Opinion be the more probable, yet doth it not absolutely take away the difficulty, in as much as the other fingers have each of them an Artery at well as this, which Artery proceeds from the same branch, and the same source as that of the other does. Whereto it may be added, that it is not necessary there should be manifest conduits for the conveyance of these vertues, Nature her self, as *Hippocrates* affirms, making secret paths and ways for the passage, not onely of her own faculties, but also for that of the humours themselves, which she would rid her self of.

Art. 13.

That there is a like Sympathy between the Spleen and the Middle-finger.

I might add for a third observation, to discover the Sympathy there is between the Spleen and the Long or Middle-finger, the miraculous effects, which the opening of the *Salvatella* produces in diseases of the Spleen. For that Vein passing commonly between the Middle-finger, and the Ring-finger, as *Hippocrates* affirms, or between the latter and the Little-finger, but sending some branch to the Middle-finger; it may, with much probability, be imagin'd, that the vertue of the Spleen is convey'd by the said Vein to that Finger, and that the Ring-finger being wholly taken up with the influence of the Heart, cannot entertain that of the Spleen, if it be true, that the vertues are not confounded, as we have shewn elsewhere. And indeed, what ever some late Practicers of Physick may say, experience, back'd by the authority of the first Masters of that Science, is of more force then all the reasons can be alledged by them.

For, besides that it is a thing of dangerous consequence, for any one to think to make all the rules of Medicine subject to ratiocination, which is many times weak and deceitful, and to discard the sentiments of the Ancient Professors of that Art, who were more exact observers of things, then those who have come after them; this, I say, not urg'd, I can truly and safely affirm, that, having caus'd this vein to

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be opened in Quartan Agues, above sixty times, it never fail'd, after the preparations necessary thereto, either quite to take away the Fever, or abate much of the violence of it, and made the fits more easily supportable. Let them not therefore argue any thing from the distribution, nor yet from the largness of the Vessels; For as one and the same boal of a tree hath several branches, which have not the same vertue, and that, of these, some bear flowers, or fruits, others nothing at all; In like manner, though all the veins of the Arm and Hand proceed from the same trunk, yet have they not the same employments, and they are only so many channels, through which the several faculties may flow. So that the faculty which proceeds from the Spleen, may pass wholy in the *Salvatella*, without dispersing it self into the other veins; which may be imagin'd done, after the same manner, as it is, that the parts disburthen themselves only on those, which are particularly attributed and affected to them, though they have a connexion with some others, by their vessels and situation; And hence it is that the several transportations of the humours, and the changes which diseases make from one place to another, do proceed, as we shall shew more at large hereafter.

As to the largeness of the Veins, which makes the evacuations of them more advantageous then are those of such as are less, it is a thing out of all dispute, when the question is of diminishing somewhat of the universal fulness of the body: But for what concerns the discharging of some part, it is observ'd, that, many times, the lesser veins, provided they be neer it, and that there be some secret communication between them, do it more safely and more effectually then

then the greater. In fine, since it is an opinion, without prescription of time, that the opening of the vein hath prov'd successful in diseases of the Spleen, as may be seen in the writings of *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, and all the *Arabians*, it is not likely it should be approv'd by such eminent persons, and that it should continue in repute for so many ages, through which it hath descended to us, had it not been supported and confirm'd by experience, in as much as there is not any Reason, which might have given ground to that perswasion. And if it be by this way, that this remedy came to be known, there is no necessity we should reduce it to the examination of reasons, no more then we do the purgative faculties, and all the other specifick vertues, whereof Medicine is full.

To return therefore to the proof, which this discourse interrupted; we said, that some advantage might be made of this observation, to confirm the sympathy there is between the Spleen and the middle finger. But if particular instances might serve for proofs to general Maxims, I dare affirm, that I have one, which wonderfully makes good this sympathy. For I know a person, who, being subject to the diseases of the Spleen, is never troubled therewith, but the middle finger of the left Hand becomes cold, benumm'd, and of a wan colour, as if it were depriv'd of life.

To this we may add the Story related by *Hippocrates*, in the fourth Book of *Popular diseases*, of the Woman, whose *Hypochondria* were so extended, and the respiration so obstructed, to whom there happen'd the eleventh day a fluxion and inflammation in that very finger, which gave her some ease for a certain

certain time, though afterwards, the violence of the Fever, and the Impoſthume, which bred in her entrails, occaſion'd her death. For it may be conjectur'd thence, that ſome part of the humour, which was in the Spleen, was disburthen'd into that finger, as being a part, between it and which there was a communication and correſpondence, and that the ſaid disburthening procur'd it ſome eaſe; but with this further obſervation, that, it being not poſsible, that the whole cauſe of the indiſpoſition ſhould be contain'd in ſo narrow a place, the remainder occaſion'd the impoſthume, whereof ſhe died. However, to deal ingenuouſly, we muſt confeſs, that theſe are only conjectures, not fit to enter into competition with the precedent obſervations, which ſeem to have demonſtrated the truth we are enquiring after.

Art. 14.

That there is a Sympathy between all the interiour parts, and the other parts of the Hand.

WHat hath been ſaid in the precedent Articles is ſo evictive, that it were to be wiſh'd, we had as good proofs, to make a diſtinct diſcovery of the reſt of the Sympathies, which are between the other interiour parts, and ſome other places in the Hand. But, to excuſe the negligence of not looking after them, it may with much probability be affirmed, that, ſince thoſe of the Heart and Liver are certain and unqueſtionable, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the

the others ſhould be ſo too, though they are not apparent to us: And that not only the Brain, and the other parts, which have publick and principal functions, as well as the Heart and Liver; but alſo that the Spleen, the Stomach, the Lungs, the Kidneys, and poſsibly ſome other parts, ſhould have each of them, in the Hand, their proper and affected place, between which and them there is a certain correſpondence and complyance.

Art. 15.

That the Face is the Epitome of all the exteriour parts.

IT may therefore be brought in as a proof of that ſecret intelligence, which is between ſome parts and others, and for the honour of that we now treat of, that the Hand and Face are as it were an abſtract of all the parts of the Body. For the latter is an Epitome of all the exteriour members, there being not any part of it, but hath its particular and manifeſt reſemblance to ſome one of them; as the former, in like manner is, of all the interiour parts, as having not any place, between which and ſome one of them there is not a ſecret connexion and ſympathy. And no doubt, this is one of the principal reaſons, that theſe two parts have had ſo peculiar a conſtitution of the skin, which, though all elſewhere, it be ſeparated from the Muſcles, is, in theſe, ſo joyn'd, that it is impoſsible to ſeparate the one from the other: it being Nature's pleaſure, who hath deſign'd theſe parts for Mirrours, wherein all the others were

to

to be repreſented, that the fleſh ſhould be joyn'd to the skin, that the impreſsion it receives from the Nerves, Veins, and Arteries, which are ſpread through it, ſhould be more eaſily communicated, and be more ſuddenly apparent without. Which thing may alſo be obſerv'd in the ſoles of the Feet, which, in ſome ſort, participate of the ſame advantages with the Hands, and upon the ſaid advantages there is another Science eſtabliſh'd, called *Podomancy*, which promiſes the ſame things as *Chiromancy*, but not with ſo good ſucceſs, for the reaſons we ſhall give elſewhere.

Art. 16.

That there is a mutual Sympathy between all the parts.

NOr is it only between the exteriour and manifeſt parts, that this aſſociation and mutual correſpondence is found, there is yet another more general ſympathy, which was known by *Hippocrates*, and ſuch, as he made it his ground of that ingenious diviſion of the Veins, which he hath made in his book *Of the Bones*. For that tranſcendent Wit, having conſider'd the ſeveral tranſportations of the humours, and the changes of diſeaſes, ſo often made from ſome certain parts to others, hath deſign'd the Veins whereby they might be made, and which accordingly were to be opened, in order to the preventing thereof. And, that ſuch an order might be obſerv'd in that procedure as ſhould take away the confuſion thereof, he hath laid down ſeveral heads, or as it were articles, at which he would begin the diſtribution of

those Vessels; for he hath plac'd the first in the Heart, the second, in the Reins; the third, in the Liver; the fourth, in the Eyes; and the Fift in the Head; from whence he draws four pair of Veins, which are afterwards spread into divers places.

Art. 17.

That the distribution of the Veins made by Hippocrates, *for the discovery of the said Sympathy, was not understood either by* Aristotle, *or* Galen.

FRom what is aboveſaid, it is not to be inferr'd, that *Hippocrates* was of opinion, that those were the first Sources, from which the Veins derive their origine, as *Aristotle*, *Galen*, and in a manner all their followers have impos'd upon him, since he could not be ignorant, that all of them have their root in the Liver, whence they are distributed into all the parts of the Body, in order to the conveyance of their nourishment into them; as he afterwards makes it appear in the distribution he hath made of the Liver-vein, and whereof he hath given a further account in the second Book of *Popular diseases*: But it was only to denote the correspondence there is between those five parts and the rest, & the diseases and symptomes which they mutually communicate.

Accordingly, when he saies, that the left Eye receives a Vein from the Right, and the latter another from the Left, it is not to be taken literally, as if those Veins did really derive their origine from those

places

places; but it is to shew, that the indispositions of one eye are communicated to the other, as if they had veins, whereby they might be directly convey'd. True indeed it is, that this communication is wrought by the interposition of the veins, and that these veins do also proceed from some common branch; but that is at such a distance from the Eyes, that it cannot be precisely affirm'd, there is any intercourse of veins between them, upon any other account then that of the sympathy there is between them. And this is so certain, that, many times, *Hippocrates* considers not the continuity of the veins, in the distribution he makes thereof, since he shews, that the Head and Lungs hold a correspondence with the Spleen, though the veins of the Spleen are not united, nor continuous with those of the aforesaid parts; in as much as it is sufficient, in order to the correspondence, whereof he speaks, that there should be some kind of communication between those veins, by some means or other, as we shall shew hereafter.

But to make a more particular discovery of the secret and advantage of this admirable distribution, it is requisite we should examin some articles of it. For when he tells us, that, from these four pair of veins, which issue from the Head, there is one which hath two branches, which falling from the Temples descend into the Lungs, whereof one passes from the right side to the left, and spreads into the Spleen and left Kidney; and the other passes from the left side, and goes into the Liver and right Kidney; and afterwards both those branches end at the Hemorrhoidal veins: Does he not thereby teach us not only why the opening of the Hemorrhoidal veins is good for those, who are troubled with pains in the Reins, Plurisies, and

and Inflammations of the Lungs; but also why the suppression of them causes the Dropsie and the Phthisick? For, though there be other places, where it should seem, that the reflux of the blood, which they contain, might be made; yet the correspondence there is between them, and the Liver and Lungs, is the only reason why it is not made elsewhere.

And questionless, those branches, which, descending from them, pass from the right side to the left, and from the left to the right, acquaint us with the cause, which hath been sought after to so little purpose; to wit, why the imposthumes and swellings, which happen from the upper part to the lower, are not always on the same side, where the source of the disease is observ'd, but sometimes on the right, sometimes on the left; whereas those which happen from the lower part to the upper, are always consonant to the regularity of the part, where the seat of the indisposition is: For, without this distribution of the Veins, it is impossible to give a reason for all these accidents.

Nay further, without the said distribution, it would not be known why there is so great a correspondence between the Breast and the Genitals, that the Cough ceases, when those are swell'd; that the swelling is assuag'd, when the Cough follows; nay, that the swellings of the Veins which happens to them, correct the defects, that make the voice small or hoarse.

In a word, this is the only secret, to discover the wayes, which Nature observes in her transportation of the humours, from one part to another, and for the discerning of the veins, which are to be opened in every particular indisposition. For, though they have all the same root; though divers of them have common

mon branches, which ſhould equally diſtribute unto them the blood and humours, which they contain; yet the correſpondence and friendſhip there is between the parts, prevails with Nature, to force them rather by one vein then another, and ſhe, making choice of that which is moſt convenient for her purpoſe, meddles not with the others, which are near it, and proceed from the ſelf-ſame origine.

And this is evidently remarkable in the ſympathy, whereof we have heretofore given ſuch preſſing examples. For, in all probability, it is by the Veins and Arteries, that the ſecret vertue, which is communicated from the Heart and Liver to certain fingers, is convey'd into them; and yet all thoſe, which are in the Hand, are not employ'd in that conveyance, and though they proceed from the ſame branch, yet is there not any more then one, whereby the vertue of the Heart, and another, whereby that of the Liver, is convey'd. Otherwiſe, there would be no determinate place for the reception of their influence, and all the fingers of the Hand, which have veins and arteries, would receive it equally; the contrary whereof we find by experience.

Accordingly, to ſay the truth, all theſe veſſels are only channels and conduit-pipes, which cannot, no more then thoſe of ſprings or fountains, give any motion to the humours: But they are the Spirits only, which convey and force them, to thoſe places, where they are ordered to go. And as the correſpondence, there is between the members, is carry'd on and improv'd by means of theſe Spirits; ſo is it not to be doubted, but that the blood, wherewith they are intermix'd, marches along with them, from one part to another, and, conſequently, occaſions that miraculous

raculous harmony of the veins, obſerv'd by *Hippocrates*.

For no doubt that Harmony was the ground, upon which he and the ancient Maſters of Medicine have, in the ſame member, obſerv'd veins that held a certain correſpondence with ſeveral parts, as, in the Arm, the Head-vein, the Liver-vein, and the Spleen-vein, which they alwayes punctually opened, in the particular indiſpoſitions of thoſe parts, ſlighting, or at leaſt not minding, the weak reaſons, which the inſpection of Bodies, and the affectation of novelty have ſince brought into vogue.

Art. 18.

Whence proceeds the regularity which Nature obſerves in her evacuations.

AND certainly, if a recourſe be not had to this direction of the Spirits, it would be impoſſible to give an account of the regularity, which Nature obſerves in her motions, when they are abſolutely at her diſpoſal, and which Medicine imitates in the evacuations preſcrib'd by it. For when, in inflammations of the Liver, the right Ear becomes red; when ulcers riſe in the right Hand and right Foot; when blood iſſues out at the noſtrill of the ſame ſide; or when there happen impoſthumes and ſwellings in the right Ear; And, on the contrary, when all the ſame accidents are obſervable on the left ſide, in inflammations of the Spleen; When, I ſay, Medicine preſcribes Phlebotomy on the ſame ſide that the diſeaſe is; and teaches us withall, that all the evacuations made on the

the oppoſite ſide, are dangerous, in caſe they are made of themſelves, or naturally, or to no purpoſe, if done by Art. What other reaſon can be aſſign'd for this regularity, at leaſt ſuch as may be ſatisfactory to the mind, then that alledged by us? For what is ſaid of the ſtreight Fibres which enter into the compoſition of the veſſels, whereby ſome are of opinion, that the humours are attracted, is, to give it no worſe tearm, impertinent: ſince they are incapable of making any ſuch attraction, as we have ſhewn elſewhere; ſince they are found equally on all ſides of the veſſel, and conſequently cannot determine, or direct the motion of the humours to one rather then another: ſince there are not alwayes Fibres to promote that regularity, in as much as from the Spleen to the left Noſtril, there cannot be any at all, the veins of the Noſe proceeding from the hollow Vein, between which and the Spleen there is no connexion; And, in fine, ſince the humours which are without the veſſels, nay the very vapours, and the moſt ſimple qualities are communicated from one part to another, after the ſame manner, ſo as that the Fibres act not at all upon thoſe occurrences, they, in caſe there were any, not contributing any thing to the tranſportation of the vapours and qualities.

Moreover, if any ſhall affirm, that this may be done by thoſe ſecret conduits that are in ſome parts of the fleſh, and aſcend from the lower parts to the upper, yet ſo, as that thoſe which are of one ſide have no communication with thoſe of the other, we anſwer, that it is a pure imagination without any likelihood of truth, in as much as, moſt commonly, theſe evacuations are wrought by the veins; and that it is requiſite, the humours, which flow through thoſe ſecret

conduit-pipes, ſhould enter into the veins, where it muſt be aſſerted there are not any paſſages; nay further, that there ſhould be ſome conduits croſs the body, ſince the humours ſometimes paſs from the Right ſide to the Left, ſometimes from Before to Behind, and moſt commonly from the Centre to the Circumference. But, all conſider'd, reflecting on either of theſe opinions, we cannot find, why there ſhould be ſo much danger, when the regularity is not obſerv'd in the evacuations of the humours.

But it being ſuppoſed, that the ſaid evacuations are wrought by the direction of the Spirits, it is eaſily concluded to be neceſſary, that Nature muſt needs be extremely oppreſs'd, when ſhe follows not the order which had been preſcrib'd her, and when ſhe gets out of her ordinary road, to ſhun the enemy that preſſes upon her. For it is to be attributed to this very reaſon, that the motions ſhe makes in ſharp Fevers upon even days are always dangerous; in as much as it is an argument of the violence ſhe ſuffers, and the diſorder into which the violence of the Diſeaſe forces her, when it makes her forget the odd days on which ſhe ought to engage againſt the choler, which is the cauſe of thoſe Diſeaſes.

But however the caſe ſtands, we may confidently affirm, that the regularity we ſpeak of, without all doubt, proceeds from the Spirits, which conduct the humours all over one half of the body, and diſpoſe them not at all into the other, unleſs there be ſome great obſtruction. For, Nature hath ſo great a tenderneſs for the conſervation of things living and animate, that ſhe hath, in a manner, divided them all into two parts, out of this deſign, that if it happened one ſuffered any alteration, the other might ſecure it

ſelf

ſelf from it, and ſo, in it ſelf, preſerve the nature of the whole. Now, this diviſion is real and manifeſt in ſome ſubjects, as in the ſeeds and kernels of ſome Plants, all which conſiſt of two portions, which may be ſeparated one from the other; as alſo in all thoſe members of the Animal that are double. In others it is obſcure, and not obſervable in an actual ſeparation of the parts, but onely in thoſe operations which ſhew, that they have each of them their diſtinct juriſdiction and different concernments; ſuch as is that whereof we ſpeak, which diſtinguiſhes the whole body into two halfs, whereof one is on the right, the other, on the left. Of the ſame kind is alſo that which may be obſerved in the members that are ſingle, as the Brain, Tongue, Noſe, *&c.* where we many times ſee one half, which is aſſaulted by ſome Diſeaſe, the other free from it, though there be not any ſeparation between them.

If then it be true, that Nature, to preſerve one half of the body, charges the other with all the diſorder that happens thereto, and permits not the humours, wherewith it is troubled, to exceed her limits, and, by that means, to faſten on the other, it is not to be doubted, but that the Spirits, which are her firſt and principal organs, do ſerve her in that enterprize, and that the tranſportation of the humours, from one place to another, is their charge, but onely ſo farr as ſhe hath given them order to do. And if, to compaſs this tranſportation, there be any neceſſity of making uſe of the Veins that are on the other ſide, yet does not that make them forget Nature's deſign, and the commands they had received from her; and ſo they onely paſs along, if I may ſo expreſs it, the borders of their neighbours, to get to the place whereto

they are directed. Thus, for example, when, to disburthen the Spleen of the humours whereby it is incommodated, there happens a bleeding of the Nose by the left Nostril, it is absolutely necessary, that they should go out of the Spleen-veins into the Hollow-vein, which is on the right side. But the Spirits can conduct them in such manner, as, at last, to make them return all along the same line, and within that half of the body, wherein the Spleen is. But this is to enter too farr into the secrets of Medicine; it shall therefore suffice, at the present, to affirm, that the communication there is between the Veins, according to the distribution made thereof by *Hippocrates*, proceeds from the Spirits, which convey the humors from one to another, consonantly to the relation and correspondence which there is between the parts, or according to the regularity they observe among themselves.

Art. 19.

That the Starrs, or Planets, have a certain predominancy over the several parts of the Hand.

TO return to the Sympathy there is between the interiour members, and the several parts of the Hand, I am of opinion, that the reasons alledg'd by us for the maintaining thereof, if they do not absolutely convince the most obstinate, will, at least, leave in their mind some doubt of the truth thereof. And I make no question, but that *Chiromancy* ought to be satisfy'd therewith, since that having been hitherto unknown

unknown to it, they make good, the chiefeſt of its foundations; as alſo that it will be eaſie for the ſaid Science, to eſtabliſh thereupon the maximes of Aſtrologie, which ought to furniſh it with moſt of its rules, and ſecure its preateſt promiſes.

For, if it be once granted, that the interiour parts are govern'd by the Planets, and that they receive, from thoſe Celeſtial Bodies, ſome particular influence, as Aſtrologie teaches; it muſt of neceſſity follow, that the vertue which is deriv'd from thoſe parts to the Hand ſhould be accompanied by that which the Planets communicate to them; And that, for example, if the Heart communicates its influence to ſome finger, the Planet, under whoſe government the Heart is, ſhould alſo derive his to the ſame place: it being not probable, that the influence of the Planet ſhould make a halt at the Heart, while this laſt communicates to the Hand that which is proper and natural to it; in as much as, the truth of the Celeſtial influences being granted, it muſt be affirm'd, that thoſe two vertues are combin'd into one, which is the onely eſſential diſpoſition, and the ſpecifick property of each part. Now, it is a concluſion of Aſtrologie, confirm'd by its principles and obſervations, That the Liver is govern'd by *Jupiter*, the Spleen by *Saturn*, the Heart by the *Sun*, and ſo of the reſt: whereof the conſequence is, that the fore-finger ſhould be accordingly govern'd by *Jupiter*; the middle-finger, by *Saturn*; the Ring-finger, by the *Sun*, &c. in regard there is a correſpondence and ſympathy between thoſe principal parts and the ſaid fingers, and that the former communicates to the latter the vertue they have in themſelves. All which conſider'd, we are not any longer to think it much, that Chiromancy hath

chang'd the order of the Planets in the Hand; nor yet ask, why it ſhould place *Jupiter* on the fore-finger, and the *Sun* on the Ring-finger, rather then on any other part, in as much as the nature of the Heart, and Liver, and the ſympathy there is between them and thoſe fingers, hath aſſign'd it thoſe places to be, as it were, particular houſes, which the ſaid Planets have in the Hand, as they have in the Heavens ſuch as are peculiar to them.

Theſe things thus laid down, the whole difficulty is reduced to this point, *viz.* to know, whether thoſe Starrs do really govern the principal parts of the body, and communicate unto them ſome ſecret vertue, which might be cauſe of the good or bad diſpoſition they have?

But, for any man to think to drive on this Queſtion as farr as it might go, and to examine al the conſequences and circumſtances thereof, with the ſeverity, which Philoſophy requires in theſe matters; beſides that it would bring into doubt thoſe truths which Aſtrologie places in the rank of things already judg'd, and ſuch as its moſt irreconcileable enemies are, for the moſt part, forc'd to acknowledge; it would require a Diſcourſe which ſhould exceed the limits of our deſign, nay, indeed contradict the method wherewith all Sciences would be treated. For this admits not, that all thoſe things which occurr therein ſhould be brought into diſpute; it particularly declares againſt the cenſuring of thoſe principles upon which they are eſtabliſh'd, and would have all thoſe, which are deduced from the concluſions of the ſuperiour Sciences, how doubtfull ſoever they may be, to be receiv'd with the ſame priviledge, as the maximes and common notions of the Mathematicks may challenge. It is therefore

therefore sufficient for Chiromancy, that Natural Philosophy maintains its first foundations; and so whatsoever it afterwards receives from Astrologie, ought to be allow'd, or at least the disquisition thereof left in suspence, till the ground of Astrologie it self shall have been examined.

Art. 20.

That the Planets have a predominancy over the interiour parts.

TO remove therefore, in some measure, the distrust which some may have, that the Conclusions which Chiromancy derives from Astrologie for principles, are wholly imaginary, and contrary to truth, we are now to make it appear, by some observations not admittable into dispute, That some parts of the body, are under the particular direction and government of certain Planets.

Nor will this be any hard matter to do, as to some of them. And though we should reject the experiences, which Astrologie might furnish us with upon this occasion, and that, upon such a rejection, we should not have others convincing enough to make an absolute proof of this truth; yet would the former lay down a great presumption for the ascertainment of the rest, and leave a very wel-grounded conjecture for us to imagine, that every member is governed by one of those Starrs, and that the Principle which Astrologie had made thereof, in order to the furtherance of Chiromancy, is not ill establish'd.

Art.

Art. 21.

That the Moon hath such a predominancy over the Brain.

LEt us then begin with the Brain, and affirm, that it is a thing out of all controversie, that the Moon hath a secret superintendency over that part, and that it is more apparently sensible of its power, then any of the other parts. For it swells and abates; it increases and diminishes, proportionably to the increase or decrease of that Planet. Thence it comes, that the Science of Medicine, upon a certain knowledge of these changes, takes a care, that, when Trepanning is prescrib'd, it should be perform'd with the greater precaution in the full of the Moon; in regard the Physicians know, that, then, the Brain is also in its full, and that causing the Membranes, which encompass it, to come neerer the bone, it exposes them to the danger of being the more easily touched by the instrument.

But there cannot be a greater demonstration of the connexion and sympathy, which there is between the Moon and the Brain, then that the Diseases of that part have their intensions and remissions, according to the course of that Planet. For, of these Indispositions, there are some do so regularly follow her motions, that they may be the Ephemerides, or Prognostications thereof: Nay, though she be under the Horizon, and that the person subject to those indispositions endeavour, by all ways imaginable, to secure them-

themſelves againſt her influences; yet does not all this hinder but that the breaking out of a fluxion, which comes preciſely at the time appointed, in the change of her Quarters, will cauſe them to be felt, though they be not ſeen either in the Heavens or the Almanacks.

Moreover, do not the fits of the Epilepſie or Falling-ſickneſs ordinarily follow the motions of that Planet? Are there not ſome kinds of diſtractions, and extravagances which are called *Lunacies*? Nay, to deſcend even to Horſes, are they not ſubject to diſeaſes in the Head, known by a name not much differing from the forementioned, purely upon this account, that both of them follow the motion of the Moon? In a word, is it not a thing generally acknowledg'd, that the beams of that Planet cauſe ſtubborn diſtempers, and diſcolour the countenance, if one be a long time expos'd thereto, eſpecially if the party be aſleep? Now all theſe things cannot be referr'd to any other cauſe then the influences thereof, in as much as moſt of them are many times obſervable, when ſhe is under the Earth, and that, granted to be there, neither her light, nor the Magnetick vertue attributed to her, can have any action upon us.

Nor is there any doubt made of the truth of theſe ſecret qualities, eſpecially after the obſervations, which have been made of an infinite number of effects they produce; and, among others, of the Ebbing and flowing of the Sea, which, without all diſpute, follows the motion of the Moon, beginning alwaies when ſhe appears either above our Horizon, or that of the Antipodes, and being in her greateſt force, when ſhe is come to their Meridian or ours. For if it can be ſhewn, as it would be eaſie for us to do, would

would this place admit of a discourse so long as should be requisite thereto; if, I say, it can be demonstrated, that the Flowing of the Sea cannot proceed from the motion of the Earth, nor from the light of the Stars; nor from any Magnetick vertue, nor by the impulsion of the Moon, nor by the Rarefaction caus'd in the Water by Heat, there remain only the Influences of this Planet, to be the cause of that miraculous motion, and no doubt to be also the like cause of all the accidents before-mentioned.

Art. 22.

That the Sun hath the like predominancy over the Heart.

NOw, if it be acknowledg'd, that the said celestial Body (the Moon) hath the influences we have mentioned, and that it is by them it hath the direction and government of one of the principal parts of the body, there is no question to be made, but that the Sun, which hath the Supremacy, and is, as it were, the Father of all the other Planets, should have such as are more powerful; and that he, whose concurrence is requisite for the generation of all things, hath reserv'd to himself the first and noblest part of Animals, that he might have the conduct thereof, and communicate his vertues thereto. No doubt but it must be so, and therefore it may be affirm'd, that he hath made choice of the Heart for his Throne, and the place of his exaltation: and that, as he is in the Heavens, in the midst of all the Stars, so is he plac'd in the midst of all the members of the Body, which are govern'd by the Planets. Thence

is

is it, that he dilates his vertue into all the parts of the little world; and if, in his course, he comes to suffer some malignant Aspect, that member is sensible of it, and sympathizes with the disorders of its Soveraign. Upon this discovery hath it been observ'd, that those, who are sick, suffer an extraordinary weakness in Eclipses of the Sun, nay, that those, who are of a more delicate Complexion, do sensibly resent in themselvs the effect of that Constellation. To this may be added that the vital faculty becomes languishing, and weak, during the time of the Solstices and the Æquinoxes, and, when ever any malignant Stars rise with him, that *Hippocrates* hath forbidden the making use of any remedy, till ten daies are past. But we must not omit to bring, in this place, an observation, which that incomparable person hath left behind him in his Book *of Dreams*, whereby may be discover'd, not only the sympathy there is between the Heart and the Sun, but also that which is between the Moon and the Stars, and the other parts of the Body. For having suppos'd, that the Sun hath a relation to the middle of the Body, the Moon to the cavities that are in it, and the Stars to the external parts, he affirms, that if those Celestial bodies appear in the dream with the purity, and according to that regularity of motion, which is natural to them, it is a signification of perfect health, and that there is not any thing in the body, but is consonant to the rule and order, which Nature requires. But if the party dreaming seems to see any of the Planets dimm'd, or disappearing, or obstructed in its course, it is a sign of some indisposition to happen in those parts, between which and those bodies there is a sympathy and correspondence. For if those disorders happen in the Stars, the indisposition

ſition will be in the conſtitution and habit of the Body; if in the Moon, it will be in the Cavities; but if it be in the Sun, it will be ſo much the more violent, and more hard to be cured, as ſuch as engages againſt the principles of life: it being not to be imagin'd, that the middle, he ſpeaks of, can be underſtood of any thing, but the vital parts, which comprehend the Heart, and the parts about it.

Now, if this be true, as Reaſon and Experience hath ſince frequently confirm'd it, we are to conclude thence, that ſince, in dreams, the Imagination frames all thoſe Images of the Sun, to repreſent to its ſelf the good or ill diſpoſition of the Heart, it is neceſſary, that it ſhould have ſome ground to joyn together two things, which are ſo different among themſelves, and that it ſhould find, in the ſaid part of the body, certain Solar qualities, which may ſerve for a model for the figures and repreſentations it makes of that Star. And, in a word, it is requiſite, that the particular Influences, which the Heart receives from the Sun, ſhould be the originals, according to which, the Soul, in ſleep, draws all thoſe admirable copies. If the caſe were otherwiſe, why ſhould ſhe not as well make them for ſome other member? And why, in the inflammation of the Liver, for example, where the heat is at that time greater, then in any other part of the Body, ſhould ſhe not make to herſelf a repreſentation of that Star, which is the ſource of all the heat in the world, as well as ſhe does in the leaſt alterations of the Heart? Certainly, there are, in this part, ſome vertues, ſo ſtrange and ſo conceal'd, that it is impoſſible to make any reference thereof to the Elements. For that it ſhould many times defie the flames, ſo as not to be conſum'd thereby; That it ſhould

ſhould not grow ſofter by boyling, if the Auricles be not taken away; That ſome kinds of fiſhes cannot be boyl'd, if the heart be left within them; theſe, I ſay, are effects ſo particular thereto, and whereof it is ſo hard to give any reaſon, by the manifeſt qualities, that there is ſome ground to preſume, that thoſe which it hath are of a higher order, and referrible, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, to the Element of the Starrs.

Now, if the influence which the Heart receives from the Sun is the cauſe, that the Dreams do, by the images of that Planet, repreſent the diverſe diſpoſitions, wherein the heart is; it is requiſite, the caſe ſhould be the ſame, as to the Moon and Stars, in reference to the Cavities of the Body, and the exteriour parts. And thence, no doubt, it proceeds, that Aſtrology hath diſpos'd, under the direction of the Moon, the Brain, the Breaſt, the Inteſtines, the Bladder, and the Matrix, which are the moſt conſiderable cavities of the Body; as alſo that it hath divided all the exteriour parts among the Signs of the Zodiack, grounding it ſelf, at firſt, on this Doctrine of *Hippocrates*, whereto it hath ſince added its own Experiences.

Art. 23.

That the other Planets have the Government of the other interiour parts.

THeſe reaſons thus laid down, there is no difficulty to be made, but that the other Planets have alſo their particular influences, and, as well as the two already

already mentioned, have the government of certain parts of the Body. But Philosophy hath been so negligent in preserving the observations thereof, that, those, which Astrology furnishes us withall, being excepted, we have not any from which may be deduced the direction of *Jupiter* over the Liver, that of *Saturn* over the Spleen, &c. unless we may be admitted to bring into that rank, the marks and moles which are found naturally imprinted on those parts. For it is an observation grounded on experience, that he, at whose birth *Saturn* hath the predominancy, hath commonly one of those marks upon the region of the Spleen; if it be *Jupiter*, he hath it upon that of the *Liver*; if *Venus*, the mark is to be seen on the privy parts, and the party hath another between the Ey-brows. Upon which observation, *Dares Phrygius*, in the Pourtraiture he made of the beautiful *Helene*, affirms, that she had one between the Ey-brows, which *Cornelius Nepos* hath neatly expres'd, in these two excellent verses:

Parva supercilijs nubes interflua raris
Audaci maculâ tenues discriminat artus.

But I do not account these observations full enough, nor so sufficiently confirm'd by experience, as that a certain proof, of what we pretend to, may be deduced from them. In the mean time, till there be a more exact disquisition made thereof, we shall not stick to affirm, that the Sun and Moon, which, without all dispute, have a predominancy over the Heart and Brain, may well secure the presumption we have, to imagine, that the other Planets have a certain Empire over the members, which Astrology hath made subject

ject thereto. And consequently, we may conclude, that the Principle which Chiromancy derives from it, is not without some ground, and that it may make good a great part of the promises it makes.

Art. 24.

That the Principles establish'd regulate many doubtful things in Chiromancy.

THese are then the reasons, upon which, I conceiv'd, that some establishment might be made. This further advantage may be made of them, that they may serve to regulate many things, whereof there is some controversie in the practick part of Chiromancy, and to discover the causes of many effects observ'd therein. For there are some, who affirm, that it is not only requisite to make an inspection into the Hands, but that it is also necessary to look upon the Feet; that the left Hand ought to be the more consider'd in Women, and those whose Nativities happen in the night; and the Right, in men, and those who are born in the day. But the advantage which the Hands have over the Feet, clearly shews, that the inspection of the latter is to little purpose, and that the Artist may find out in the Hands, whatever can be expected from this kind of knowledge. Moreover, the Right Hand being more noble then the Left, in all sexes, at what time soever the Querent be born, ought to be more exactly consider'd, then the latter, especially as to what concerns the Heart, Liver, and Brain, between which and it there is a greater communication. But, on the other

ſide, the Left hath the preheminence, as to what concerns the Spleen, and the other parts, which are on the ſame ſide, by reaſon of the power which Regularity hath upon thoſe occaſions. In fine, what we have ſaid before concerning Length, Bredth and Profundity, furniſhes us with the cauſes of the diverſity which is obſerv'd in the Lines: for thoſe which are ſimple ſhew that the vertue is weak, length being the firſt eſſay it makes; thoſe which are croſs'd diſcover a greater ſtrength in it, as having extended it ſelf into bredth, and that it does its utmoſt in thoſe which are deep.

But I forget my ſelf, and conſider not, that I inſenſibly enter into a particular diſquiſition of thoſe things, which it was my deſign to have balk'd. Nay, I am to fear, I have expreſs'd my ſelf too freely in the general, and that I betray a certain acknowledgment, by the certainty I find therein, that I have the ſame perſuaſion for the particular. But I am far from entertaining any ſuch thought. True it is, I lay the foundations of a Science, which ſeem to me ſolid enough, but I find not materials to compleat the Edifice. For moſt of thoſe rules and precepts, wherewith ſome would have carried on the Superſtructure, are not ſufficiently eſtabliſh'd; the experiences, by which they are maintain'd, are not fully verified and confirm'd; And there is requiſite a new ſupply of obſervations, made with all the caution and exactneſs neceſſary, to give it the form and ſolidity, which Art and Science require. But *from whom* are theſe to be expected, ſince thoſe, who might be thought able to make them, will not buſie themſelves about it? And *when* may they be expected, ſince there are ſo many to be made; and that there is ſo much dif-

difficulty in the making of them wel

But if it ſhall happen, that any will venture their endeavours herein, and ſhall attempt it with a confidence of being able to overcome the charge and difficulties of ſo great a deſign, I am to tell them, that, in my judgment, they will be extreamly oblig'd to you, SIR, for having engag'd me, to promote their work, and aſſigning them the foundations, on which they are to build; and you are to acknowledge withall my complyance with your deſires. For if you conſider my ordinary imployments and ſtudies, you will find, that I have done them ſome violence, to humour your inclinations, and that I cou'd not give you a greater demonſtration of the friendſhip and reſpects I have for you, then by expoſing my ſelf to cenſure, to ſatisfie your curioſity. I am not to fear yours, becauſe I am confident it will be favourable to me; but I dread that of the Publick, from whom no favour is to be expected, and whoſe judgments are very ſevere, and, many times, unjuſt. It is your buſineſs therefore to prevent my appearance before that ſevere Tribunal, if you are not ſufficiently confident, that I ſhall eſcape the puniſhment of temerarious Writers; and conſequently, hazzard not, at leaſt without great precaution, the little eſteem good fortune hath been pleaſed to favour me with in the world, and for the ſecurity and preſervation whereof, I conceive you oblig'd to concern yourſelf, ſince you know how much I am,

SIR,

Your, &c.

THE SECOND LETTER TO *MONSIEUR* B.D.M. UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF *METOPOSCOPY.*

SIR,

I Know not whether I ought to complain of your Curiosity, which requires of me things that are so difficult, or lay the fault on the complyance I have for you, which will not suffer me to deny you any thing, within the reach of my performance. When you would have me to establish the principles of *Metoposcopy*, upon Physical observations, as I have done those of *Chiromancy*, you consider not, that you engage me in an attempt, which *Cardan*, *Achillinus*, and the *Conciliator* durst not undertake; and when I comply with your commands, I also reflect not, that I expose my self to the censure of all those, who shall see

ſee this diſcourſe, and, no doubt, will blame me for beſtowing my time in the examination of things ſo vain, and ſo much cry'd down, and, by my conjectures, confirming thoſe in their errour, who give too much credit thereto. But ſince I have not ſo much command of my ſelf as to balk the ſatisfaction of your deſires, let me beg your care of my reputation, and entreat you, to acquaint thoſe, to whom you ſhall communicate this Piece, with the judgment, which, you know, I make of theſe kinds of Sciences. For though I find ſome grounds, whereby their Principles may be maintain'd, nay am of a perſuaſion, that if ſuch perfect obſervations might be made, as were neceſſary to give them rules, there might be framed an Art thereof, which would be very advantageous and delightful: yet does not this hinder my being of opinion, that all thoſe, which we find in Books, are not only falſe, but alſo temerarious, and that thoſe who make uſe of them, juſtly deſerve the contempt, which Wiſdom hath for things of that nature, and are no leſs juſtly ſubject to thoſe puniſhments, whereto Religion hath alwaies condemn'd them. With this precaution, I ſhall dilate my diſcourſe upon this ſubject, according to the enſuing Heads or Articles, and ſhew;

1. *That Metopoſcopy hath the ſame Principles with Chiromancy.*
2. *What part of the Face are governed by the Planets.*
3. *That not only the Forehead, but alſo the other parts of the Face are to be conſidered in Metopoſcopy.*

4. *That the Sun and Moon have the government of the Eyes.*
5. *That* Venus *hath the government of the Nose.*
6. *That there is a correspondence between all the marks of the Face, and others, in other parts of the body.*
7. *Whence the Lines of the Forehead proceed.*
8. *What particular Planet hath the government of the Forehead.*
9. *That* Jupiter *hath the government of the Cheeks.*
10. *That* Mercury *hath the like government of the Ears.*
11. *And lastly, that* Mars *hath the government of the Lips.*

Art. 1.

That Metoposcopy hath the same Principles with Chiromancy.

WE are therefore, in the first place, to affirm, that the same Principle, upon which *Chiromancy* is establish'd, serves also for a ground to *Metoposcopy*, in as much as all the promises of this latter Science are grounded on the government and direction, which the Planets have over certain parts of the

the Face, as they have over those of the Hand. So that if the said Principle be found well establish'd, in order to *Chiromancy*, there is no question to be made, but it makes as well for *Metoposcopy*. Nay, it may be affirm'd, that the general reasons, whereof the former hath made use, are more pressing and decisive in the latter; And if they give presumptions and apparences of some truth in the one, in the other they seem to give assurance and certainty.

For, if it be once granted, that the Planets have a certain direction and government over the nobler parts, and that they inspire their good or bad qualities into them; That there is also a certain secret correspondence between the said Parts, and some Members, whereto they communicate the good and bad dispositions, which they may have; And that for the same reason, the same Star, which hath the government of some noble Part, governs also that, between which and the other there is a correspondence and sympathy, as we have already shewn in the precedent discourse: If, I say, this be true in *Chiromancy*, it should be much more certain in *Metoposcopy*; since it may be inferr'd, that, so far as the Face hath the preheminence before the Hands, so the direction of the Planets, and the sympathy of the nobler parts should be proportionably stronger and more efficacious in that part, then they are in any of the rest.

For certainly, there is not any likelihood, that the Heart, the Brain, the Liver, and the other principal parts, should have any particular vertue, to be communicated to certain parts of the Hand, as the experiences we have produc'd do make evident, and not make some participation thereof, to that, which is

the most excellent of all, and as it were the Epitome of the whole Man, and the Mirrour, wherein all the dispositions of Body and Soul are represented and observ'd.

We need not bring any reasons, or proofs, to demonstrate the truth of these advantages; they are too evident, and too well known, to leave any place for doubt; there needs no Eyes, to make a greater apprehension thereof then words can express: nay, there needs no more then common sence, to conclude, that, if there be any influences communicated by the nobler parts and the Stars to the exteriour parts, the Face ought to have a better and greater share of them then any other part whatsoever.

Art 2.

What parts of the Face are govern'd by the Planets.

ALl those grounds and consequences being presuppos'd, we now come to examine, *what parts of the Face those are, between which and the Noble Parts and the Stars, there is a certain Sympathy.* For, as this Sympathy is grounded upon the Formal and Specifick vertues, and that Nature confounds not those vertues, as we have shewn elsewhere; so it is requisite, that there should be some place in the Face, answerable to the Heart and the Sun; another, to the Liver, and *Jupiter*; some other, to the Spleen, and *Saturn*, and so of the rest; and that every one of them should receive the vertues and influences, which are proper both to the noble part, between which and

and it there is a Sympathy, and the Planet, under whose direction it is.

The Vulgar *Metoposcopy* takes notice of no other places, where these impressions should be made, then the Forehead, which the Professors of it have divided into seven parts, in order to the placing of the seven Planets therein. So that they have assign'd the first and highest place to *Saturn*; the second, to *Jupiter*; the third to *Mars*; the fourth, to the *Sun*; the fifth, which is above the left Eye-brow, to *Venus*; that which is above the right, to *Mercury*; and they lodge the *Moon* between those two. And when these places are mark'd with any lines, they denote the power of that Starr, which is appropriated thereto.

But I fear me, this orderly, and regular disposal of the Planets is a product of Man's wit and invention, which affects a kind of proportion and Symmetry in all things, and imagin'd, that those Celestial Bodies ought to be placed in the Face, with a respect to the same order which they observe in the Heavens. Chiromancy hath done much better, when slighting that proportion, it chang'd the order of the Planets, and plac'd them in the Hand, after a quite different situation. For, from thence it hath been with some reason concluded, that there were some experiences, which had oblig'd it to rank them as it hath done, and to recede from that method, which the imagination so industriously observes, in all its operations, wherein it never wants references and resemblances, to establish its Dreams and Visions.

Now, what makes me to imagine the falling of *Metoposcopy* into the said errour, is this, that there are many, who have not approv'd the Situation, which some others have assign'd to those Planets, as having

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dispos'd *Venus* into the place of the *Sun*, and transferr'd the *Sun* and *Moon* over the two Eye-brows, and set *Mercury* betwixt them. And all this was done, upon an imagination they had, that it was more pertinent, to place the two great Luminaries over the Ey-brows, in order to their having a superintendency over the Eyes, which are the cleareſt and moſt luminous parts of the whole Face. But this obſervance of proportion, though it ſeems ſufficiently well imagin'd, is not a rule for the conduct and guidance of Nature. She propoſes to her ſelf ſuch ends and means as are more ſolid, then any of theſe vain Chimera's; and thoſe, who are deſirous to enter into the knowledge of her Secrets, do not make a ſtand at theſe appearances, but ſearch after reaſons, grounded upon certain, and well-eſtabliſh'd, experiences.

Moreover, the acquaintance I had with a perſon admirable in the ſtudy of this Art, gives me a rational encouragement, to doubt of all theſe kinds of orderings and rankings of the Planets. For he put *Saturn* in the place, where the *Sun* was plac'd by ſome, and *Venus* by others. And whereas that is the moſt remarkable part of any in the Forehead, and how ſcarce ſoever the lines may be in that part, yet there never fails to be one there; he conceiv'd, that the Line of *Saturn* was proper and natural to the Forehead, and that all the others were accidental, and, as it were, ſcatter'd up and down there, onely to denote the Aſpects, which that Planet hath to the others. So that, upon a bare inſpection of the Face, he exactly diſcover'd the diſpoſition of the Planets, as it was at the minute of the Nativity. In the mean time, he made ſuch certain judgments upon theſe grounds, and I my ſelf have made ſuch ſtrange ones, upon the rules

rules I receiv'd from him, that they have created in me a perſuaſion, not onely that there is a true Science of *Metopoſcopy*, which is not ſo vain and deceitfull as ſome might be apt to imagine; but alſo that that which is commonly found in Books, and whereof ſuch as are addicted to that ſtudy ordinarily make uſe, is grounded on ſuch falſe Principles and Rules, as cannot attain the knowledge, which may juſtly be expected, from an Art ſo miraculous, and of ſo great advantage.

But when all is done, what place ſoever be aſſign'd to thoſe Starrs, the Queſtion ſtill remains, to know, whether there are any Phyſical experiences and obſervations whereby it may be maintain'd? For, if we muſt referr our ſelves to thoſe of the Science it ſelf, it might produce an infinite number, and I conceive my ſelf able to eſtabliſh the Syſteme I ſpoke of before, by thoſe I have ſeen made by others, and thoſe I have often made my ſelf. But, in as much as the teſtimony a man gives of himſelf is not legal, and may be ſuſpected; accordingly, it is not juſt to believe that which *Metopoſcopy* might give on its own behalf, and there is not any Art, how vain or ſuperſtitious ſoever, but may be eſtabliſh'd by its own obſervations. Let us thefore try, whether we can elſewhere find out ſuch reaſons and proofs, as may ſettle the grounds of this Art, and give, at leaſt, ſome preſumption of the truth there may be in it.

Art.

Art. 3.

That not only the Forehead, but also the other parts of the Face are to be considered in Metoposcopy.

But, before we come to the examination of the aforesaid point, it is requisite, we should undeceive those, who are of opinion, that the Forehead is the onely part of the Face, from which *Metoposcopy* deduces the signs and marks, which it makes use of; for it is certain, that all the others do contribute somewhat thereto, as well as it. And indeed, it is not to be imagin'd, that, it being granted, there is a certain secret intelligence between the Starrs and noble parts of the body, and the exteriour parts thereof, in the Face, the said correspondence and sympathy should be between them and the Forehead onely; And that the Eyes, the Nose, and the Mouth, which are such considerable parts, and which Nature frames and conserves with so much care and tenderness, should not have any communication with them.

And thence it comes, that those Astrologers, who have apply'd themselves to this Science, have made every part of the Face subject to some particular Planet. For, not to mention the Forehead, wherein, as we said before, they have plac'd them all, they have consign'd the Right Eye to the *Sun*; the Left to the *Moon*; the Nose to *Venus*; the Ears to *Mercury*; the Cheeks to *Jupiter*; and the Lips to *Mars*; and according to the constitution of those parts, they have laid down Rules whereby to judge of the good or bad

bad disposition of those Starrs, and of the effects they might work upon the persons. So that those Rules and Judgments being under the jurisdiction of *Metoposcopy*, there's no doubt to be made, but that it makes its use and advantage of all the parts of the Face, and that it is a gross errour, to imagine, that it hath nothing to consider, but the Forehead.

This presuppos'd, we now come to examine the reasons, whereby the situation, which every planet hath of each of those parts, may be establish'd and confirm'd.

Art. 4.

That the Sun and Moon have the government of the Eyes.

IN the first place then, if it be observ'd that all the Passions are to be discern'd in the Eyes, and that the Heart and Brain are the sources out of which they proceed, it will be easily judg'd, according to the Principle laid down by us, to wit, That those Noble parts of the Body, which receive some influence from the Starrs, communicate it to the Members, between which and them there is any correspondence and sympathy; It will be concluded, I say, that, since the Heart and Brain are govern'd by the *Sun* and *Moon*, as we have shewn elsewhere, it must of necessity follow, that they should derive to the Eyes, the Vertues which they have received from those Planets.

Moreover, it is an Observation confirm'd by abundance of Experiences, that those, who are born, during the time of Eclipses, are commonly weak-sighted,

ſighted, as if thoſe two great Luminaries, which may be called the Eyes of the Heavens, communicated their defect to the Eyes of the Body, between which and them, there is a certain connexion and correſpondence.

Nor is there any reaſon it ſhould be here laid to our charge, that, contrary to the proteſtation we have made, we borrow this proof from Aſtrologie; for it is altogether natural, as all thoſe which Medicine and Agriculture deduce from Lunations, and the riſing of the greater Starrs: It is not maintain'd by the doubtfull calculations of Aſtrologers, and do not affirm, as they do, that the *Sun* and *Moon*, being in unfortunate places, produce that effect; in as much as that ſuppoſes the diſtinction of the Celeſtial Houſes, and the Aſpects, which belong purely to the Judicial part of that Science.

And I make no doubt, but that, upon theſe Rules, was made that admirable Prognoſtication, which *Hippocrates* gives an account of in his *Prorrheticks*, where he ſays, that a Phyſician being ſent for in a mortal diſeaſe, affirm'd the ſick party would not dye of it, but that he ſhould loſe both his eyes. For ſince that incomparable perſon, who knew more of the Prognoſtick part of Phyſick, then all thoſe who have come after him, ingenuouſly acknowledges, that he knew not the ſecret of making ſuch predictions; It is very probable, that this was made by the Rules of *Metoposcopy*, according to the principle laid down by us.

But what! It may ſeem deducible from what we have ſaid, that both the eyes are equally under the direction and government of the two great Luminaries, whereas, in the mean time, *Metoposcopy* would have the Right eye to belong privatively to the *Sun*,

and

and the Left to the *Moon*. It will be no hard matter to solve this difficulty, if it be remembred, what we have said in the Discourse of *Chiromancy*; to wit, That there are two kinds of influences, which all the parts receive from the noble parts; the one common and general; the other, particular and specifick. According to the former, there is a correspondence between the Eyes and the Heart, and Brain, by means of the vital heat, and the sensitive vertue, which they receive from them; and, in this respect, it may be truly affirm'd, that the *Sun* and *Moon*, who have the government of these two principal parts, have accordingly a general direction over both the eyes. But if we consider the sympathy and particular association, which is between the members among themselves, a Truth we have demonstrated both by experience, and the doctrine of *Hippocrates*, it will be found, that there is some reason to believe, that the Heart and Brain may have a stricter connexion with one Ey then with the other; and consequently, that one of them may be under the particular direction of the *Sun*; and the other, under that of the *Moon*. Now, whereas the Right eye is in a nobler situation then the Left; in regard it is stronger, and more exact in its action, then the other, and that it onely causes the stedfastness and regularity of the sight as we shall shew anone; there is no doubt to be made, but that it is accordingly governed by the noblest and most powerful Planet.

But that the Right eye it stronger then the Left, is a thing so certain, that it needs no proof. For, not to urge that all the parts on the right side are stronger than those on the other; nor yet, that the Right eye is less subject to Diseases then the other, and, when the

the fore-runners of Death dissolve and destroy the vertue of the parts, this Eye conserves its own, sometime after the Left is quite extinguish'd; It must, upon this further account, be stronger then the other, that it is more exact in its action. And this is an evident sign of its being more exact, that the regularity of the full and compleat sight, which is made with both eyes, depends onely on the Right. Hence it comes, that when a man looks with both eyes on any Object whatsoever, and comes afterwards to shut the Left Eye, the Object will appear to him in the same situation, and upon the same Line, as he had observ'd it, with both eyes. But, if he shuts the Right Eye, the Object will appear no longer upon the same Line, and seems to have chang'd its situation: Which is a certain argument, that the regularity of the compleat sight proceeds from the Right Eye, since the line upon which it sees the Objects, is the same with that, whereby both eyes are directed.

Art. 5.

That Venus *hath the government of the Nose.*

AS concerning the proof we have, that the Nose is under the particular direction of *Venus*, it is so convincing, that the most obstinate cannot doubt of it, it being still presuppos'd, that there is any part of Mans body under the government of some Planet or other. For, according to the concurrent testimonies of all Astrologers, which are also confirm'd by the common manner of speaking in all the nobler Languages, *Venus* hath the oversight of Generation, and

and the parts necessary thereto. Now it is out of all controversie, that there is a correspondence and sympathy, between them and the Nose; and consequently, 'tis requisite, that it should receive the same Influence, which that Planet communicates to them, and that it should be under the same Empire as they are subject to. I conceive there is not any person so ignorant, as not to know somewhat of the correspondence we spoke of, since it is come even into proverbs: but all haply are not acquainted with one thing which evidently demonstrates it, and is this, That the natural marks or moles, which are upon the Nose, inferr and denote others about those parts, dispos'd in the same situation, or at least such as is, in some measure, answerable to that they are in, upon the other.

Art. 6.

That there is a correspondence between all the marks of the Face, and others in other parts of the Body.

AND certainly it is a thing worthy admiration, and such as, in my judgment, is not sufficiently taken into consideration, That there is not any of those natural marks upon the face, but there is another upon some certain and determinate part of the Body, particularly answerable thereto. For if there chance to be one upon the Forehead; there will be another upon the Breast; and accordingly as the former shall be in the midst of the Forehead, or in the upper or lower part thereof, on the one side or the

other, that upon the Breaſt ſhall have the ſame differences of ſituation. If there be one upon the Eybrows, the correſpondent mark ſhall be upon the Shoulders; if upon the Noſe, the other ſhall be about the Parts we ſpoke of in the precedent Article; if on the Cheeks, the other ſhall be on the Thighs; if on the Ears, the other ſhall be on the Arms, and ſo of the reſt.

It is certainly impoſſible for a man to conſider the miraculous references of theſe correſpondent marks, and not take occaſion thence, to reflect on the infinite wiſdom of God, who reducing all things to unity, that they may be the more conformable to himſelf, after he had made an abridgment of all the World in man, thought fit to make an Epitome of man in his own Face. For it cannot be affirm'd, that this correſpondence, whereof we ſpeak, is ſimply in thoſe marks, ſince they are all fram'd of one and the ſame matter, and conſequently, they cannot have any more reference to one then to another: But it muſt of neceſſity be in the parts themſelves, and that the aſſociation there is between them ſhould be the cauſe, that one cannot have a mark imprinted on it, but the correſpondent member muſt at the ſame time undergo the ſame impreſſion. Accordingly we find, beſides the ſecret concurrence they may have together, a ſenſible aud manifeſt rapport and reſemblance in their ſituation and ſtructure. For the Breaſt, which is that part of the Body, below the Head, which is moſt bony and moſt flat before, is exactly anſwerable to the Forehead, which hath the ſame qualities. The parts neceſſary to Generation are in the midſt of the Body, with a certain prominency, as the Noſe is in the midſt of the Face. The Thighs, which are very fleſhy, and ſideling, have a

refe-

reference to the Cheeks, which have the same situation. The Ey-brow is answerable to the Shoulders by reason of the eminency remarkable in both; the Ear, to the Arm, as being both on the sides, and as it were out of play; and so of the rest. Yet is it not to be inferr'd hence, that this resemblance is the true source of the said sympathy; no, it is not sufficiently adjusted, and exact enough, to produce effects so like; and it is necessary, that there should be some more secret tye and connexion, whereby these parts might be so associated among themselves as they are, and which may be the principal cause of that miraculous Harmony which is found among them, whereof these natural Characters are the irreproachable witnesses.

Art. 7.

Whence the Lines of the Forehead proceed.

THe Forehead is, no doubt, that part of the Face, wherein *Metoposcopy* finds most work to busie it self about, and where it meets with the greatest number of those Signs, upon which it makes its judgments, which are therefore the more certain, in regard there is a greater diversity of the said marks, and that they are the more apparent in that part then in any other. And this is also the reason, why it hath taken the name it bears from that part, as such as it looks upon as the most considerable and most necessary.

For certainly, he who shall make it his business to observe, that in so narrow a space, which should naturally be smooth and even, there is fram'd so great

a variety of lines, points, and irregular figures; That of these, some start out, as it were, of a sudden, and others vanish, and are blotted out; That some are more deep, others more superficial; some shorter, some longer; some pale, and others in a manner betraying a certain colour; That there are not any two men in the world, in whom they are alike; And lastly, that all this diversity of lines may be observ'd in the same person; He, I say, who shall take a particular notice of all these things, will have just occasion to believe, that there is in the Forehead some secret which is not known to men, and that the impressions made therein have nobler and higher causes then any that are in Animals.

And indeed, upon examination, it will be found, that all the reasons which may be alleged for this diversity of Lines, cannot be deduc'd, but either from Motion, which gives a certain fold or wrinkle to the skin where it hath been often accustomed to be made, as it happens in the joynts; or from Drought, which causes a contraction of the skin and wrinkles, as may be seen in fruits, that have been long kept, and in the furrows and wrinkles which old Age spreads into all the parts.

But there is no probability, that the Lines of the Forehead should be the effects of the motion which it is wont to suffer, since they are different in all men, who nevertheless move that part after the same manner. For all persons have the same manner of dilating and contracting the Forehead; every one hath the same muscles purposely design'd for those motions; And Nature inspires into every one the same motives, upon which they ought to be made.

Some may haply affirm, that the Consistency of the

the skin is the cauſe of that diverſity, and according to its being more thin or thick, the folds are more or leſs eaſily made in it. But are there not abundance of perſons, who have the ſame conſtitution of Skin, wherein yet there is not any line like one the others? Are there not ſome, whoſe skin is very delicate and thin, wherein there is not any to be ſeen? And are there not alſo thoſe, who have it thick, which yet is full of them?

Nor can it be maintain'd, on the other ſide, that Drought is the cauſe of theſe Lines, ſince it may be obſerv'd, that ſome children of a ſanguine Conſtitution, have more of them then ſome decrepid old men; And that it is found they are not alike in old people, though, 'tis poſſible, the Drought may have been equal. Beſides, I would fain know, it being ſuppos'd that this quality ſhould be the cauſe of theſe impreſſions, whence it comes, that young people, who have wrinkles in their Foreheads, have not any in the other parts? And why thoſe which old Age imprints on the other parts of the skin, are alike in all men, and are not ſo in the Forehead.

Yet it is not to be inferr'd, but that Motion and Drought contribute very much thereto, but with this caution, that they do not occaſion the firſt draughts of them, and only promote their ſooner, or more remarkable appearance. There is ſome other Cauſe, which draws the firſt deſign of them, and, as a Maſter-builder, takes the firſt meaſures thereof, and begins the ſtructure; which is afterwards compleated, by the contributory labours of other workmen. For, to be ſhort, all the Lines are deſign'd on the Forehead, even from the very birth, though they do not immediately appear there, but diſcover themſelves

ſelves after a certain time, ſometimes ſooner, ſometimes later; ſometimes they are deeper, ſometimes more ſhallow and ſuperficial, according to the efficacy of the Cauſe, whereby they are imprinted, and conſonantly to the nature of the Temperament of every particular perſon, and the motions of the Forehead whereto he is accuſtomed. Since it is not to be doubted, but that a man often tranſported with anger, or ſuch a one as is of a froward peeviſh diſpoſition, is wont to bend or knit his brows, that is, to frown, and by that means cauſes certain folds in the Forehead, which contraction makes the Lines drawn therein to appear ſooner, and more remarkably, then they would have done otherwiſe.

Since then it is to be inferr'd, from what hath been deliver'd, that the firſt impreſſion of theſe Lines is not to be attributed to any Cauſe aſſignable within the Body, we muſt endeavour to find one without it; And whereas there are undeniable proofs, that there are certain Planets, which have the government and direction of ſome particular members, wherein they produce ſuch effects, as cannot proceed from any thing elſe; It muſt be concluded thence, that the lines of the Forehead are of that rank, and that they cannot be imprinted there, but by ſome one of thoſe celeſtial Bodies, under whoſe government that part is.

There are therefore two things to be taken into our preſent examination; the one, What Planets they are, which have the government of the Forehead; the other, What Reaſons and Experiences there are, whereby the ſaid direction may be confirm'd.

Art.

Art. 8.

What particular Planet hath the government of the Forehead.

AS to the former Queſtion, there is ſome difficulty in it, by reaſon of the ſeveral opinions of thoſe, who have written of that Science. For ſome of them do make the Forehead ſubject to one particular Planet; others are perſuaded, that all of them have a certain government of it. But theſe latter are not agreed among themſelves, as to the ſituation of them in it, as we ſaid elſewhere. Had they brought any proofs to make good what they advance, 'twere rational we ſhould ſubmit to their deciſions: But having not produc'd any, we are left at liberty to make our own choice, and, after ſo many experiences, as we have ſeen confirm'd upon other principles, we may reject theſe, and ſtand to ſuch as are maintain'd upon better grounds.

We conceive it therefore more probable, that the Forehead ſhould be govern'd by one particular Planet, rather then by all together, in as much as all the other parts of the Face, which are more noble, and of greater advantage then that, have each of them but one of thoſe Stars, whereto they are ſubject. For if there be a correſpondence and ſympathy between the parts of the Body, and that thoſe between which there is ſuch a correſpondence are govern'd by the ſame Planets, it being ſuppos'd that all the Planets have ſome government of the Forehead, it muſt follow, that every part of the Forehead, wherein any

Planet is placed, ſhould correſpond with the other Members, over wich the ſame Planet governs: And whereas the Moles, diſpers'd up and down ſeveral parts of the Body, are the certain marks of that ſympathy, it will be accordingly requiſite, that thoſe, which happen in the Forehead, ſhould denote others on all the Members govern'd by thoſe Stars. Now, it is clear, that they have not any correſpondence, but with thoſe on the Breaſt; And conſequently the Forehead muſt be ſubject only to that Planet, which commands the Breaſt. And whereas thoſe two, *viz.* the Forehead and Breaſt are the moſt bony parts of the whole Body, and that all the Bones are under the direction of *Saturn*, as we are taught by Aſtrology, it follows, that the ſaid Planet hath its particular ſeat in the Forehead.

But if that be not granted, this at leaſt will be very probable, that if there be any place more noble then another in the ſaid part, it muſt be that wherein the ſaid Star acts moſt powerfully, and in which it imprints the Lines, which are the effects and marks of its power. And in that caſe, the Line which is directly in the midſt of the Forehead belongs to *Saturn*, ſince the middle is as it were the centre and principle of the extremities.

From this Ratiocination, it may be deduc'd, that the Syſteme of the Phyſiognomiſt I ſpoke of before, is better grounded, then that of the ordinary *Metopoſcopy*, and that beſides the Line of *Saturn*, which is in the midſt of the Forehead, and that which ſeems to be moſt proper and natural thereto, all the others ſerve only to denote the rapports and aſpects, which there might be, between *Saturn*, and the other Planets.

But

But how ever the case stands, he attributed, to the said Planet, those lines, after a manner different from that which is commonly us'd. For he assign'd to *Mercury* that which is immediately under that of *Saturn*, and that above it, to *Mars*; the next to *Venus*, and the uppermost to *Jupiter*; and, on the lowest, which are just over the Eye-brows, he placed the *Sun* and *Moon*. And according to the constitution which each of them had, he judg'd of the Aspects, between *Saturn* and those Planets, in the Horoscope, which proceeding prov'd consonant to the calculation of Judiciary Astrologie. So that, according to his judgment, all those lines belong'd as much, or more, to *Saturn*, then to those other Planets, and depriv'd him not of the absolute government he ought to have of the Forehead.

Upon which account I cannot forbear affirming, that the said person had so exact a knowledge of this Art, that he found in it certain Rules, whereby to discover the day and hour of the Nativity; And that I my self, having made use thereof, fail'd not above ten times at the most, in an hundred judgments, that I made of it. Now, if the Science may arrive to that pitch, there is hardly any one but will conclude, that it will be able to make good its promises, in the discovery of things less obscure and abstruse, such as are the dispositions of the noble parts, the Inclinations, and manners of Men.

But to produce any other reasons of all these particulars, then the experiences which the Art it self hath thereof, is a thing not in the power of Philosophy, which, it seems, hath been negligent in making such Philosophical observations as might have rendred the truth thereof more manifest. Let it not however be account-

accounted an inconsiderable assistance, that she hath given us some light, to discover, that some parts of the Face are under the direction of certain Planets. Let us now see, whether she will help us, to shew, that *Jupiter* hath the government of the Cheeks.

Art. 9

That Jupiter *hath the government of the Cheeks.*

NOr will it be any hard matter for our said Directress, Philosophy, to satisfy us, that *Jupiter* hath the goverment of the Cheeks, if it be true, that the Liver is under his jurisdiction. For, as those parts are the most fleshie, and most sanguine of any about the Face, and such, as wherein the alterations of the Liver and Bloud are sooneſt and most evidently apparent; so is there not any doubt to be made of it, but that they are under the same direction, as the other. Besides that, the Moles which are seen on the Cheeks, denote others on the Thighs, which have a correspondency to the Cheeks, and are govern'd by the Sign *Sagittary*, wherein is the House of *Jupiter*. For we have shewn in the precedent Discourse of *Chiromancy*, that the Astrologers have learn'd of *Hippocrates*, to distribute the Veins to all the exteriour parts of man's body, according to the correspondence, and sympathy, there is between the said parts.

Art.

Art. 10.

That Mercury *hath the like government over the Ears.*

THere is ſome difficulty to know, whether *Mercury* hath the government of the lips, as ſome affirm, or whether *Mars* hath the conduct thereof. But there is a greater probability, that the Ears are the parts govern'd by *Mercury*, in regard the Moles, to be ſeen on them, have others, correſpondent to them, on the Arms, between which and them there is a ſympathy. Now, it is a thing generally acknowledg'd in Aſtrology, that *Mercury* hath the government of the Arms, and that the Sign *Gemini*, wherein he hath eſtabliſh'd his principal Houſe and his exaltation, does alſo govern thoſe parts.

Art. 11.

That Mars *hath the government of the Lips.*

MOreover, there is correſpondence between the Lips and the Belly, and the Moles to be ſeen on the former denote others on the Latter, which is under the direction of *Mars*. Add to this, that the Lips are ulcerated in Tertian Fevers, which no doubt proceed from Choler, which is under the government of that Planet. And this is an obſervation, which deſerves to be exactly conſider'd in this place. For this ulceration being critical, and in a manner proper to thoſe

those kinds of Fevers, it must needs be inferr'd, that there is a particular sympathy between the Lips, and the humour, which is the source of the disease, and that thence proceeds its fastning on that part, rather then any other whatsoever. I am,

SIR,

Your most humble, and

most affectionate Servant,

LA. CHAMBRE.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

What Judgment is to be made of Chiromancy and Metoposcopy.

WHat we have deliver'd in the two precedent Discourses is all we can say upon a Subject which hath not yet come under the examination of Philosophy. For though there have been some great Wits, who have addicted themselves very much to the study of *Chiromancy* and *Metoposcopy*, yet is there not any one of them, that hath taken the pains to produce the least reason, to maintain the principles thereof.

Not that I am absolutely of opinion, that those, which I have made use of, are such as may satisfie either the expectation which some may have conceiv'd thereof, or yet the severity which Philosophy observes in these matters. To give them their just desert, they are only conjectures and light presumptions; but with this encouragement, that we must expect to run some hazard in the disquisition of natural things, since there are so few of them, wherein Demonstrations and convincing proofs can find any place.

For, what advantages soever we may have in order to

to the discovery of man, we shall find it still a work of so much delicacy, aud wherein there are so many several pieces to be consider'd, that the number of those we are ignorant of, very much exceeds that of those which we know. And whereas he is in effect a little World, it may accordingly be affirm'd, that we are as little acquainted with the things which are abbreviated in him, as those whereof the great World consists, which are wholy conceal'd from our knowledge.

The Head is, no doubt, the Epitome of the whole Heaven; it hath its Constellations and Intelligences as well as the other. But if we observe the Stars, their situation and their motion, and yet not know what their Nature is, nor why they are so dispos'd; the same thing may be said of all the parts of the Face. For, not to speak any thing of the figure of those, which are the most considerable, the Lines that are in the Forehead, and about the Eyes; the strokes and features which are of each side of the Nose, and those that compass the mouth, and a hundred other Lineaments, which diversifie that Part, and make it unlike in all men; All this, I say, is easily discover'd, and as easily imagin'd, that Nature hath not done it without some design. But the manner, after which she does it, and the end, whereto she designs it, are not yet fully known: For the Observations which have been made upon that account, have made but a weak discovery thereof, the number of them being not considerable enough, nor they made with that strictness and exactness they ought to have been. Nay, most of those that are found in books are temerarious, and force the Science beyond its just limits. For it must be granted, that the greatest ju-

risdiction

risdiction, that Metoposcopy and Chiromancy can have, reaches no further, then to judge of the Dispositions of the Body, and the natural Inclinations of the Soul, and that, if they pretend to the Confidence of Judicial Astrology, which would fain bring free and contingent actions under its Jurisdiction, they deserve the same contempt, and are lyable to those punishments, which Religion hath alwaies condemn'd the other to.

But if they keep within the limits we have assign'd them, it must be acknowledg'd, that there are some general reasons very favourable to them, and such as evidently shew, that there may be some truth in them. For it cannot be doubted, in the first place, but that the Stars act by vertues, which are different from Light, in as much as all the effects which they produce cannot be attributed only to that quality, and that there is a necessity of having a recourse to to the Influences, to give a reason of the flowing of the Sea, and some diseases, which, without all dispute, follow the motion of the Moon. Secondly, it is as certain, that there are some parts of mans body, over which those Stars have a particular government, and that since the Heart and Brain are of that order, in respect of the Sun and Moon, it is an invincible presumption, that the other noble Parts are govern'd by the other Planets. And lastly, that there is a connexion and correspondence between those parts, and some of the exteriour, whereto they ought to communicate the vertues and qualities, which they have received from the Stars.

Now, from these general Maxims, it follows, that there is a correspondence and sympathy between all the Parts of the Face and Hand, and the Interiour

Parts

parts of the Body, and the Planets, whereby they are governed; And consequently, that there is a possibility of discovering the Dispositions by those latter, and, consequently to that, the Inclinations, which accompany them, by the experience which hath been made of the nature and power which those Starrs have.

I know well enough, that the Enemies of Astrologie laugh at the particular vertues commonly attributed to them: But there is a certain mediocrity to be observ'd, between those, who deprive them of all, and those, who allow them too much. For no man should be so farr self-will'd, as quite to destroy their Influences, for the reason alleged by us; nor, on the other side, so credulous, as to grant them all those vertues, which the vanity of the Judicial part of the Science is so liberal as to give them. Though there be in it a thousand frivolous and ridiculous suppositions; yet may there be also derived from it some rational observations, which require a sincere acknowledgment. When it is taken into consideration, what Agriculture, the Art of Navigation, and Medicine affirm, of the Rising and Setting of the Starrs; When it is seen, that the Horoscope gives so exact a description of the Stature, the Temperament, and the humour of those whose Nativities are examin'd; would it not be an insupportable obstinacy, or rather a blindness of mind, out of pure willfulness, to contest against the vertue of the Starrs, upon which those judgments are made, and, without any reason, to oppose such experiences as have been observ'd an infinite number of times.

For my part, I am so distrustfull of the strength of Humane Understanding, and I find there are so few things in Nature, into which 'tis able to penetrate, that,

if

if Religion had not declar'd free actions to be exempted from all subjection to the power of the Stars, I durſt not, upon the pure Ratiocination of Philoſophy, affirm the contrary. What! We are ignorant of that which we ought to know beſt? Nay, we are yet to learn what it is to *Think*, and know not *how* we think, and yet we ſhall have the temerity to regulate the power and influences of the greateſt, and moſt admirable Bodies that are in the World, and to preſume that thoſe are deceiv'd, who allow them more then we imagine they have?

It ſpeaks therefore greater prudence and moderation, to comply with the common opinion, which attributes, to thoſe Bodies, the direction and government of the principal parts of Man's body, as being ſuch as is confirm'd, by the many obſervations and experiences, which have been made thereof. But it muſt be done with this precaution however, that we ſuffer not our ſelves to be abus'd, by the conſequences which may be deduc'd from this Truth. For we muſt ſo look on it, as not to extend much beyond the principles and grounds of Chiromancy and Metopoſcopy; in as much as particular Rules, which have been built thereon, are either falſe, or uncertain. And indeed, it may confidently be affirm'd, that thoſe Rules which pretend to judge of free and contingent actions, are abſurd and criminal; And that thoſe others, which are limited, and levell'd onely to the diſcovery of corporeal diſpoſitions, are doubtful, as being not ſufficiently confirm'd, by juſt and exact obſervations.

It were therefore to be wiſh'd that ſome perſons had apply'd themſelves more ſeriouſly, then hath yet been done by any, to this curious diſquiſition, in as much as

it would possibly have furnished us with a fuller knowledge of that miraculous harmony which is observable among the parts of man's body, and gave the occasion of its being sometime call'd the *Miracle of Miracles*. Nay, it may be further presum'd, that the Science of Medicine, might have deriv'd some light, and assistance from it, in order to a more exact discovery of the dispositions of the interiour parts, and the making of more certain judgments of the success of Diseases. And lastly, *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* would also have made considerable advantages of such a disquisition, and would have inserted among its own Rules, such as those kinds of Sciences should have supply'd it withall: but with this caution on the other side, as not to permit those other things, which are not onely uncertain, and, upon their ill-groundedness, unmaintainable, but also cry'd down as vain and superstitious, to creep into a design so serious, and so solidly grounded, as that it pretends to. So that, instead of going so farr to find out the Signs, which may discover the Inclinations, the Motions of the Soul, Vertues and Vices, This contents it self with those, which are nearer hand, and more manifest, and such as may be deducible from sublunary Causes.

SECT. I.

Of the several parts which compleat THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

THe said Art then makes account to comprehend all the knowledge it may give, and the several dis-

discoveries it is to make, in Nine general Treatises; whereof,

The First shall contain the Characters of the Passions, in two and twenty Chapters.

The Second, the Character of Vertues and Vices, in an hundred Chapters.

The Third, the Temperaments, in two and fifty Chapters.

The Fourth, the nature of those living Creatures, which contribute any way to the Physiognomy, in twenty nine Chapters.

The Fifth shall treat of the Beauty of Man and Woman, in fifty Chapters.

The Sixth, of the Morality of several Nations, according to the Climates, in sixty Chapters.

The Seventh, Of the Inclinations, proceeding from Age, Fortune, Course of Life, &c. in twenty Chapters.

The Eighth, Of Dissimulation, and the ways how it may be discovered.

The Ninth, and last, shall set in order all the Signs which shall be deduc'd from these great sources; shall shew, as it were, at the first sight, those, which ought to discover every Inclination in particular, every Motion of the Soul, every Vertue, and every Vice, and so compleat and give its utmost perfection to THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

Chap. X.

What qualities are requiſite in that perſon, who would apply himſelf to THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN.

IF Antiquity had reaſon to ſay, That the caſe is the ſame with Sciences, as with Seeds, and Plants, which never bring forth any thing, if they meet not with a ſoil fit for them; it is certain, that there is not any, wherein that Truth may be more evident, then in thoſe Sciences, which pretend to Divination, as being ſuch as will become barren and of no advantage, if they meet not, in their minds who are deſirous to make uſe of them, with the diſpoſitions which are neceſſary thereto. Thence it is, that *Ptolemy* tells us, that it is not ſufficient to know the Rules and Maxims of them, and that if the Student have not the particular *Genius*, which thoſe Sciences require, he will never be able to make a rational judgment. So that before he exerciſe himſelf in *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN*, he ought to know, what that particular *Genius* is, whereof he ſtands in need, as alſo the Qualities he

ſhould

ſhould be Maſter of, to make his advantage of that familiarity.

I ſhall not make the buſineſs more difficult then it is, nor bring in hither all the other Sciences, to keep this Art of ours company. I might ſay, that Medicine and Moral Philoſophy are particularly requiſite thereto; That treating of Climats, and the natures of ſeveral Animals, it cannot well be without Geography, and Natural Philoſophy; That treating further of the Proportions and Figure of parts, it it might ſeem not well able to do it, without Arithmetick and Geometry; And, in fine, that its judgments being grounded on a continual ratiocination, and one of its Rules deriving its name from *Syllogiſm*, it were requiſite, that he, who would apply himſelf thereto, ſhould be an excellent Logician. And no doubt, to proceed further in this conſideration, we may affirm, that there is not any Science, but may be made ſerviceable to this. But there is no neceſſity, that a Man ſhould go and conſult *Hippocrates*, *Ariſtotle*, *Euclid*, and *Ptolemy* to become a Proficient therein, and balking all thoſe ſtudies, that of the preſent work will, in my judgment, be ſufficient to learn It, and to make an advantageous uſe thereof.

But for this latter, I require in him, who would exerciſe himſelf therein, two things, which I cannot abſolutely teach him. One ſhall promote the good uſe he may make of this Science; and the other ſhall prevent his abuſing of it; as ſhall be deduc'd in the two next enſuing Articles.

Art.

Art. I.

Of the Genius *requisite, or in order to the exercise of this Art.*

OF those two things, the former is the particular *Genius* we spoke of, under which denomination, I comprehend all the endowments and qualities, requisite to this Art: For I dissent from those who derive it from the Starrs. It is a fantastick imagination of the Astrologers, to assign to every man two *Genius's*; one to have the presidence of Life, and is such as proceeds from the disposition of the Heavens, at the time of the Nativity; the other, to preside over the profession, which the party is afterwards to follow, and that does not proceed from the general constitution of the Heavens, as the former, but from the particular disposition of some certain Starrs, to which they assign the direction of the Art, and Profession, which a man is to exercise, ; and these they affirm to be *Mars*, *Venus*, and *Mercury*, in the first, seventh, or tenth House. And this is that they call the *Ascendent*, of whose influence this *Genius* is the effect; This is that which the *Platonists* keep so much stirr about, and whose acquaintance and familiarity they so earnestly endeavour to acquire. But these are no better then ridiculous and dangerous Visions, which insinuate a certain false representation of those Truths taught us by Theology, and such as Faith and Philosophy do justly condemn.

For my part, I am of Opinion, that we may say, of this *Genius*, what *Hippocrates* says of the good fortune

fortune of the Physician, that this latter proceeds not from any occult cause, which produces its effects without him, and contrary to his expectation, but is absolutely the effect of his Abilities, and Conduct; And, in a word, that his Prudence makes his own good fortune, and his Patient's. For, without question, the case is the same with the *Genius*, which is necessary for the Art we treat of. It is not some invisible Dæmon, that illuminates the mind, by secret lights and guides, and directs it, in particular discoveries of this Science: But it is a just and exact application of its Rules, or rather that Prudence, which, putting the general Maximes in use, fitly applies them to particular Subjects.

Now, this Prudence proceeds partly from the Nativity, and party from Study and Exercise. From the Nativity do proceed the natural Qualities and Endowments of the Mind, requisite for the exercise of a Habit. This is properly the Εὐφυΐα of the *Greeks*, whichich we may call *good* or *fortunate Discent*, whereof, as *Plato* affirms, there are three kinds; one, proper to Sciences; another, to Manners; and the last, to Arts, such as is that, which *THE ART HOW TO KNOW MEN* does require.

Art. 2.

Of the natural Qualities which are requisite for the exercise of this Art.

THe natural Qualities of the Mind, necessary in order to the exercise of this Art, are strength of Imagination, and soundness of Judgment. For, though Memory be also requisite therein, in regard

there is a neceſſity of remembring many Precepts, a great number of Signs, and the connexion and correſpondence of many things, whereof this Art is full; yet is it certain, that the greateſt burthen lies upon the Imagination and the Judgment. For a man muſt, of a ſudden, frame to himſelf ſeveral Images; he muſt obſerve divers conformable and diſconformable Signs, and afterwards make a compariſon between the one and the other, to diſtinguiſh the ſtronger from the weaker; in which operation, it is out of all doubt, that the Underſtanding and the Judgment are more put to it, than the memory, which hath made its proviſion long before, whereas the others are haſtily ſet on work, and not allow'd the leiſure to prepare themſelves for it.

But to theſe natural Qualities there are yet two other things to be added, Method, and Exerciſe: For the latter brings a man to a certain facility of judging well, which cannot be acquir'd by any other means, and creates a kind of confidence, which may be interpreted an Enthuſiaſm and Divine Diſtraction or Fury in theſe Sciences.

Art. 3.

Of the Method, neceſſary in order to the Exerciſe of this Art.

THe Method we ſpoke of, conſiſts in certain general Rules, which are to be obſerv'd in order to the making of a more infallible judgment. We ſhall here ſet down thoſe we conceive the moſt conſiderable.

The

The First is, That our Artist ought very carefully to examine the Signs, which proceed from the external causes, which of them are transient, and which are common, and not to make any judgment by them.

The Second, One single Sign is not to be thought sufficient to make a judgment of the Inclinations and Habits; but it is requisite there should be more. For it is imprudence, as *Aristotle* affirms, to give credit to one single mark: Ἐνὶ σημείῳ μὴ δεῖν τῶν σημείων μιᾷ.

The Third. When there happen to be contrary Signs, it is requisite a particular Observation be made of the stronger, and the judgment is to proceed according to them. Now, we have given an account of the strength and weakness of Signs, in the Second Chapter of this Second Book.

The Fourth. Our Artist is, above all things, to consider the Temperament of the person, whose humour he would discover, and use it as a Rule whereby he is to measure all the other Signs. For, being the present and inseparable instrument of the Soul, it fortifies, or weakens, the other Signs, proportionably to its conformity or opposition thereto.

The Fifth. It is further requisite, that he strictly examine the strength or weakness of the party's mind; for both these have a great influence over the passions and habits, in as much as most of the passions are rais'd in the Soul, for want of knowing the causes thereof. It is possible one may conceive himself injur'd, when there is not any injury done him; and some other may be seiz'd by an apprehension, who hath no cause to fear. So that upon such occasions, weakness of mind is the cause of those emotions, as, on the other side, soundness of judgment smother them.

The

The Sixth. Whereas it is posible, that vicious Inclinations may be reform'd by ſtudy, and bad education may alter & corrupt the good, it concerns the Artiſt to add, as much as may be, the Moral marks, to the Natural, and endeavour to diſcover by the Words and Actions of the perſon, whoſe humour he would be acquainted with, whether he follows his Inclinations, or hath reform'd them.

Art. 4.

Of the Moderation of Spirit, indiſpenſibly requiſite in the Study of this Art.

NOw, whereas all theſe Rules, and all theſe Obſervations, are very hard to be reduc'd to practice, it muſt be laid down as a thing certain, that it is very eaſie to make many temerarious judgments thereby, and to abuſe this art, if great care be not taken. Therefore among all the Qualities, requiſite in the perſon, who is deſirous to ſtudy it, I wiſh him particularly *Moderation of Spirit*, that he may not be partial or præcipitate in his judgments, and, above all things, not to make any to the diſadvantage of others, but in the ſecret cloſet of his own Heart, ſo as that neither his Tongue, nor their Ears may be witneſſes thereof. Otherwiſe Religion and Prudence would not permit the exerciſe of this noble Science, and, in ſtead of being neceſſary and ſerviceable to Society, it would become its greateſt Enemy.

FINIS.

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